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Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Introduction 
Selling stock to the general public is one important method by which firms 
are able to raise new equity capital. If the firm sells stock for the first time to the 
general public, it is called an initial public offering (IPO). Subsequent to the IPO, 
firms may seek to raise further equity capital by offering to sell new shares 
through a seasoned equity offering (SEO). 
In the UK, most young/small firms initially raise equity capital from a 
small number of investors through private placements. If a firm prospers and 
needs additional equity capital, it may choose at some point to go public by selling 
stock through an IPO. By issuing publicly traded equity, the firm establishes both 
a market value for the firm and a market for its common stock. 
There have been many IPO studies that record the so-called "Underpricing 
anomaly" as a primary stylised fact of IPOs. The underpricing refers to the 
significance increase of the IPO market price over the first few days after the 
initial listing. This fact suggests that the IPO pricing is not simple very few 
information about the issuing firm is available to the market prior to IPO. This 
study is to examine the IPO valuation based on the prospectus information, which 
is perceived as comprehensive information about the firm prior to the IPOs. 
Furthermore, this study is also to observe the impact of the prospectus information 
on the IPO after market performances. 
This chapter introduces the background and the motivation behind the 
study, the research questions, and the organisation of the thesis. 
1.1. IPO Anomalies 
Many studies have documented apparent anomalies in the pricing of initial 
public offerings (IPOs). Several academic hypotheses have been posited to 
explain these anomalies. As mentioned earlier, the so-called `Underpricing 
phenomenon' was the first and most researched IPO anomaly found by scholars. 
The underpricing phenomenon refers to the statistically and economically 
significant positive initial returns characteristic of IPOs over the first few days 
after the initial listing of the shares. Given the large degree of uncertainty 
regarding the true value of the newly listed shares, some significant degree of 
mispricing is to be expected. However, the typically large price increases of IPO 
shares in the immediate post-listing period suggest that IPOs are systematically 
underpriced. Underpricing was first documented in the late 1960s in the US 
market (Reilly and Hatfield, 1969). These authors found that from 53 sample 
firms that went public in 1963-1965, the initial (first-day) return ranged from 18.3 
to 20.2%. Eventually, other researchers also discovered much the same 
underpricing phenomenon in other countries. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996) 
summarise the evidence of IPO underpricing in a large number of countries. (see 
table 1.1). In this study, the underpricing issue is addressed later in the Initial 
returns analysis chapter (Chapter 5). It discusses the impact of the IPO valuation 
(Chapter 4) on the underpricing. 
The second anomaly is the long-run underperformance of IPO shares. This 
phenomenon was first documented by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) who found 
evidence of substantial negative abnormal returns over longer time horizons. By 
examining the IPO prices after the first 250 trading days, they find that on 
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Table 1.1. Comparative evidence of IPO underpricing 
Country Study Sample Period Initial Return 
(%) 
USA' Ibbotson et al (1994) 1960-1992 15.3 
UK2 Jenkinson and Mayer (1988) 1983-1986 10.7 
Australia Lee et al. (1994) 1976-1989 11.9 
Canada Manigart & Rogiers (1992) 1984-1990 13.7 
Finland Keloharju (1993) 1984-1992 14.4 
Germany Ljungqvist (1996) 1970-1993 9.2 
Japan Kaneko and Pettway (1994) 1989-1993 12.0 
Sweden Rydqvist (1993) 1970-1991 39.0 
Brazil Aggarwal et al (1993) 1979-1990 78.5 
Hongkong McGuiness (1992) 1980-1990 17.6 
Malaysia Dawson (1987) 1978-1983 166.6 
Singapore Koh and Walter (1989) 1973-1987 27.0 
Source: Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 
average, IPO prices underperform the market index by 13.73%. It means that 
investors who purchase IPOs on the first trading day and hold them for a period of 
250 trading days would have underperformed the market by 13.73%. Like 
underpricing, the IPO long run underperformance also exists in other markets. 
Levis (1993) claims that in the UK, on average, IPOs underperform the market by 
-8% to -23% on their 3`d anniversaries, depending on the benchmark used. Unlike 
the persistence of the underpricing anomaly, the evidence for the long run 
underperformance is mixed (see table 1.2). There have been several theoretical 
explanations to account for this anomaly, which later are reviewed in the 
Literature review (Chapter 2). 
1 Ritter and Welch (2002) note that during the period 1999-2000, the underpricing level was as 
high as 65.0% on average, as a result of Internet stock IPOs. 
2 In 2000, on average, the level of underpricing in UK markets (Main, Techmark, and AIM) was 
60.1% (Levis, 2001) 
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Table 1.2. Comparative evidence of IPO long run performance 
Country Study Sample period IPO long-run 
abnormal returns 
(%) 
Australia" Lee et al (1996) 1976-1989 -51 
Brazil21 Aggarwal (1994) 1980-1990 -47.0 
Chile2' Aggarwal (1993) 1982-1990 -23.7 
Finland2' Keloharju (1993) 1984-1989 -26.4 
Germane' Loughran & Ljunqvist (1994) 1974-1989 -12.8 
Sweden Loughran & Ljunqvist (1994) 1980-1990 +1.2 
Tunisia2' Ben Naceur (2000) 1992-1997 +5.7 
UKZ' Levis (1993) 1980-1988 -8.1 
US" Loughran & Ritter (1995) 1970-1990 -17.1 
Note: "Source: Ibbotson & Ritter (1995) 
21Source: the corresponding studies 
Similar to the underpricing, this study also presents and discusses the IPO 
long-run performance of the research sample in the IPO long run performance 
analysis (Chapter 6). In particular, this study tries to examine the impact of the 
prospectus information on the IPO long-run performance. The results are expected 
to provide additional information and evidence, such as the impact of the earnings 
forecast on the IPO performances, to what is already included in the existing 
literature. 
The third anomaly is the hot/cold market. This phenomenon was first 
documented in the US by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). According to the efficient 
market hypothesis, the timing of a financing decision should not matter since any 
offering will be fairly priced. This leads to the conclusion that IPOs occur 
randomly over time. However, evidence shows that there are sustained periods 
when the number of offerings is so immense and the volume of trading is very 
heavy. These periods are called `hot issue' markets. On the other hand, evidence 
also records the periods when only very few firms go public and the volume of 
trading is small. These periods are called `cold issue' markets. Although this 
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phenomenon is very interesting, very few explanations have been suggested. This 
study does not intend to examine the hot/cold IPO market; however, a brief 
discussion about the states of the UK market during the research period is 
provided and this discussion will include consideration of the hot/cold 
phenomenon. 
While the evidence for the second and third anomalies (the long-run 
underperformance and hot market) is mixed, scholars have observed the 
persistence of the underpricing. Ritter and Welch (2002) indeed argue that the 
explanations behind the IPO anomalies lie between the offering day and the first- 
trading day. Some studies even suggest that the IPO long-run underperformance is 
a mean reversion of the underpricing (e. g., Ritter, 1991). Other studies also 
examine the relationship between the hot market and the underpricing and find 
that there is a significant difference in the degree of underpricing between the 
`hot' and the `cold' period in the market (e. g., Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975). 
Therefore, it is sensible to draw the focus of the research to the IPO pricing 
process among the market participants (issuers, sponsors, and the investors). This 
issue would be the main objective here. 
This study focuses on the pricing of the IPOs in the UK main market, on 
both the issuers/sponsor level and the market level. It is argued that the IPO 
prospectus information, to some degree, has considerable explanatory power to 
the IPO pricing. This study will contribute to the knowledge of the usefulness of 
the prospectus information to price the IPOs. Later in the research design, it is 
argued that the determining factors affecting both levels of IPO prices may 
explain the underpricing as well as the long-run performance facts. Therefore, this 
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study also may contribute to the knowledge of the impact of the prospectus 
information on the IPO after market performance. 
1.2. The IPO pricing process 
As mentioned above, going public is a very important stage of the life 
cycle of a firm. After deciding to list its shares on the stock exchange, a firm 
should follow a two-stage admission process applied to any firm that want to be 
listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In the first stage, companies need to 
apply to the UK listing Authority (UKLA) for the security to be approved by 
being admitted to the UK Authority's Official List (the UKLA's list of approved 
companies). Then, they also need to apply to the Exchange to be admitted for 
trading. The UKLA has set a number of basic requirements that must be met 
before listing can be granted and the exchange can admit the shares to trading. 
The requirements include the sponsor, trading records, minimum shares in public 
hands, the controlling shareholders, the prospectus, and the continuing 
obligations. 
The estimated timetable for a firm and its sponsors to the admission day is 
shown on the following table (Table 1.3). The table shows that the issuers and the 
sponsors spend some considerable time to set, review, and finalise the offer price 
and the prospectus. Therefore, it is important to examine the IPO pricing process 
and how the issuers and the sponsors use the prospectus for their benefit. 
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Tables 1.3 Time table for the issuers and sponsors to the admission week 
Weeks to the 
admission week 
Events Firms Sponsors 
Appoint advisers   
12-24 weeks Instruct all advisers   
Agree timetable -  
Produce draft prospectus   
Produce other documents in first draft -  
Initial review of pricing issues   
Hold first draft meetings   
6-12 weeks 
Submit draft documents to the UKLA -  
Hold initial meeting with the Exchange   
Review PR presentations   
Host analyst presentations   
Continue draft meetings   
Carry out due diligence   
1-6 weeks Hold PR meetings and roadshows   
Submit documents to the UKLA -  
Bulk print pathfinder prospectus -  
Approval all documents by the UKLA   
Pricing and allocation of the offer   
1 week Register prospectus -  
Sign subscription agreement   
Bulk print final prospectus -  
Make the formal application for listing 
and admission to trading - 
 
ission week Ad 
Pay UKLA and Exchange fees   
m 
Listing and admission to trading granted The UKLA & 
Trading begins Exhange 
Source: A practical guide to listing (LJL, 2UU3) 
According to the UKLA (2003), the IPOs could be offered at a fixed price 
or tender, depending on the flotation methods used. There are three methods of 
flotation; public offer, placing, and introduction3 In a public offer, the adviser 
offers the company's shares to private and/or institutional investors and usually 
arranges for the offer to be underwritten. It is normally the most expensive route 
to market, often used by larger companies or those looking to raise substantial 
amounts of capital. A placing usually involves the offering company's shares to a 
selected base of institutional investors. This allows the firms to raise capital with 
lower costs and greater freedom and it gives the firms more discretion to choose 
its investors (UKLA, 2003). The result, however, is a narrower shareholder base 
and consequently there may be lower liquidity in the shares once a firm has been 
admitted to the markets. In an introduction, the least expensive and easiest of the 
three methods, the company joins our markets without raising any capital. In 
general a company can do this if over 25% of its shares are already in public 
hands and there is a fair spread of shareholders. An introduction involves no 
underwriting fees and little requirement for advertising; the opportunities for 
boosting the company's profile and visibility are, however, more limited. Since 
this study attempts to examine the IPO pricing, which lead to the IPO anomalies, 
this flotation method is considered not to be suitable for this study. Therefore, 
IPOs that flotate with this method are excluded from the research sample. 
In conjunction to the IPO pricing, in public offer IPOs, the shares could be 
offered at fixed price and/or tender. In a fixed price offer, the sponsor (and the 
3 Under the previous listing rules, the methods of flotation for equities are offer for sale, offer for 
subscription, placing, and introduction. The public offer method includes the offer for sale and 
offer for subscription methods (FSA, 2002) 
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issuer) fixes the offer price about a week before the admission date and undertakes 
the distribution of the shares at this price. In a tender offer, the offer price is set in 
a certain range and investors are invited to bid4. Except in privatisations, most 
public offer IPOs in the UK market use the fixed price method. In that case, 
applications for the public offer are invited from the public; the issue is also sub- 
underwritten, at the same price, by a group of financial institutions. The IPOs 
brought to market by the placing method are usually offered at a fixed price. The 
sponsor underwrites the entire issue for a short period and distributes them to 
specified persons or its clients. Although it has not yet been a popular method in 
the UK, there is an increasing trend to use the book-building approach. This 
approach is used extensively for IPOs in a number of markets, such as the US 
markets. Basically, the IPO final offer price is set up after examining the market 
demand during the `roadshow' period. This study includes the IPOs that are 
brought to the market by this method. 
Although the IPO offer price categorisation is clearly described, the setting 
of the initial IPO offer price has been a challenging intersection between valuation 
theory and practise. While classic Finance theory suggests the use of discounted 
cash flow (DCF) as the conceptual foundation of valuation (see Brealey and 
Myers, 2002), McCarthy (1999) argues that the most common IPO pricing method 
used by issuers and sponsors is the comparable firm multiples methods. 
Additionally, Kim and Ritter (1999) find that estimating future cash flows and 
discount rates for IPOs are imprecise, suggesting that the DCF method appears to 
be used very little by the practitioners. This study particularly employs the 
° The privatisation of British Airports Authority (BAA) in 1987 was split into two categories with 
regard to pricing: (1) 75% of the equity was offered at fixed price and (2) 25% of the equity was a 
tender offer to institutional investors. 
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accounting-based valuation model. This model is widely used in the non-IPO 
cases (e. g., Easton and Harris, 1991, Rees, 1999, Francis et al., 1999) to 
investigate the value relevance of the accounting numbers. The evidence shows 
that the accounting-based valuation model works very well. To the researcher's 
knowledge, very few IPO studies use the accounting-based valuation model. Kim 
and Ritter (1999) indeed mention the Ohlson's model; yet, they do not use it as the 
research model. Keasey and McGuiness (1992) examine the usefulness of the 
forecasted earnings disclosed in the prospectus; however, they do not include 
other fundamental variables, such as book value of equity and dividend. This 
study develops the research models based on the accounting-based valuation 
model, which includes the important firm fundamentals, such as earnings, book 
value of equity, and dividend. 
Since the IPO could be priced with any method, the circumstance is even 
more difficult for the investors to value the offer. Assuming that the issuing firms 
and their sponsors know better about the firm's value, the UKLA requires the 
firms to publish the prospectus, which complies with the Listing Rules. 
1.3. The offering prospectus 
The UKLA expects that the prospectus provides potential investors with 
the information they need to make an informed decision on the firm and its shares. 
Besides the information of the offer, the prospectus should also cover general 
information of the firms and the audited financial statements for minimum the last 
3 years audit. It is expected that such information could be used to estimate the 
firm's value on the date of the IPO. However, the issuers and sponsors could also 
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exploit the prospectus as a media to signal important insider information. Having 
assumed that the firm and its sponsor have better knowledge of the firm's value 
than other market participants, the IPO signalling theory argues that the good 
firms use some variables to signal the value and the prospectus is a very good 
media to send the signals. 
The information of the offer includes the advisers (sponsor, brokers, 
auditor, and PR), the offer price, the number of shares sold at the IPO and the 
percentage to the enlarged total shares, the use of the proceeds, and the 
management forecasts. Such information is very important to the investors as well 
as the issuers. Since prior studies shows the effectiveness of the agent reputation 
to the IPO valuation (e. g., Byrne and Rees, 1996), disclosing the group of the 
adviser is a way chosen by the firms to signal their value. The other thing is the 
voluntary disclosure of the management forecasts. The rational of disclosing such 
information is that the firms try to persuade investors to value the IPO as a firm 
after the IPO (with proceeds as additional fund to the firms). Therefore, variables 
such as pro-forma book value of equity and the earnings forecasts have been 
widely used in the IPO prospectus. However, this kind of practice is prohibited in 
the tighter legal environment market, such as in the US. 
The other information disclosed in the prospectus is the nature and 
organisation of the business. It is important for the investors to know the nature of 
the business of the issuing firms. Therefore in the US market, the Securities and 
Exchange Committee (SEC) requires the issuing firms to disclose the business 
risk statement in the prospectus. This is aimed to inform the investors thoroughly 
about the natural business risk faced by the firms that could affect the post-IPO 
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firm's performance. Furthermore, in practice, the issuing firms even highlight the 
high business risk by using the bold type face of the statement (Klein, 1996)). 
Prior studies also show that the share performance varies across different 
industries, hence knowing the business of the firms enables investors to value the 
IPO better. 
The third part of the prospectus is the firm's financial statement for the last 
3 years. Although some studies in non-IPO shares find that the historic accounting 
information has little explanatory power to the shares performance, Klein (1996) 
finds that such information could be used to price the IPOs. Moreover, the 
financial statements could provide the accounting-based risk assessment. 
Bildersee (1970) argues that the accounting data can be considered as a summary 
of all company events and decisions. So, it summarises, in some form, information 
basic to the measurement of total risk associated with the firm and with the 
securities supporting firm. 
The data of this study relies heavily on the information disclosed in the 
offering prospectus. A number of variables are chosen as proxies to the prospectus 
information. Furthermore, the information is categorised into fundamentals, ex- 
ante risk factors, and signals. The fundamentals, here, is defined as the accounting 
fundamentals, such as earnings and book value of equity. In most UK IPO 
prospectuses, the issuers/sponsors try to draw the potential investors' attention to 
the future accounting fundamentals. This is demonstrated by highlighting the 
information regarding the earnings forecasts and the pro-forma book value of 
equity in the offering information, which is presented on the very first page of the 
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prospectus. Therefore, in particular, this study investigates the impact of the 
accounting fundamentals on the IPO pricing. 
The next prospectus information category is the ex-ante risk factors. There 
have been a number of business risk models developed by academics and 
practitioners. Arthur Andersen developed the so-called `Arthur Andersen Business 
Risk Model' (AABRM) in 1997. The model is usually used to assess the business 
risks of their clients. ICAEW (1998) used the AABRM as a framework for their 
research on financial reporting of risk of the newly listed firms, in which they try 
to assess the business risks of the firms through their IPO prospectuses. The 
AABRM includes 55 risk factors. However after a systematic content analysis 
through the IPO prospectuses of the sample for this study, only 5 risk factors that 
are consistently reported in the documents. Therefore, since only 5 out of 55 risk 
factors identified in the AABRM are employed in this study, it does not claim the 
AABRM framework is used, although, the terms and definitions of the risk factors 
used here are adopted from the AABRM. The literature review chapter presents a 
discussion on the risk concept and measures, on which this study tries to develop 
the proxies to the risk factors used, as defined in the AABRM. 
The other prospectus information examined in this study is the signals. 
Potentially, the issuers/sponsors value the signals as importantly as the accounting 
fundamentals, since they place the signal information, such as the sponsor name, 
and the percentage of equity sold at the IPO in the first section of the prospectus. 
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1.4 The scope of research 
Having highlighted the persistence of the underpricing fact in the IPO 
market, this study focuses on the IPO valuation. It could be argued that the 
underpricing phenomenon is a result of the decisions made by the market 
participants during the period between the admission day and the first trading day. 
Ritter and Welch (2002) also encourage other scholars to focus on the IPO early 
pricing, as they argue the IPO anomalies are the result of events between the day 0 
and day 1. The IPO pricing process has been examined in section 1.2 above and 
also the role of prospectus as the investors' main source of the firm's information 
prior to the IPO. 
Klein (1996) examines the importance of the prospectus to price the IPOs. 
She finds that accounting information, such as the earnings, is strongly related to 
both the offer price and the first-day market price. However, Kim and Ritter 
(1999) do not find a similar result; instead they find that the future earnings 
figures explain more of the variations in the IPO prices than the historical figures. 
Using the data from thinner markets (Singapore and Korea), Firth et al. (1995) 
and Firth (1998) find a robust relationship between the management earnings 
forecasts and the IPO valuation. 
Keasey and McGuiness (1991) examine the relationship between the 
management earnings forecasts in the prospectus and the pricing of IPOs in the 
USM. They find that the prospectus earnings forecasts are significantly more 
accurate than time-series forecasts. Additionally, they find a positive association 
between the information content of the earnings forecasts to the IPO market price, 
although no significant relationship is found to the offer price. 
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Having examined the IPO prospectus in the UK main market, it could be 
argued that the issuers and their sponsors have a tendency to disclose and 
emphasize the fundamental accounting information, such as the management 
earnings forecasts, the pro-forma book value of equity, and the dividend forecasts 
in the prospectus. Therefore, this study attempts to analyse the role of the 
fundamental information disclosed in the prospectus in the IPO valuation (Chapter 
4). 
Prior studies also show that the IPO underpricing is positively related to 
uncertainty. However, the measure of uncertainty itself has been a long-standing 
debate in the research area. Most IPO studies examining the uncertainty employ 
an ex-post measure, such as the variance of the IPO market prices for the first 5 
days (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Very few studies employ ex-ante measures, such 
as the business risk (Klein, 1996). This study tries to propose new measures for 
the ex-ante uncertainty by employing accounting-based risk measures. Beaver et 
al. (1970) argue that the accounting measures are used widely by investors as 
proxies for company risk. Thus, accounting measures reflect both the systematic 
and unsystematic risk. By combining the offer information and the historical 
financial statement data in the prospectus, this study develops a number of risk 
factors, which could be used as proxies for company risk. 
Other important information in the prospectus is the signals, which are 
defined as the firm's decision as to its advisers, the time for when to go public, 
and the ownership structure. The relationship between the signals and the IPO 
valuation and performance has been examined by other scholars, as discussed later 
in the Literature review chapter. The results vary across the markets, time periods, 
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and the proxies used. This study includes those variables in the assessment of the 
IPO valuation. 
The IPO valuation is defined as the IPO pricing at the firm and market 
level. First, this study investigates the valuation of the IPO offer price. Very few 
IPO studies have examined the offer price valuation (Klein, 1996; Beatty et al., 
2002). To my knowledge, none has been done using the UK market. Hence, this is 
one of the study's contributions to the research area. Most IPO valuation studies 
try to analyse the determining factors of the initial market price. This study also 
examines the valuation of the initial market price. By doing so, it is expected the 
results may highlight the different explanatory power of prospectus information, if 
any, on both prices (the offer and initial market prices). Then, any different 
behaviour of any prospectus information may explain the `mispricing' of IPO, 
which is commonly known as the underpricing 
Prior studies in the UK have found evidence of the long run 
underperformance following IPOs. This study extends the analysis by 
investigating the impact of the prospectus information to the IPO performance in 
the long run. In doing so, the analysis also attempts to examine whether the IPO 
`mispricing' in the early days of trading affect the IPO long-run performance. 
1.5. Research methodology and method 
This study consists of three empirical studies that are categorised in the 
positivist methodology. The simplification process is used by developing two 
main empirical models; the IPO valuation model and the IPO performance model. 
The IPO valuation model adopts the accounting-valuation model as the basic 
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theoretical model. This comes as another contribution of the study. To the 
researcher's knowledge, no prior IPO valuation study has used the accounting- 
based valuation model. The model has been widely used for seasoned and found 
to work very well. Therefore, this study is a test of the model of whether it 
performs well with the IPO sample. Then, the model is developed to several 
empirical models by including other prospectus information, such as the risk 
factors and signals. The IPO performance model is the OLS regression model that 
is modified into a number of operating models. 
The sample of 161 IPOs is taken from the UK main market during period 
1987-1997. The sample is the IPO that are brought to market by public offer and 
(or) placing methods. The information of fundamentals, risk factors, and signals 
are drawn from the IPO prospectus. 
1.6 Research questions and hypotheses 
This study examines the IPO valuation and performance in the UK main 
market during the 1987-1997 period. It is argued that at the admission day (To) the 
issuers/sponsors set up the IPO offer price based, partially, on the prospectus 
information (fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and signals). Then, it is also 
observed whether the `initial' investors/brokers use the prospectus information to 
value the IPO on the first trading day (T1). This objective leads to the first 
research question: Is the prospectus information useful to price the IPOs? 
Then this study investigates whether the `mispricing' is identified on Ti. If 
there is any mispricing, a further examination is carried out to observe whether it 
is due to the different perception towards the prospectus information or to the 
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unobservable factor, which is defined as the error terms of the IPO valuation at To. 
This argument leads to the second research questions: Does the prospectus 
information have a predictive power towards the IPO short run performance? 
Based on the IPO literature, which finds the persistence of the 
underpricing, this study also argues that if the issuers/sponsors underprice the 
IPOs relatively to the accounting fundamental, the greater the valuation residuals, 
the lower the initial returns5. Therefore it is hypothesised that the initial returns is 
negatively related to the valuation residuals. 
Prior studies also provide evidence of the IPO underperformance in the 
long run, which is also examined in this study. It is expected that the prospectus 
information has limited impact on the IPO long run performance since other 
information is available in the market to price the IPOs. The IPO long run 
performance, here, is defined as the abnormal returns for the investors, who buy 
the IPOs at day 2 and hold them up to the 15`, 2nd, and 3rd listing anniversary. This 
argument leads to the third research question: Does the prospectus information 
still have any impact on the IPO long run performance? 
Many IPO studies find that the IPOs, which are less underpriced, perform 
better in the long run. This suggests that in the long run, the market correct any 
mispricing identified in the short run. This study posits the similar hypothesis, 
which expects a negative association between the initial returns and the long run 
abnormal returns. 
5 Valuation residual is defined as the difference between the actual offer price and the model 
predicted offer price. The initial returns is defined as the percentage of the price changes from the 
offer price to the initial market price on the close of the first trading day. 
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A number of IPO studies attempt to examine the relationship between the 
IPO valuation and the underpricing phenomenon (Welch, 1989; Klein, 1996; 
Byrne and Rees, 1996, Beatty et al., 2002). Other studies try to investigate the 
IPO underpricing and the long run performance (Ritter, 1991; Levis, 1993). This 
study analyses the three different aspects of IPO valuation: the initial valuation, 
the underpricing, and the long run performance, which comes as a unique 
contribution of this study. 
A summary of the research main hypotheses and the research method used 
is presented in a diagram in Figure 1.1 below. 
1.7. Organisation of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter is the 
literature review. The chapter critically reviews the influential papers on the IPO 
studies, particularly for the IPO valuation and performance. It also discusses a 
number of leading papers on the accounting-based risk measures. 
The literature review is followed by the research design chapter, which 
describes how this study is carried out. First, it introduces the theoretical models 
and is followed by the empirical models used in this study. This is followed by a 
discussion of the working hypotheses development. After that, the research 
sample derivation is explained. Finally, the chapter is closed by a brief 
presentation of the UK institutional framework. 
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The next three chapters provide a discussion of the empirical results. The 
first empirical chapter presents the analysis of the IPO valuation. Firstly, it 
discusses the descriptive statistics of all variables employed in the valuation 
model. It continues with a discussion of the empirical results of the IPO valuation 
models. It also includes a section of sensitivity analysis, which examines the 
sensitivity of the IPO valuation models to the choice of measures (proxies). This 
chapter aims to answer the first research question: Is the prospectus information 
useful to price the IPOs? 
The second empirical chapter includes the discussion of the result of the 
IPO short run performance model. It presents the evidence of the underpricing in 
the research sample. Furthermore, it aims to answer the second research question 
- Does the prospectus information have a predictive power towards the IPO 
short run performance? - and provides a discussion on what drives the 
underpricing. The final empirical chapter addresses the third research questions - 
Does the prospectus information still have any impact on the IPO long run 
performance? - and demonstrates the discussions of the result of the IPO long 
rung performance. Splitting the sample into the privatisation vs non-privatisation 
sub-samples, and survivors vs non-survivors sub-samples, provides evidence of 
the different IPO long run performance. Moreover, the chapter also includes a 
discussion of the factors that are related to the IPO long run performance. 
Finally, the summary, conclusion and the possible future research are 
presented in the last chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Chapter 2, 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
The previous chapter provides a brief overview of the research area of the 
Initial Public Offerings (IPO), particularly of its three well-known anomalies. In 
the first edition of their book on "going public", Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996) 
predict that IPOs would continue to be the subject of intense academic debate. Five 
years later, in their second edition (2001), they show how the research on IPOs has 
taken a number of significant steps forward over the years. 
This chapter reviews a wide range of significant IPO literatures. Firstly, it 
will evaluate the IPO anomaly literatures. This is followed by a discussion of IPO 
valuation. Finally, this chapter will review some studies of firm specific risk and 
its relation to IPO valuation and performance. 
2.1. The underpricing anomaly 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there have been many studies 
investigating the three well-known IPO anomalies. The first anomaly found is the 
underpricing phenomenon. Reilly and Hatfield (1969) are the first scholars who 
document the underpricing in new issues. They find that from 53 sample firms 
that went public in the US during 1963-1965, the initial return range from 18.3% to 
20.2%. After that, there have been other studies, which find similar results using 
different time periods and samples (e. g., McDonald and Fischer, 1972; Logue, 
1973; Neuberger and Hammond, 1974). Following those, many studies record the 
positive initial return of the IPOs in a large number of countries, as summarised by 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) (see table 1.1 in chapter 1). 
However, it is Ibbotson (1975) who, among the firsts, provides a 
comprehensive explanation of the underpricing evidence. He attempts to measure 
initial performance of new issues and to examine the aftermarket performance to 
test for departures from market efficiency. The result is six possible explanations 
for the observed underpricing in the IPO market. They are: 
1. Underwriters are required by US securities regulation to price the IPOs below 
their expected value. 
2. It may be issuers that underprice IPOs intentionally in order to `leave a good 
taste in investors' mouths' to make subsequent offering at attractive price. 
3. Underpricing may be the result of underwriters' colluding to favour their 
investor clients. 
4. Underpricing is used to reduce the risk that underwriters bear, if their 
commissions are not enough to cover the risk. 
5. There may be some undisclosed mechanism by which investors compensate 
issuers for the discount on offering price. 
6. Underpricing may serve as a form of insurance to protect issuers and 
underwriters from lawsuit. 
However, he concludes that all of these suggested explanations are 
inadequate as they involved `unknown legal constraints, needlessly complicated 
indirect compensation schemes, or irrational behaviour'. 
Additionally, in their recent paper, Loughran and Ritter (2002) explain that 
the IPOs, which leave so much money on the table, are generally those, whose the 
offering price and market prices are higher than had originally been anticipated. 
Thus, the issuers losing wealth are simultaneously discovering they are wealthier 
than they expected to be. Their explanation emphasises the covariance of issuers' 
loss and the changes in their wealth. 
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Since Ibbotson's paper (1975), many models have been developed to 
explain the underpricing anomaly. Several noble models attract scholars to 
undertake further investigations. The discussions of them are presented next 
2.1.1. The Winner's Curse Hypothesis 
The most popular model was developed by Rock (1986). This study offers 
a theoretical analysis of the IPO underpricing. In his model, he assumes that 
underpricing is the result of information asymmetry among market participants. 
He argues that among the market participants, investors have superior information 
about new issues. Investors themselves can be split into two categories regarding 
the information that they hold. Investors who have more information are called the 
informed investors (II) and investors who hold less information are called 
uninformed investors (UI). As a consequence of this asymmetry, Its compete with 
UIs only for `good' issues, creating an adverse selection mechanism in which UIs 
obtain `bad' issues with greater probability. Thus, `good' issues will have excess 
demand, and `bad' issue will have excess supply. In the IPO, if an offering faces 
excess demand, the shares will be distributed to investors by rationing. Since Its 
can differentiate the quality of issues from the beginning, they register a `good' 
issue earlier. Thus the Uls receive disproportionate levels of `bad' issues. This 
condition is well known as winner's curse. Therefore, in order to induce Uls' 
participation in the market, issuers underprice their IPOs deliberately. In other 
words, participation by UIs must require underpricing. 
Nevertheless, this conclusion itself is insufficient to explain why 
underpricing actually occurs. First, reducing the price results in offer proceeds 
falling, which in turn increases IIs' demand for a larger portion of the offering. 
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This increases adverse selection, discouraging Uls from placing orders. Second, it 
can be argued whether price decreases have their expected effect of stimulating 
Uls' demand. This is important because one must explain why participation by UI 
is valuable to the issuers. (Anderson et al., 1995). In spite of this, Rock's study 
has been a major innovation regarding the IPO underpricing explanation, and many 
scholars attempt to extend the work. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) are among others who develop Rock's model. 
They propose another explanation of IPO underpricing. In their model, they keep 
Rock's assumption on information asymmetry, which then leads to ex ante 
uncertainty faced by investors. Ex ante uncertainty is the uncertainty about issue 
value before the offering. They argue that there is a positive relationship between 
the degree of uncertainty over share value and the extent of underpricing. In 
particular, as share value becomes more uncertain, the differing probabilities of 
getting good versus bad issues become more important since bad issues become 
even worse. The ex ante uncertainty is not the same as systematic risk measured by 
the Beta coefficient in capital market. They use two proxies for ex ante uncertainty, 
the number of uses of the proceeds and the inverse of the gross proceed. For these 
proxies, Beatty and Ritter argue that many issuers appear to be reluctant to give 
highly detailed specification of what they will do with the proceed because it may 
increase exposure to legal liabilities and disclosure proprietary information to 
competitors. Then they conclude that there is a robust relationship between ex ante 
uncertainty and the degree of underpricing. The greater the ex-ante uncertainty of 
the issue, the greater the underpricing. This result has inspired many studies to 
develop alternative explanation for the IPO underpricing. 
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Using Finnish market data, Keloharju (1993) conducts a test for the 
winner's curse hypothesis. The evidence confirms the presence of the winner's 
curse. Michaely and Shaw (1994) also find that consistent with the hypothesis, the 
result shows that in markets where investors know a priori that they do not have to 
compete with informed investors, IPOs are not underpriced. They test two IPO 
samples, the first is a sample of relatively homogenous IPOs, and the second is a 
sample of `general' IPOs. The homogenous sample reflects the lower level of 
asymmetric information in IPOs. They find a significantly different level of 
underpricing between the two samples, with the homogenous sample significantly 
lower than the second sample. This result is a support for the winner's curse 
hypothesis. 
Despite evidence found to support the winner's curse hypothesis in a 
number of empirical studies, Keasey and Short (1992) argue that the model suffers 
from conflicting assumptions and untestable proposition. They suggest that the 
underpricing is a simple reflection of the fact that the issuers are uncertain of the 
demand for IPOs and they underprice to ensure sufficient demand. 
2.1.2. The Underwriter reputation hypothesis 
This hypothesis holds Rock's assumptions on asymmetric information. 
However, it assumes that the information asymmetry exists among the market 
participants, and it is the investment bankers, who have superior information about 
the market to that of the issuers or investors. 
This hypothesis is firstly suggested by Baron (1982). Based on the agency 
theory, his model focuses on the optimal behaviour of issuers as the principals and 
investment banker as the agent that is hired to execute the offering. The model 
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demonstrates a positive demand for investment bank advising and distribution 
services. It also provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues. 
However, empirical evidence does not support the model's proposition. Muscarella 
and Vetsyupens (1989) find that investment bankers that underwrite their own IPO 
also experience underpricing. 
Although Baron's model has been a major contribution to the underwriter 
reputation model, it does not discuss the role of underwriter reputation. Among the 
first studies, Logue (1973) conducts research that proposes the effect of 
underwriter reputation on IPO performance. Using 250 IPOs in the US market 
during 1965-1969, he finds that there is a negative relation between underwriter 
reputation and the degree of underpricing. After that, Neuberger and Hammond 
(1974) conduct a study to evaluate the performance of the underwriters of 
unseasoned offerings. The study concludes that the underwriter reputation is a 
significant variable in the valuation of new issues. 
Following those studies, Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that underpricing 
equilibrium is enforced by investment bankers. In addition, it is explained that 
since the issuers cannot make a credible commitment by themselves, they should 
hire investment bankers to take the firm public. Therefore, investment bankers are 
in a position to enforce the underpricing equilibrium because it will be involved in 
many IPOs over time. For an investment bank to find that it is in their interests to 
enforce the underpricing equilibrium there are three necessary conditions. The first 
condition is that the investment bankers are uncertain about the market price of the 
issue when it starts trading. Secondly, the investment bankers have non-salvage 
reputation capital at stake, on which investment bankers earn a return. Thirdly, the 
investment bankers may lose their earnings if they cheat by underpricing too much 
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or too little. The last two conditions are the standard conditions in the recent 
literature on reputation and product. Beatty and Ritter (1986) also argue that to be 
categorised as having good reputation, the investment bankers should have 
willingness to not behave opportunistically. From this argument, they put forward 
a proposition that any investment banker that cheats will lose customers, issuers 
and investors. 
To test the hypothesis, they use the underwriter's standardised average 
residual as a proxy for reputation measure. Underwriters that had greater average 
residual than standard are referred to as pricing `off-line' and known as non- 
prestigious underwriters, whereas underwriters that have less average residual were 
referred as pricing `on-line' and known as prestigious underwriters. Then, they 
analyse changes in underwriter's market share following the IPOs. The empirical 
evidence shows a robust support for the proposition. 
After Beatty and Ritter's study, there have been many studies on the 
relationship between the underwriter reputation and the degree of underpricing. 
Most of them have obtained similar results that show that there is a negative 
relationship between the prestige of investment bankers and the underpricing. The 
more prestigious the underwriters, the less the degree of underpricing. (e. g., 
Johnson and Miller, 1988; Carter and Manaseter, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 
1991; Carteret al., 1998). 
Moreover, Johnson and Miller (1988) expand their investigation by 
proposing another hypothesis. They argue that once the ex ante uncertainty has 
been taken into account, the level of investment banker prestige should not offer 
any incremental explanation of the degree of underpricing. If more information 
regarding the issue value is available to investors, then a smaller number of 
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informed investors are seeking to invest in IPOs offered by prestigious 
underwriters. They also argue that the prestigious investment bankers are 
associated with lower risk issues than non-prestigious investment bankers. The 
explanation behind this idea is that because of the mean-variance efficiency 
assumption, a high risk firm could not reduce total underwriting costs by selecting 
a more prestigious investment bank, since Any underpricing savings realised would 
be offset by a higher underwriting commission. Therefore, the issuing firm 
hypothesis posits that total underwriter-related costs are positively related to the 
degree of uncertainty regarding firm's value and unrelated to underwriter prestige. 
They test hypotheses that the degree of underpricing and underwriter- 
related costs are positively related to the degree of uncertainty regarding the issue's 
value, and is unrelated to underwriter prestige. They use two different proxies for 
underwriter reputation. The first proxy applied by Johnson and Miller (1988) is 
using three different cut-off points to dichotomise underwriters into prestigious and 
non-prestigious groups. The first cut-off is that prestigious underwriters are only 
members of the bulge brackets, while members of other brackets are assigned non- 
prestigious. Secondly, they include members of major bracket in the prestigious 
group. Thirdly they add members of the sub-major bracket into the prestigious 
group. The second method is prestige-ranking system. They assign underwriters 
in the bulge bracket as rank 3, those in major bracket as rank 2, those in the sub 
major bracket as rank 1, and the rest as rank 0. 
Using a total of 962 IPOs in the US market during the 1981-1983 period, 
they find the negative relationship between level of investment bank prestige and 
the degree of underpricing. However, once initial returns are adjusted for risk, this 
relationship becomes insignificant. Thus, they conclude that investors have no 
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reason to favour non-prestigious underwriters-related IPOs, except for reasons of 
utility. On the issuer side, they conclude that issuers have no incentive to seek out 
high prestige investment banks, since the choice of underwriters does not appear to 
influence underwriter's total cost. 
Similar to Johnson and Miller's study (1988), Carter and Manaster (1990) 
assign underwriters' reputation into rank, by examining the tombstone 
advertisements. Based upon the location of each investment bank in ads, 
investment banks are given a rank from one to nine. By examining the relative 
placements of underwriters with respect of their peers, each investment bank is 
assigned a rank. Those underwriters appearing at the top of the ads would be the 
most prestigious and would receive the highest ranking. Those underwriters at the 
bottom of the ads would receive the lowest ranking. The result of this method is a 
prestige rating for each investment bank on a scale from zero (representing least 
prestige) through nine (most prestige). Since then, there have been many studies 
implement this measure of underwriter reputation. 
Using 501 firm commitment US IPOs during 1979-1983, Carter and 
Manaster (1990) offer some empirical support for the argument that a desire to 
protect their reputation induces prestigious underwriters to select only less risky 
offerings. Hence, lower risk firms can try to signal their high quality by selecting 
prestigious underwriters who underprice less than non-prestigious underwriters, 
and underwriter reputation should be a credible guarantee of limited informed 
trading. 
While previous studies try to measure the underwriter reputation using 
industry information, Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Kumar and Tsesekos 
(1993) propose a different approach to measure the underwriter prestige. 
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Megginson and Weiss (1991) use the underwriter's relative market share as a 
proxy for underwriter reputation. The relative market share for each underwriter is 
determined by dividing the underwriter's total credits by the industry's total. 
When a syndicate manages an offering, it is the lead manager that is given full 
credit for the total amount underwritten. The lead manager maintains the `books' 
and its name is the very first one at the top of the tombstone advertisements. In 
their study, they also offer the presence of venture capital that could perform 
certification function as a complement to the certification provided by prestigious 
investment banks. 
Kumar and Tsesekos (1993) argue that the use of the over allotment option 
gives an advantage to the underwriter to build and maintain the underwriter- 
investor relationship and reputation. If the issue contains the over allotment option 
provision, the underwriter has the option of purchasing additional shares from the 
issuer at a discounted price. Therefore, the over allotment option allows the 
underwriter to satisfy more of the original demand from clients in the event that the 
issue's after market price appreciates in value above the offer price. The less 
prestigious underwriter appear to have more interest in building client relationship, 
hence it is expected that the over allotment option would be more beneficial in 
creating a solid investor base. Therefore they posit that the relative size of the over 
allotment options is negatively related to the underwriter reputation. 
Moreover, they also examine the relationship between the investment bank 
reputation and the type of underwriting contract. They argue that the role of the 
underwriter is to certify that the issue price is consistent with insider information 
regarding the future earning prospects of the firm. The issuing firm is viewed as 
effectively `leasing' the brand name of an investment bank to certify that the issue 
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price reflects available inside information. This study posits that a hierarchy of 
investment banking contract determines the level of certification provided by the 
investment bank. They define investment-banking contract as negotiated or 
competitive and firm commitment or best effort. 
Recently, Logue et al. (2002) examine the interaction between underwriter 
reputation and market activities. They find that underwriter reputation is a 
significant determinant of pre-market underwriter activities, however weakly 
related to after-market price stabilization activities, and unrelated to issuer returns. 
They also find that underwriter activities prior to IPO date are significantly related 
to the underpricing, but unrelated to IPO long-run performance. Finally, they find 
underwriter activities after-market is significantly related to the IPO long-run 
performance. The results suggest that there is a sequence of activities in the 
underwriting process, which could give some impact to the IPO return both in the 
short and the long run. 
In sum, the underwriter hypothesis posits that the investment bankers have 
an important role in underpricing equilibrium. The result shows the more 
prestigious the underwriter, the less the degree of underpricing. In many cases, 
`good' firms tend to hire the prestigious underwriter in order to give signal about 
their value to investors. On the other hand, the prestigious investment bankers tend 
to select `good' issues to be brought to market. 
2.1.3 The Signalling hypothesis 
Another model developed to explain the underpricing anomaly is the 
signalling model (Allen-Faulhaber [1989], Grinblatt and Hwang [1989], Welch 
[1989]). Similar to Rock's and Baron's models, the signalling model also assumes 
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that there is information asymmetry among market participants. However, instead 
of investors or underwriters, this model presumes that it is issuers who know more 
about the firm value in the future. The model also assumes that there are two types 
of firms, good firms and bad firms (this assumption is excluded from the Grinblatt- 
Hwang model). However, investors do not know about firm quality until it is 
revealed in the market. Therefore, it is important to the good firms to reveal their 
firm value to potential investors before the flotation date. To avoid mimicking 
action from the bad firms, the good firms need a signal to reveal this value 
information. This model argues that good firms may employ underpricing as a 
signal to the firm value. 
In the context of IPO, firms typically can signal their quality with several 
variables, such as the firm's choice of underwriter or auditors, quality of 
management, quality of bank loans, and others. However, in these particular 
signalling models, scholars argue that the offering price at IPO is a credible signal, 
since it requires no monitoring, therefore it will be beneficial to investors. For an 
action to succeed as an effective signal, it should satisfy two conditions. Firstly, it 
is not too costly, and secondly, it is unlikely to be imitated by low quality firms 
that aim to mislead investors. If the signal works effectively, high quality firms 
may separate themselves from low quality firms. 
The high quality firm underprice shares in the first issue to reveal the firm's 
true value and to credibly separate itself from low quality firms. In Ibbotson's 
words,, issuers underprice the IPO in order to `leave good taste in investor's 
mouths', thus this will support the accomplishment of subsequent seasoned 
offerings in the open market. Therefore, signalling true value is beneficial to high 
value firms as it allows a higher price to be fetched at the second stage sale 
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(seasoned equity offerings) if the separation is achieved. Although underpricing is 
costly, the high quality firm can afford it because such a firm can recover its loss in 
the subsequent seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) after their true quality is revealed. 
As a consequence, low quality firms are deterred from imitating this action because 
they are less likely to reap the benefits of underpricing by selling their seasoned 
issues at higher prices (Jegadeesh et al.., 1993). 
The signalling models generate a rich set of empirical implications 
regarding the relationship between underpricing and the value of the firm, the 
project risk, the probability of a firm to be a high quality or low quality, the 
subsequent offering, and the hot issue market. The Grinblatt-Hwang (GH) model 
relates the project risk (here means IPO risk), to the degree of underpricing and the 
issuer's fractional holding. It claims that the degree of underpricing is an 
increasing function of project risk. In other words, it could be said that the-riskier 
the firm, the greater the expected degree of underpricing. It also implies that, given 
the issuer's fractional holding, the greater the degree of underpricing, the higher 
the value of the firm. Allen-Faulhaber (AF) (1989) and Welch (1989) also suggest 
a positive relation between'IPO underpricing and firm value. 
The AF model provides other implications. The model is applied to earlier 
studies (Ibbotson & Jafe, 1975; Ritter, 1986). Regarding the hot issue in IPO, the 
model suggests that hot-issue markets may occur in specific industries whenever 
an exogenous shock substantially improves expected profitability. This is related to- 
how the AF model explains revelation of firm value that is determined by expected 
dividend. Duplicating the winner's curse implication, signalling models also 
suggest that the greater the ex ante uncertainty, the higher must be the expected 
underpricing. This relationship is implied by signalling models since the noisy 
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market is needed to achieve separating equilibrium existence that assures the extent 
of underpricing. 
Welch's model assumes the probability of one firm categorised to one type 
(lower quality or high quality) relates to the underpricing phenomenon. It implies 
that the lower the probability that a firm is of high quality, the higher the 
probability that it underprices at IPO. It also implies that as the cost of imitation 
increases, there will be more firms underpriced at IPO. Since the Welch model 
assumes that IPO is always followed by the seasoned offering, it suggests that the 
value of the outstanding shares falls less upon news of a seasoned offering when a 
firm has played an underpricing equilibrium in order to adjust investors' prior 
belief about firm value to true value revealed. 
There are a number of empirical studies regarding the signalling models in 
IPO. The first hypothesis tested is that if firms do underprice to condition 
investors favourably for subsequent offerings, it is expected that firms who reissue 
in open market will experience greater underpricing. However, the evidence on 
this is mixed. Welch himself (1989) finds that there is a significant positive 
relation between the degree of underpricing and the probability of firms to undergo 
the SEOs. Moreover, he also finds that many IPO firms that are more underpriced 
indeed choose to issue a substantial amount of public SEOs. Using a different time 
period, Michaely and Shaw (1994), find that the empirical results do not support 
the signalling models. In fact, they find that firms that underprice more return to 
the reissue market less frequently and for lesser amounts than firms that underprice 
less do. Further, they also find that firms that underprice less experience higher 
earnings and pay higher dividends, contrary to the models' predictions. Most of the 
GH model's predictions are not supported by Michaely and Shaw's findings. They 
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do not find that there is a positive relationship between the degree of underpricing, 
firm value and risk. The evidence also' does not support a positive relationship 
between underpricing and subsequent dividend policy that is suggested by the AF 
model. Regarding IPO long run performance, Michaely and Shaw's study indicates 
that firms that reissue in the open market outperform non-issuing firms. However, 
they do not find a relationship between underpricing and the degree of fractional 
holding with superiority of share performance in the long run. 
Jegadesh et al.. (1993) find supporting evidence for the signalling models. 
Regarding the seasoned offering, they argue that there is a positive relationship 
between underpricing and the probability of seasoned equity offering or open 
market insider. Using 1,985 IPOs (1980-1986) with firm commitment offering 
method in the US market, they find evidence that supports the proposition 
suggesting that the more underpriced IPOs tend to go back to the market sooner 
than the less underpriced IPOs. However, they do not find a significant difference 
when they use the aftermarket returns (returns after 20 days of the issue). 
Therefore, they conclude that the evidence to support the signalling theory is weak. 
Using UK data, Espenlaub and Tonks (1998) empirically test the signalling 
hypothesis by, in particular, examining the relationship between the post-IPO 
directors' sales and the SEOs. They argue that there is an incentive to the initial 
owners (including the directors) to deliberately undepricing the IPOs to recoup the 
profits in the SEOs. Therefore, they include the post-IPO director's sales in the 
SEOs. They hypothesise that there is a positive relationship between the 
undepricing and the probability (the relative volume) of the directors' sales after 
the IPO. They find mixed results. They do not find a significant relationship 
between the underpricing and the probability of the post-IPO directors' sales. 
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However, they find that the volume of the post-IPO directors' sales is positively 
related to the underpricing, as a support to the signalling hypothesis. 
Although the main implication of the signalling hypothesis is a positive 
relationship between the firm value and the underpricing, none of the studies 
reviewed above empirically test this proposition. Keasey and McGuiness (1992) 
directly investigate the underpricing and firm value relationship. Using UK USM 
data, they find a positive relationship between the firm market value - proxied by 
the firm's market capitalisation on the fifth day of trading post-flotation - and the 
underpricing as predicted by the signalling hypothesis. Using Australian data, How 
and Low (1993) also find support for the hypothesis. 
Another empirical implication of the IPO signalling model is the ownership 
retention at the IPO. The model argues that the issuers deliberately underprice the 
issues at the IPO in expectation to get profits later from their selling at the 
subsequent SEOs. Therefore, it is expected that the firms that are more underpriced 
tend to have a higher percentage of equity retained at the IPOs. In line with that, 
Leland and Pyle (1977) propose that retained equity is used as a signal to the firm 
value. They argue that the percentage of equity retained at the IPO conveys the 
insiders' believes in the firm's future value. A discussion of ownership retention is 
presented later in the IPO valuation section (section 2.6.2) 
The other issue that has received much attention from scholars is whether 
there are other means, in addition to underpiricing, that effectively signal the value 
of the firm. Slovin and Young (1990) analyse the relationship between issuer and 
banks as a signal of firm value. They argue that bank processing of asymmetric 
information and external monitoring of corporate activities reduces the ex ante 
uncertainty of investors about firm value. They demonstrate that the existence of 
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bank debt and/or lines of credits lowers the expected initial return associated with 
IPOs. The empirical result is robust regarding the inclusion of variables that 
reflect other mechanisms that can improve ex ante uncertainty. Concerning the 
conditions of effective signals, it seems that banking relation is dominated by 
underpricing, since it needs monitoring cost and can be easily imitated by other 
firms. However, it is beneficial to investors because it may reveal the type of firm 
before the IPO. 
In sum, the signalling hypothesis posits that in order to reveal their true 
value, issuer deliberately underprice the issue. This signal is observable by 
investors but it is costly for low value firms to imitate the action. Although the 
model is theoretically convincing, the evidence, as discussed above, shows mixed 
result. 
2.1.4 The insurance hypotheses 
In addition to information asymmetry, underpricing is also explained by 
institutional aspects. Another underpricing explanation proposed by Ibbotson 
(1975) is that underpricing serves as an insurance against legal liabilities. Later, 
this hypothesis was developed by Tinic (1988) and Hughes and Thakor (1992). 
They argue that both issuers and underwriters underprice the IPOs deliberately in 
order to avoid the lawsuits from investors. 
Tinic (1988) offers the insurance hypothesis, which is also well known as 
the lawsuit-avoidance hypothesis. She argues that the expected cost of legal 
liability would be particularly high for IPOs because performing the due-diligence 
investigations is fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. Therefore, both issuers 
and underwriters attempt to avoid this situation. 
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Moreover, the issuer typically lacks familiarity with disclosure 
requirements. What to them may seem to be an inconsequential piece of 
information to be disclosed may be judged a material omission in a civil action. On 
the underwriters' side, they argued that the most important part of their 
investigation centres on the quality of management and forecasting future earning 
capacity of the firm. Both are frequently based on subjective evaluation and 
judgement. Although the risks, uncertainties, and speculative qualities of the 
securities are frequently stated in the registration statements and prospectuses, they 
do not seem to deter investors from bringing civil suits against the issuers and 
investment banks. 
Since issuers and investment banks both are vulnerable to legal liabilities, it 
may seem that an obvious means of protecting themselves would be to purchase 
jointly an insurance policy against potential damages. However, since there is a 
moral hazard problem, there will be no insurance policy available. 
With insurance against legal damages, the issuer and investment bank 
would have incentives to shirk their responsibilities to produce information about 
the firm. This would increase the probability of post-offering lawsuits and the 
expected losses for the issuer. To protect itself against this event, the issuer would 
have to incur costs in verifying the quality of the investigations conducted by the 
investment bank and charge a predetermined penalty to the investment bank 
whenever it is found to be shirking. If an investment bank can establish easily 
verifiable standards for a diligent investigation, beforehand, then the cost of the 
policy can include a premium for the moral hazard. 
Since there is no insurance policy to cover such lawsuits, Tinic argues that 
underpricing serves as an efficient form of insurance against potential legal 
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liabilities of issuers and their agents. In sum, Tinic argues that in order to avoid 
legal liability for `insufficient' information disclosure in the prospectus, both the 
issuer and the investment bank intentionally underprices an issue. This lawsuit- 
avoidance hypothesis posits three implications. Firstly, underpricing reduces the 
probability of litigation. Secondly, underpricing reduces the conditional 
probability of an adverse judgement if litigation occurs. And thirdly, underpricing 
reduces the amount of damages in the event of an adverse judgement. 
Hughes and Thakor (1992) argue that since it is the underwriter who sets 
the offering price, it is his or her responsibility if investors claim that there is a 
mispricing in the IPO. They argue that the underwriter sets the issue price 
knowing that he/she will be sued in the future if there is evidence that the court 
will judge as indicative of overpricing. There is a perfect sequential equilibrium in 
which some issues are overpriced, some are underpriced. There is underpricing on 
average, and there exists a positive probability of successful litigation against the 
underwriter. Lawsuits are obviously costly to underwriters, not only direct cost, 
such as legal fees, but also in terms of the potential damage to their reputation 
capital. 
They also postulate a trade-off between minimising the probability of 
litigation, which means minimising these costs on the one hand, and maximising 
flotation revenue on the other. In their model, they assume that minimising the 
probability of litigation increases the offering price, implying that the more 
overpriced an IPO, the more likely is a future lawsuit. In addition, underpricing 
reduces not only the probability of a lawsuit, but also the probability of an adverse 
ruling conditional on a lawsuit being filed and the amount of damages to other 
assets, such as reputation capital in the event of adverse ruling. 
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In order to test her hypothesis, Tinic draw 204 issues from the US market 
and take the year 1933 as the cut-off point in time regarding the 1933 Securities 
Act. She splits the sample into two groups. The first group consists of 70 
flotations during 1923-1930, and the second group consists of 134 flotations during 
1966-1971. Prior to the 1933 legislation, the principle of caveat emptor applied to 
the securities industry in an almost open way, so that issuers and investment banks 
faced no litigation risk. Since 1933, underpricing should have been rising in 
parallel to increased risk of future litigation. Evidence supports the hypothesis that 
in order to avoid legal liability for mis-statements in the IPO prospectus, 
underwriters and issuers rationally choose to underprice IPOs (Tinic [1988], 
Ibbotson [1975] and Hughes and Thakor [1992]). However, Drake and Vetsuypens 
(1993) using a longer time line do not find sufficient evidence to support the 
hypothesis. Moreover, using data from other markets (Finland and UK), Keloharju 
(1993) and Jenkinson (1990) also do not find evidence for the hypothesis. 
The most thorough evidence is due to Drake and Vetsuypens (1993), who 
among other things find that underpricing does not reduce the probability of a 
lawsuit. They examine 93 IPOs by issuers who were subsequently sued under the 
provisions of the 1933 Securities Act in the period 1969-1990. They find that 
purchasers of underpriced IPOs are just as likely to sue as purchasers of overpriced 
ones. Moreover, issuers that are sued are no more or less underpriced than 
comparable firms that are not sued. Therefore, they conclude that underpricing is 
not a sufficient condition to avoid lawsuits. Furthermore, their analysis shows that 
underpricing is an expensive form of insurance against future lawsuit. However, 
they do not test the second and third implications of the lawsuit-avoidance 
hypothesis proposed by Tinic (1988), which relate the underpricing and the 
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reduction in the conditional probability of an adverse judgement, and the amount 
of damages in such an event. 
In sum, the lawsuit-avoidance hypothesis argues that the issuers and the 
investment bankers deliberately underprice the issues in order to avoid the lawsuit 
from investors regarding the information disclosure prior to flotation. Since this 
model involves the institutional aspect, in this case the securities regulation, the 
empirical result only supports the US cases. While different countries may set 
different regulation, the relationship between underpricing and legal liabilities is 
rarely proved in other countries. 
In contrast to the insurance hypothesis, Ruud (1993) argues that 
underwriters do not underprice IPOs deliberately. What they do is to support 
offerings whose prices fall below the offering price in after-market trading. Price 
support is underwriters' intervention in the market by repurchasing a fraction of 
shares in after-market trading. Therefore, the share price could go up higher than 
the offering price and leave positive returns to investors. This hypothesis has some 
support from empirical evidence. It is recorded that about half of all US IPOs in 
1982-1983 must have been supported. While price support action is illegal in some 
markets, it is legal in many countries, including UK, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and the US. (Jenkinson, 1996). 
2.2. Underpricing phenomenon in the UK 
Among the first scholars examining IPO performance on the London Stock 
Exchange is Dimson (1979). His study finds robust evidence of underpricing in the 
UK market. Levis (1990) verifies that some studies find existence of underpricing 
in LSE (Buckland et al.., 1981; Bank of England, 1986). The studies indicate 
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average first day abnormal return ranging from 8.5% to 17%. A recent working 
paper by Levis (2001) exhibits the persistence of underpricing in the main market, 
techmark market, and AIM. Levis shows that on average IPOs listed on AIM tend 
to be more underpriced than the ones listed on the main and techmark markets. 
Table 2.1 below shows the performance of first day return in each market in 2001. 
Table 2.1. The IPO first day returns in LSE, 2001 
The table contains a number of descriptive statistics of the first day returns of UK 
IPOs in 2001, which took place in the Main market, Techmark market, and AIM 
Main Techmark AIM All 
Average first day return (%) 5.9 39.5 72.6 60.1 
Median first day return (%) 6.8 15.7 13.3 11.4 
Standard deviation 6.9 102.2 245.9 214.2 
Largest first day return (%) 16.7 658.8 2,775.0 2,775.0 
Lowest first day return (%) -9.3 -43.4 -32.1 -43.4 
Total amount left on the 229.6 1,335.2 644.6 2,229.4 
table (£m) 
Source: Levis (2001) 
In his study, Levis (1990) aims to test Rock's model under the British 
institutional framework. In particular, he attempts to explain the underpricing 
phenomenon as a combined effect of Rock's models and the particular nature of 
the settlement mechanism applicable in the UK new issues market. For this 
purpose, he argues that new issues would be considered to be underpriced only if 
the `net expected return' is significantly different from zero. 3 Similar to previous 
studies, Levis' study finds positive abnormal returns on the first trading day. 
However, it does not support the main proposition. It is apparent that the positive 
3 Net expected return is the abnormal return on the first trading day after subtracting the interest 
cost that occurred on the over-subscribed offers and the loss from the under-subscribed offers. 
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abnormal return is just sufficient to cover the losses incurred in undersubscribed 
and the interest costs involved in the over-subscribed offers. 
Another study by Keasey and McGuiness (1992) also attempts to explain 
the underpricing in the UK market, in particular on the USM. They propose a 
signalling model, which employs multi signals. They argue that to be a credible 
signal, the variable should be observable by investors. They propose five 
observable actions as signals to the IPO value, they are: (i) the percentage of shares 
retained by entrepreneurs, (ii) the levels of planned post-flotation capital 
expenditure, (iii) the quality of the advising agents, (iv) the disclosure/non- 
disclosure of forecasted earnings, and (v) the level of underpricing. They derive a 
total of 12 proxies for these signals and test them against the dependent variable, 
the market capitalisation of issuers at the close of the fifth day of trading. The 
result confirms previous signalling models. They find that the underpricing serves 
as a signal to the market value of a firm. Along with that, they also find that the 
percentage of shares retained, net proceeds, and the auditor quality significantly 
signal the firm value. 
Using a different set of data from the UK Main market and USM, Byrne 
and Rees (1994) also find a significant positive return for five days after the IPOs 
are first traded. Moreover, the result also shows significant relations between the 
underpricing and the sponsor reputation, equity retained and dividend per share. 
Consistent with previous studies, they find a negative relation between the 
underpricing and the equity retained by old shareholders on the flotation day. 
Contrary to previous studies, they find that IPOs brought to market by a prestigious 
sponsor tend to be more underpriced than other IPOs. The result of the relation 
between the underpricing and dividend per share comes as a unique part of this 
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study. None has incorporate dividends in the underpricing model before this study. 
The result shows a robust significant negative coefficient on dividends. Based on 
the signalling argument, it is argued that dividends may have a role as a signal, so 
that investors require a lower mark-up for IPOs with high dividend payout. 
Using a sample of 222 IPOs on the USM market during 1984-1988, Keasey 
and Short (1992) investigate the relationship between the underpricing and the ex- 
ante uncertainty surrounding IPOs. The underpricing is measured by the initial 
returns on the fifth day of trading. They employ a number of prospectus 
information as proxies to the ex-ante uncertainty. They find that the level of IPO 
undepricing on the USM is significantly related to a few factors, such as the 
percentage of equity retained in the firm by the original entrepreneurs, the amount 
of new money raised on flotation and the presence of an earnings forecast. 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) examine public offerings of state-owned 
enterprise and their difference to privately owned ones. According to the 
government, the UK privatisation policy objectives are to promote efficiency in the 
business, and to spread share ownership as widely as possible among the UK 
population (Bishop and Kay, 1989). Moreover, it is also emphasised that the 
concern is with economic efficiency and not the intention of raising money for the 
UK Exchequer. However, Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) argue that in order to 
ensure the achievement of the second objective, the privatisation, IPOs are 
deliberately underpriced. Furthermore, they also attempt to examine the 
undepricing deliberation with the motive to raise fund for the government. I 
Using a total sample of 38 UK privatisations and 2,100 private company 
IPOs obtained from Loughran et al. (1994), Dewenter and Malatesta find that 
privatisations are significantly more underpriced than private company IPOs are. 
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This confirms the evidence found by Keasey and McGuiness (1992). However, 
they do not find support for the hypothesis that the privatisation IPOs are 
deliberately underpriced. 
2.3. The long-run underperformance anomaly 
The second anomaly is the long-run underperformance of IPO shares. 
Firstly, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) find evidence of substantial negative abnormal 
returns over longer time horizons. They refer to this phenomenon as a fad. They 
suggest that if IPOs are systematically overvalued in early trading, investors who 
purchase shares at the first after market price will underperform the market index. 
How IPOs perform in the long run was examined formally by Ritter (1991). 
He points out several reasons why the long-run performance of IPO is of interest. 
Firstly, from an investor's viewpoint, the existence of price patterns may present 
opportunities for active trading strategies to produce superior return. Secondly, a 
finding of non-zero after-market performance calls into question the informational 
efficiency of the IPO market. Thirdly, the volume of IPOs displays large 
variations over time. Finally, the cost of external equity capital for companies 
going public depends not only upon the transaction costs incurred in going public, 
but also upon the returns earned in the after market. 
Ritter's study is motivated by several prior studies [Ibbotson (1975), Stoll 
and Curley (1970), Stern and Bornstein (1985)), which suggest that at some point 
after going public the abnormal return on IPO may be negative. After Ritter's 
study, there have been many studies attempting to assess the IPO long-run 
performance [Loughran-Ritter (1995), Levis (1993), How (2000)]. However, other 
studies show that IPOs outperform the market as summarised in table 1.2 in the 
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introduction chapter. The evidence demonstrates the mixed results of the IPO long- 
run performance relative to the market. The hypotheses and results regarding the 
IPO long-run performance are discussed below. 
2.3.1. Fad hypothesis 
This hypothesis is proposed firstly by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990). As 
mentioned above, they find evidence of IPO shares undeperforming the market 
over longer time horizons. They could not find any rational explanation to this 
phenomenon. Therefore, they refer to this situation as a fad in the IPO market. 
Ritter (1991), drawing a sample of 1,526 firms that went public in the US 
during 1975-1984, examines their performance after three years trading, and 
finally compares them to the performance of matching firms by industry and 
market capitalisation. 
He finds evidence that is consistent with the notion that many firms go 
public near the peak of industry-specific fads. Further, he also finds that a strategy 
of investing in IPOs at the end of the first day of public trading and holding them 
for 3 years would have left the investors with only 83 cents relative to each dollar 
from investing in a group of matching firms listed on the US markets. Moreover, 
younger firms and firm that went public in heavy volume years did even worse 
than average. Thus, it can be argued that while new issues are a profitable 
investment opportunity if bought at flotation, they should not be held long beyond 
the first few weeks or months of trading. 
Ritter suggests three possible explanations for the long-run 
underperformance: risk mismeasurement, bad luck, and fads. However, the 
empirical evidence does not support the first two explanations. It shows that there 
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is a robust tendency that firms go public when investors are overoptimistic about 
firms' prospects so that investors overpay initially. Then, share prices are corrected, 
as more information becomes available. Therefore, expected long-run returns 
decrease in initial investors' sentiment. This result is consistent with the result of 
Aggarwal and Rivoli's study. 
Later, Loughran and Ritter (1995) extend Ritter's study. They argue that 
firms tend to make IPOs when they see firms in the same industry trading at high 
earnings and market-value to book-value multiplies. This effect is reinforced by 
the positively biased marketing campaign, which accompanies the share offering. 
Investors appear to value issuing firms as if the rapid earning growth, which they 
experience in the period before the offering, will continue forever. However, in 
fact this rapid growth often ends shortly after the offering. They also suggest that 
it is difficult for more rational investors to exploit other investors' overvaluation of 
IPO stocks. Other explanations are firstly, that when the price support provided by 
underwriters are withdrawn, the market will make an adjustment and this result in 
underperformance of IPO; and secondly, it is difficult at the best of times to control 
correctly for risk over long time horizons. 
Replicating Ritter's study, Levis (1993) finds that the pattern of returns on 
UK IPOs is remarkably similar to that of US issues. This phenomenon is also 
found in some other countries, such as Finland, Australia, Brazil, and Canada, 
[Jenkinson (1993), Lee et al.. (1996)]. 
In sum, the finding that IPOs underperform implies that the costs of raising 
external equity capital are not inordinately high for these firms. The high 
transaction costs of raising external equity capital are partly offset by the low 
realised long-run returns, at least for those firms going public at times when 
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investor sentiment is optimistic. Consequently, the small growth companies that 
predominate among firms going public do not necessarily face a higher cost of 
equity capital than that faced by more established firms. 
2.3.2. Heterogeneous expectations hypothesis 
This proposition is firstly proposed by Miller (1977). In his theoretical 
explanation, he relaxes the assumption of homogenous expectations of investors, 
hence a divergence of opinion among investors arises. He argues that in markets 
with restricted short selling, such as IPOs, share prices are determined by 
overoptimistic investors. Over time, as the restriction weakens and more 
information becomes available, share prices are corrected. Hence, he posits that the 
greater the divergence of opinion among investors will translate into greater short 
run overvaluation and therefore greater long run underperformance. 
Using three proxies of divergence of opinions (the percentage opening bid- 
ask spread, the time of the first trade, and the flipping ratio), Houge et al.. (2001) 
examine the relation between the divergence of opinion and the long run return of 
IPOs. They argue that these variables describe the uncertainty faced by a wide 
spectrum of IPO market makers, which in turn lead to opinion deviation. Using a 
sample of 2,025 US IPOs during the 1993-1996 period, they find that IPOs with a 
high proportion of flipping activity, wider opening spreads, or long opening delays, 
significantly underperform the market for up to three years after the offering. So, 
they conclude that IPOs with greater uncertainty, will exhibit poor long run return. 
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2.3.3. Agency hypothesis 
Carter et al. (1998) conduct a study on several proxies used to measure 
underwriter reputation, using data from a sample of IPOs in the US market during 
1979-1991. They only take firm commitment offerings with domestic offerings of 
at least $2,000,000. The primary method used to examine the explanatory power of 
underwriter reputation measures is the OLS regression with initial return as 
dependent variable in model 1 and long-run performance as dependent variable in 
model 2. In each model, they run a number of underwriter reputation measures 
(from Carter and Manaster (CM), 1990; Johnson and Miller (JM), 1988; and 
Megginson and Weiss ' (MW), 1989)4 individually as well as simultaneously. 
Results of model 1 show that each reputation measure is significantly related to the 
initial return. However, only the CM measure remains significant when evaluated 
simultaneously. From the analysis of model 2, they also find that on average, the 
long-run performances of IPOs are less negative for the IPOs that are brought to 
market by more prestigious underwriters. In other words, they find that the 
underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a 3-year holding 
period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. In their 
recent paper, Logue et al. (2002) find that regardless its reputation, underwriter 
activities after-market is significantly related to IPO long-run performance. 
4 Johnson and Miller (JM) measure the underwriter reputation based on their descriptions, such as 
the IPO size, the number of IPOs that have been underwritten since Securities Act 1933. They 
categorise the investment bankers into four groups. Megginson and Weiss (MW) use the 
underwriter's relative market sabre as a proxy for underwriter reputation. Carter and Manaster 
(CM) develop ten-tier reputation measure based on the rank of the underwriters in the syndicate, 
which is presented in the tombstone advertisement. 
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The role of another agent regarding the IPO long-run performance has been 
examined by Brav and Gompers (1997). They investigate the long-run 
underperformance of US IPO firms in a sample of 934 venture-backed IPOs during 
1972-1992 and 3,407 nonventure-backed IPOs from 1975-1992. It is found that 
venture-backed IPOs outperform nonventure-backed IPOs using equal weighted 
returns. Value weighting significantly reduces performance differences and 
substantially reduces underperformance for - nonventure-backed IPOs. They 
conduct further tests using several comparable benchmarks and the Fama-French 
3-factor asset-pricing model. They find that venture-backed companies do not 
significantly underperform, while the smallest nonventure-backed firms do. 
However, the long-run underperformance is not an IPO effect as they find that the 
matching firms with similar size and book-to-market that have not issued equity 
perform as poorly as the IPO firms. 
In sum, the agents seemingly have an important role in affecting the IPO 
valuing process by investors. Previous studies show that prestigious investment 
bankers and venture capital backing of IPOs have affected the IPO valuation in the 
long-term. 
2.3.4. Signalling hypothesis 
As mentioned above, the signalling hypothesis demonstrates that in order to 
reveal their true values, firms need to employ some signals to the investors prior to 
flotation. Although it is meant to explain the IPO puzzle in the early days of 
trading, there are some implications to the longer time horizons. 
As the signalling models assume that the IPOs are followed by seasoned 
equity offerings, Jegadeesh et al. (1993) argue firstly, that firms raising further 
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equity financing after their IPO are high value and hence outperform non-issuing 
firms in the long-term. Secondly, firms that underprice exhibit superior post listing 
returns relative to those that do not, and finally, the greater their quality, the more 
capital firms retain initially, and the better they perform in the long-term. 
Therefore, it implies that there are at least three testable implications. The first is 
that there is a positive association between the underpricing and the long-run 
performance. Secondly, a positive relation is expected between the quality of the 
firm and its long-run performance. Finally, there is an expectation of a negative 
relation between percentage of equity retained on the flotation and the long-run 
performance. 
The empirical evidence shows mixed results. Using US data, Welch (1989) 
finds that firms that underprice the IPO are more likely to return to the market for 
further issues. Further more, he finds that those IPOs outperform the non-issuing 
firms. However, some studies show that firms that underprice do not exhibit 
superior post-listing returns relative to those that do not. (Ritter, 1991; Jain and 
Kini, 1994; Ljunqvist, 1996). 
Using Singaporean data, Koh et al. (1996) demonstrate that the more equity 
retained by the old shareholders on the flotation, the better the IPO long-run 
performance. However, based on Germany data, Ljungqvist (1996) fails to find 
support for that proposition. 
2.3.5. Problem with long-run returns measurement 
The mixed results regarding the IPO long run performance may be 
attributable to several factors. One, which is debated widely, is the proper 
measurement method for share long run return. A growing amount of literature 
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questions the methodology used in many empirical long horizon studies. Firstly, 
there are two choices of long run return measurement; Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) and Buy and Hold Return (BHR). 
Testing for the fairness of both methods, Barber and Lyon (1996) find that 
the CAR method suffers from measurement bias, as it is a biased predictor for 
BHR. Consequently, they favour the use of the BHR method in tests designed to 
detect long run abnormal stock returns. 
The second issue in long run performance measurement is the choice of 
benchmarks. There are several benchmarks used in such event studies; the 
matching control firm portfolios, the market index, and Fama-French three-factors. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) specify some biases of using market indices. They argue 
that using market indices would lead to some biases: rebalancing bias, skewness 
bias, and new listing bias. They suggest the use of matching control firm as a 
benchmark, as a control firm matched to sample firms on the basis of specified 
firm characteristics. However, Kothart and Warner (1997) argue that the use of 
matching control firm may lead to another bias, referred to as pre-event 
survivorship bias. 
Finally, scholars also discuss the power of statistical tests for the long run 
abnormal returns. Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Brav (2000) argue that the test 
statistics suffer from failure of independence of observations, as the long-run 
performance of different firms may be correlated in calendar time. Jenkinson and 
Ljunqvist (2001) take an example of internet companies during the bubble period. 
This will tend to reduce the cross sectional variance in abnormal returns. 
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2.4. IPO long-run performance in the UK 
A study on IPO long run performance based on UK data is conducted 
firstly by Levis (1993). He investigates the UK long-run performance of a sample 
of 712 UK IPOs floated during 1980-1988. He recognizes the importance of the 
size effect for UK stocks and reports long-run abnormal returns based on three 
alternative benchmarks: the Financial Times Actuaries All Shares (FTA) index, the 
Hoare Govett Smaller companies (HGSC) index, and a specially constructed all- 
shares equally-weighted index. The result confirms that over 3 years after the 
flotation, -IPOs suffer from underperformance of between -8% and -23% 
depending on the market benchmark. Using a similar method, but a longer time 
period to Levis' study, Khurshed et al. (1999) examine the UK IPO long-run 
performance during 1991-1995. They find an average of -17.8% abnormal returns 
over 5 years after the IPOs. 
Espenlaub et al. (2000) re-examine the long-run performance of UK IPOs. 
Using more up to date data (1985-1995), they compare the IPO long-run abnormal 
returns based on a number of alternative methods: CAPM, Size control portfolio 
(SD), Value weighted multi-index using HGSC index, Fama-French value 
weighted three factor model, and Ibbotson Returns Across Securities and Times 
(RATS) approach. In line with other studies, they find that the long-run abnormal 
returns vary across the benchmarks. The result shows a range of negative and 
statistically significant abnormal returns over 60 months after the IPO dates for 
CAPM, SD, Fama-French factor, and RATS. Slightly negative and statistically 
insignificant abnormal returns are found when using the HGSC index. 
In addition to examining the UK IPO long-run performance, Khurshed et 
A (1999) also investigate the relationship between some firms' conditions pre-IPO 
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and the long-run performance. They hypothesise that the long-run performance of 
IPO is a function of the managerial decisions and performance of the firm prior to 
going public. Similar to other studies, they find a negative and strong relation 
between the IPO underpricing and the long-run performance for the sample as a 
whole. However, when the sample is split into small and big firms, the significance 
disappears in the small firm sample. They also find a negative relationship between 
the firms' pre-tax profit for the last three years before listing and the long-run 
performance. This implies that firms, which gained more profits before the listing, 
tend to underperform the market after 3 years traded. Moreover, they find some 
moderate relations between the IPO long-run performance and flotation cost, net 
asset a year before listing, and the percentage of equity retained at the flotation 
date. Interestingly, they find that the long-run performance of multinational 
companies (MNCs) is better than domestic companies. However, in contrast to 
other studies they do not find significant evidence for the relation between the 
underwriter reputation, firm size, and the long-run performance. 
2.5. Hot/Cold market anomaly 
The last anomaly is the hot/cold market issue. This phenomenon was first 
documented in the US by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). Besides the fact that there are 
'hot/cold issues' markets, they also examine the relationship between new issue 
performance in a calendar month and the performance of other new issues in the 
previous calendar month. The result is that the first month series exhibits strong 
serial dependency, indicating that 'hot issue' markets are predictable. Although it is 
sensible for the issuers to go public in the `hot' market (as the investment bankers 
often advise their clients), Ibbotson and Jaffe argue that the issuers would be better 
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off in 'cold' markets rather than in 'hot `markets, since their objective is to 
minimise the `amount of money left on the table'. The implication to the investors 
is to avoid IPOs following the `cold' market, and concentrate their investment in 
those months, which have the largest premia. 
They also examine the relationship between the number of offerings and 
IPO returns. They hypothesise that the number of offerings may be related to the 
past level of returns. The regression model results in insignificant regression 
coefficient. Therefore the result does not suggest that the timing of new issue 
offering is related to the first month performance of the IPO. 
Additionally, they examine the relationship between past market 
performance and new issue returns. However, the result shows there is not any 
relationship. Therefore, the market index cannot be expected to serve as a useful 
guide to issuers in selecting a month to offer their issues. 
The Ibbotson and Jaffe's study is extended by Ibbotson et al. (1994) using 
longer periods, and Ritter (1984). The evidence is consistent with the prior study. 
Ritter attempts to explain the `hot' issue using Rock's implication. He argues that 
if the risk composition through time of firms going public is correlated then this 
can explain the time series correlation of initial returns. Hot issue markets would 
be a result of a higher than usual proportion of risky firms coming to market a in 
given period. 
Another possible explanation for hot issue markets relies on irrationality on 
the part of investors rather than issuers and their advisers. Hot issue markets may 
exist because there are periods when investors are particularly receptive to new 
issues. During these periods, investors are willing to pay a high price for earnings 
and market to book multiples for new issues. Firms rush to the market to exploit 
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this receptiveness and receive good prices for their equity offerings. The optimism 
of investors regarding the prospects of these firms results in aftermarket prices 
being bid above intrinsic values and high initial returns are observed. (Byrne and 
Rees, 1994) 
The recent studies conducted by Loughran and Ritter (2000) has given a 
valuable contribution to the IPO hot market puzzle. They argue that existing 
literatures offer no explanation that is consistent with investors' rational behaviour. 
Therefore, they propose an explanation that is called prospect theory. It predicts 
that when the market rises, there will be an increase in the expected underpricing 
of all IPOs that are in the selling period. It implies that short-term abnormal returns 
will be higher following market rises, and this effect will be present in all IPOs 
where the selling period includes the period of the market rise. 
2.6 Equity Valuation 
Equity valuation models in the finance literature are generally based on 
Miller and Modigliani (1961). Miller and Modigliani (MM) posit that the market 
value of a firm's common equity is equal to the discounted value of present and 
future economic earnings. They define economic earnings as earnings minus net 
investments, and the discount rate as the required rate of return for that level of 
risk. 
After MM's model, equity valuation has been an important issue both in 
academia and practice. Most finance textbooks discuss several valuation models, 
including the comparable firm approach, the discounted cash flow (DCF) 
approach, and the asset-based approach (Benninga and Sarig, 1997). The 
comparable firm approach is typically implemented by capitalising the earning per 
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share (EPS) of the firm under consideration at the average or median price- 
earnings (P/E) ratio of comparable publicly traded firms. Among other comparable 
multiples usually used in this approach are market-to-book, price-to-sale, and 
price-to-operating earnings. The DCF approach, which is heavily based on the 
MM model, uses the future cash flow and appropriate discount rate to determine 
the market value of a firm. The asset-based approach looks at the underlying value 
of the company's assets to indicate value. 
Based on the residual income model (RIM), Ohlson (1995) propose an 
alternative valuation model, which links the fundamental accounting information 
to the value of the firm. The model has been extensively discussed among 
accounting and finance scholars. Since it was published in 1995 up to 1999, an 
average of 9 annual citations in the social science citation index (SSCI) has been 
found (Lo and Lys, 2000). Basically, this model provides a simple accounting 
based equivalent to the traditional dividend discounting approach. Its contribution 
comes from his modelling of the information dynamics. Empirical studies using 
this model seem to work very well (Lo and Lys, 2000). 
2.6.1. Non-IPO valuation 
The Ohlson's valuation model has been used widely for non-IPO 'cases. 
Based on US data, Frankel and Lee (1996) find a robust result with very high R2, 
suggesting that for non-IPO cases, the market value of a firm is strongly related to 
equity value and earnings. More robust evidence is found by Hand and Landsman 
(1998), who show that dividends also take a major role in setting the market price. 
Using time series data, Collins et al. (1997) examine systematic changes in 
value relevance of earnings and book values over time. In contrast to practitioners' 
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claims, they generally do not find a decline in the combined value-relevance of 
earnings and book value. Although they vary over time, in fact they appear to have 
increased slightly. The empirical result also shows that when value-relevance of 
earnings decline, it is replaced by increasing value-relevance of book values. 
Moreover, they find that among other factors, the increasing frequency of negative 
earnings explains the shift in value-relevance from earnings to book values. This 
confirms previous work by Hayn (1995) that demonstrates that stock prices are 
affected differently by negative income, as compared to positive income. 
The impact of negative earnings (income) on valuation is also observed by 
Rees (1999). Using UK data, he corroborates that negative income affect the firms' 
values. He also shows that incorporating the negative income variables into the 
valuation model results in shifting the value-relevance from net incomes to equity. 
While Collins et al. (1997) show that the value-relevance of earnings and 
book values vary over time, Rees (1998) finds that they also vary across countries. 
Many scholars have tried to simplify the Ohlson's model and examine the impact 
of different firm characteristics on the parameter estimates. Fama and French 
(1998) investigate the value relevance of dividend taxation and debts. While many 
capital market research studies offen exclude financial firms in research samples, 
Danbolt and Rees (2002) particularly investigate the valuation of financial firms in 
Europe. Using some fundamental accounting information, they find that the 
accounting valuation models works well to explain the variation in the market to 
book ratio. 
Other valuation methods used widely in practice are the comparable 
multiple and the DCF methods. Kaplan and Ruback (1995) investigate the 
accuracy of the DCF methods to estimate firms' market values. Using 3 CAPM- 
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based approaches to assess the discount rate, they find that the methods provide a 
reliable estimation of firms' value. Moreover, they also compare the result with 
one using the comparable-based methods. The evidence shows that the DCF 
methods perform as well as the comparable-based methods. 
Focusing particularly on bankrupt firms, Gilson et al. (2000) employ the 
DCF and comparable multiple methods. They find that these methods generally 
yield unbiased estimates of value, however the range of valuation errors is very 
wide. They argue that the sources of errors could be attributed to finding the proper 
discount rate or the long-term growth rate as well as the lack of information about 
bankrupt firms. 
Assuming that greater information about a stock increases the market's 
precision in valuing stocks, Ebenhart (2001) argues that the comparable multiples 
methods facilitate the market for more information access. Instead of using 
commonly used multiples such as book-to-market, price-to-cash flow, etc, he 
proposes a new simple proxy for differential information, a number of multiples 
provided by comparable firms. He finds a negative relationship between the 
amount of information provided by comparable firms and a firm's stock return 
volatility, suggesting that the more information about comparable firms available 
to the market, the more accurate the stock valuation. 
Recently, Liu et al. (2002) examine the valuation performance of a 
comprehensive list of value drivers. They find that multiples derived from future 
earnings estimation explain stock prices remarkably well. Other value drivers, 
which work well are cash flow measures and the book value of equity. In contrast 
to other studies, they find that historic earnings also have been a proficient driver, 
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while sales figures apparently are the worst driver. Additionally, they test more 
complex measures of intrinsic value, however the value performance declines. 
2.6.2 IPO Valuation 
As discussed above, for non-IPO shares there are a number of valuation 
methods used. However, the choice becomes limited when it is applied to IPOs. 
Since very little information is available in the market prior to flotation, the DCF 
methods are seldom suitable. Usually, the prospectuses enclose up to three years 
financial statements, which are not sufficient to have appropriate cash flow 
forecasts. Additionally, IPO firms are typically young firms with high prospective 
growth rate. This makes it even more difficult to determine an appropriate discount 
rate. 
Another valuation method is the comparable firm multiples methods. 
According to McCarthy (1999), this is the most common method used by issuers 
and sponsors in setting the IPO offer price. Kim and Ritter (1999) investigate the 
usefulness of the comparable firm multiples method to value IPOs. Firstly, they 
use price-earnings ratios as a denominator of an IPO market price. This approach 
results in very poor precision when historical accounting numbers are used. 
However, the accuracy of the valuation improves substantially when forecasted 
earnings are used. They, then, test other multiples, such as the market-to-book, 
price-to-sale, enterprise value-to-sales and enterprise value-to-operating cash flow. 
They find these multiples are somewhat more accurate than the use of historical 
accounting. Furthermore, they experiment using two types of benchmarks; recent 
IPOs in the same industry, and a portfolio of firms chosen by a leading investment 
banker. The result shows that the accuracy of valuation increases when the latter 
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benchmark is used. This implies that although the comparable firm multiples 
approach is popular, other information, such as the underwriter's information 
regarding market demand results in much more accurate pricing. 
Closely related to Kaplan and Ruback's study (1995), Berkam et al. (2000) 
examine the - accuracy of the comparable firm multiples methods and the DCF 
methods in valuing IPOs. Using a data set from a relatively thin market (New 
Zealand Stock' Exchange), they use forecasted accounting information on both 
methods. Unsurprisingly, in line with Kaplan & Ruback (1995), they find that both 
methods have similar accuracy in valuing IPOs. However, the empirical result 
depends highly on the benchmark used. They conclude that using the market-based 
benchmark produces more accurate estimation than using the industry-based 
benchmark. 
As discussed above, the signalling hypothesis has been notable in IPO 
theory. Downes and Heinkel (1982) are amongst others who investigate the 
valuation of new equity offerings in relation to signalling the firm value. They test 
the Leland-Pyle model (1977) using US IPO data during 1965-1969 and find that 
the firms, which retain high fractional ownership, do indeed have higher values. 
They argue that the ownership retention at the IPO signals the old shareholders' 
believes in the firms' future value. The old shareholders of the `good' firm, 
therefore, tend to retain a high fraction of shares at the IPO. Hence a positive 
relationship is expected between the ownership retention at the IPO and the value 
of a firm. As mentioned earlier in the underpricing section, one implication of the 
signalling models is that the owners of the good firms are likely to retain a high 
fraction of the ownership at the IPO. The argument is that the management use the 
underpricing to signal the firm's true value, in expectation to have a higher price at 
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the subsequent seasoned equity offerings. The old shareholders (owners) ought to 
retain a high fraction of shares in order to offset the cost of underpricing at the 
SEOs. 
Based on Leland and Pyle's (1977) model, Krinsky and Rottenberg (1989) 
argue that the net proceeds, as indicated in the offering prospectus, might also 
convey the insiders' private information regarding the future planned -projects in 
the firms. Therefore, it is regarded as a signal to the firm value. In their empirical 
investigation, Krisnky and Rottenberg (1989) find positive relationships between 
the proceeds and the IPO (subscription and market) prices. Using the UK USM 
data, Short and Keasey (1997) also finds a support for the positive net proceeds- 
firm value relationship. 
Other variables employed as signals to the value of IPO are such as auditor 
quality (Beatty, 1989; Datar et al., 1991; Feltham et al., 1991), and investment 
banker quality (Titman and Trueman, 1986), and the relationship between the 
issuers and the banks (Slovin and Young, 1990). Others use the firm's accounting 
information, such as the earnings forecast, to value the issue (Kim and Ritter, 
1999; Firth and Liau-Tan, 1998; Keasey and McGuinness, 1991). 
While Heinkel (1982), Ritter (1984), and Clarkson et A. (1991) use 
financial information in order to control for the effects of sample heterogeneity, 
Kim et al.. (1995) focus on the value relevance as well as the predictive ability of 
the -information in Korean IPOs. They develop two regression models. The first 
model is based on the pricing -formulae prepared by the Korean authority, which 
was heavily dependent on future earnings, net asset value after the offerings, and 
industry characteristics. The second model, called the augmented model is an 
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expansion of the first model by incorporating three signal variables, which are 
ownership retention, underwriters' quality, and investment level. 
The empirical result shows that earnings and industry characteristics have 
positive and significant relationships with the market price. It also indicates that 
these variables tend to have a significant role in explaining and predicting the after- 
market price. However, the evidence fails to detect any significant relationship 
between the potential signals and the market price. 
How and Yeo (2001) investigate the impact of earnings and dividend 
forecasts on the pricing of Australian IPOs. They argue that earnings and dividends 
disclosure in the prospectus minimise the IPO information asymmetry. 
Consequently, they postulate that earnings and dividend forecasts disclosure is 
related to IPO initial valuation. However, the empirical evidence does not support 
the hypothesis. They explain that Brown et al. 's (2000) study on Australian non- 
IPO cases finds that earnings forecasts are subject to error as they are noisy 
estimates of future cash flows. They, consequently, question the relevance of 
forecast information in the valuation process. 
Firth (1998) examines the role of profit forecast published in the prospectus 
as a signal' of IPO value. His previous study (Firth et al.., 1995) shows that 
historical earnings, which are required to be disclosed in the prospectus, are poor 
predictors of future earnings because of typically fast growth of the IPO firms. 
Moreover, they also do not incorporate the effects of the expanded activities of the 
firm financed by the new issue proceeds. Using the forecasted earnings disclosed 
in the prospectus, the study finds a strong positive relationship between earning 
forecasts and IPO market valuation. This result is consistent with Clarkson et A. 
(1992), who use Canadian data. 
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Klein (1996) investigates the relation between the information provided in 
the prospectus and the pricing of IPOs. Her motivation is to examine whether 
investors could use the prospectus to price an IPO. Based on Modigliani-Miller 
(1966), she argues that equity value is a linear function of accounting earnings, 
book value of equity, expected earning growth, and market or firm specific risk 
factors. She posits the hypothesis that the IPO price is an increasing function of 
earning per share, book value, expected growth, and a decreasing function of risk. 
Using the pre-IPO accounting information, such as earnings and book value, she 
finds that some accounting information disclosed in the prospectus are 
significantly related to both offer and one-week prices. This result seems to be 
different from Kim and Ritter (1999). Furthermore, Klein finds that the offer and 
one-week prices appear to be significantly related to the percentage of equity 
retained, the underwriter reputation, and whether the offer includes a warrant or 
not (usually referred to as unit IPOs). In general, the result confirms findings of 
other studies. Another robust finding is that the prospectus information explains 
the variation of the offer price more than it does the one-week price. This implies 
that having traded one week in the market, other information revealed is also taken 
into consideration in valuing the newly listed firms. While studies - mentioned 
above exhibit the important role of earnings forecast information on the IPO 
pricings, DuCharme et al. (2001) argue that since so little information about the 
firm is available pre-IPO, there is an incentive for issuers to manipulate, or 
manage, the reported earnings. Therefore, they posit that pre-IPO earnings 
management by issuers is positively related to the initial firm value. 
Since earning management is an unobservable variable, they use a number 
of management of accruals as proxies. Using 171 IPOs that went public in the US 
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market during the period 1982-1997, they find evidence to support the hypothesis 
of the positive relationship between the earnings management and the IPO offer 
price. The result implies that the issuers, who try to manage the accounting 
accruals prior to IPO, report better earnings forecasts, and thus have a high initial 
price in the market. 
In the second part of their study, they also test a hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between the earnings management and the subsequent performance of 
IPOs. They posit that pre-IPO earnings management is negatively related to IPO 
returns in the after-market. However, they find no evidence to support the 
hypothesis. 
Recently, Beatty et al. (2002) investigate the IPO pricing based on 
accounting information. They focus their investigation on the explanatory power of 
revenue, accounting earnings, and book value as cash flow surrogates, to the three 
IPO prices (the offer price, the filing price, and the initial market price. They try 
several models and find that changes in models result in big differences in the 
explanatory power of the models. They conclude that the modelling is more critical 
with IPOs than with establish firms. 
In their study, three general models are developed. The first model is the 
offer price against the accounting information. They use 5 different proxies for the 
offer price (unscaled per share, unscaled total value, total value scaled by book 
value, total value scaled by revenue, and natural log of total value). They employ 
pre-IPO earnings per share and pre-IPO book value per share as the predictors. The 
empirical results show that earnings and book value is positively and significantly 
related to all offer price proxies. The explanatory power of the model varies among 
the different offer price proxies. The earnings and book value explain as much as 
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17.6 % to the variation of per share data and the highest at 65.9% on the natural log 
model. This suggests that the historical accounting information does provide 
information to explain the variability of the offer price. 
Using the natural log of total value, they expand the model by including a 
number of predictors (revenue, IPO year dummy, percentage of shares retained at 
the IPO, and the residual from the previous natural long model). They also 
transform the earnings and book value data to the natural log form. They find all 
predictors are significant and of expected signs, and the explanatory power rises to 
75.05%. 
The above model is then expanded by adding pre-IPO market return and 
the natural log of the filing price as new predictors. Such inclusion makes a big 
impact to the change of model explanatory power. It rises up to 98.18%. 
Interestingly, the earnings, book value, and retained ownership coefficients 
become negative and lose their significance. Since the inclusion of filing value 
captures what the underwriters thought the offer price would be, the result suggests 
that underwriters tend to overweight the importance of these fundamental variables 
when setting the filing price. 
The following analysis in their study is of the market value model. This 
model relates the initial market price and the accounting information and control 
variables. The empirical evidence shows that all three fundamentals are negatively 
related to the market price. They argue that the result indicates that firms with high 
fundamentals are underpriced to a lesser degree than those with weaker 
fundamentals. To examine whether the lower market price is a result of risk 
adjustment, they develop a proxy for the ex-ante risk measure. They find that the 
standard deviation of the after market returns for 1 year is an unbiased proxy to the 
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ex-ante risk measure. A cross sectional analysis is undertaken to examine the 
impact of the accounting information, risk, size, industry on the initial returns. In 
addition, the model also includes the offer value residuals to investigate the partial 
adjustments. The results show that the accounting information is significantly 
related to the initial returns. They also find a positive relationship between the risk 
and the initial returns. A positive and significant coefficient of offer value residual 
confirms the partial adjustment made by the underwriters during the marketing 
period. 
In sum, there are several equity valuation models applied in the literature, 
however the choice becomes limited when it is applied to IPOs since very little 
information about the firm is available to the market prior to the admission. The 
prospectus is regarded as the most comprehensive information about the issuing 
firms, which is available prior to the IPOs. Using US data, Klein (1996) 
investigates the usefulness of the prospectus information on the IPO pricing. In 
line with Klein's study, this study examines the impact of the prospectus 
information on the IPO offer price and market price. The prospectus information is 
defined as the firm accounting fundamentals, the ex-ante risk factors, and the 
signals. The basic model used is the accounting-based valuation model, which 
analyses the impact of the firm accounting fundamentals on the IPO prices. 
Following prior studies (e. g., Beatty and ritter, 1986; Krinsky and Rottenberg, 
1989), the research model is expanded by including the risk factors and the signals. 
2.7 Risk 
As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, one of this study's objectives is 
to investigate the relationship between the IPO ex-ante risk factors and its 
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valuation and long-run performance. This section reviews a number of existing 
studies in finance regarding risks. 
2.7.1. Risk conceptualisation 
The two key factors in any investment decision are return and risk. Under 
the assumption that investors are risk-averse and seek to minimise the risk for any 
level of expected return, intuition suggest that additional return must compensate 
investors for assuming additional risk (Aaker and Jacobson, 1987). 
In classical decision theory, risk is defined as reflecting variation in the 
distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihood, and their subjective values. In 
statistical term, that definition is known as variation, or its derivative, standard 
deviation. 
March and Shapira (1987) conduct research regarding manager 
perspectives on risk. They argue that in the managerial perspective, the managers 
see risk in ways that are less precise and different from risk as it appears in 
decision theory. Firstly, most managers do not treat uncertainty about positive 
outcomes as an important aspect of risk. They treat risk as a danger or hazard in 
their businesses. Secondly, risk is not primarily a probability concept. In their 
study, a majority of managers felt that risk could be better defined in terms of 
amount to lose, or expected to be lost. Thirdly, managers seek precision in 
estimating risk. Most managers show little desire to reduce risk to a single 
quantifiable construct. 
Although definitions of risk abound, there is a common notion that these 
definitions attempt to convey that risk is associated with the chance of something 
undesirable happening. Mocks and Vertinsky (1985) argue that undesirable 
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consequences can be identified in terms of. (1) some natural reference points such 
as zero separating gains from losses; or (2) reference points provided by a specific 
problem context and rules, perhaps professional standards specifying reasonable 
levels of report accuracy; or (3) programs used by decision maker and risk 
assessors to formulate the problem while solving it such as target profits set by 
corporate plans. 
2.7.2 Some important studies on risk 
The study regarding risk has been an important and long discussion topic in 
several areas, such as economic, finance, and strategic management. In the 
economic area, risk is usually related to the choice under uncertainty conditions. It 
is Irving Fisher (1906) who firstly discussed the uncertainty of future asset returns 
that is described in terms of a probability. However, the most fundamental theory 
on risk is Knight's study (1921) that discusses risk versus uncertainty. The theory 
says that risk exists when the economic agent can assign numerical probabilities to 
events in a certain situation. If the probabilities cannot be assigned, then 
uncertainty exists. Referring to previous studies, Hicks (1934) suggests that 
preferences for investments could be represented as preferences for the moments of 
the probability distributions of their returns. He also proposes that preferences 
could be represented by indifference curves in mean-variance space. Then, this 
study is expanded by von Neumann and Morgenstern's study (1947), which is well 
known as `The Expected Utility Theory'. Within this theory, an individual's 
attitude towards risk is reflected in the shape of his or her utility function. 
Eventually, Hick's study has led to the spread of risk research to other disciplines. 
(The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, 1994). 
70 
In the finance area, risk is usually discussed in the context of modern 
portfolio theory. Markowitz (1952) assumed explicitly that investor preferences 
were defined over the mean and variance of the aggregate portfolio return, which 
could be referred to as risk-return analysis. After that, several studies try to relate 
investor preferences with the expected utility theory [Markowitz and Tobin (1958), 
Merton (1969), Samuelson (1970)]. They find similar conclusions that the investor 
preference, which is known as the mean-variance preferences, is applicable to the 
certain part of his or her expected utility function. 
This finding leads to the famous Tobin's analysis (1958), which deals with 
the choice between a single risky asset and cash. He demonstrates that there is 
nothing essential changed if there are many risky assets as they can be treated as a 
single composite asset. Tobin's theory is known as the first separation theorem in 
portfolio theory. Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) develop the Tobin's theory. 
They propose the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
In his study, Sharpe builds a model that explains the relationship between 
the risk and the expected return of a risky asset. The term systematic risk was 
firstly introduced in this paper. This type of risk describes the portion of an 
investment's total risk that cannot be avoided by combining it with other 
investments in a diversified portfolio. Because it cannot be avoided, investors 
require compensation for bearing systematic risk. The other part of total risk is the 
unsystematic risk, which is related to factors that are unique to specific 
investments. Investors do not require compensation for this component of risk 
because it can be avoided by diversification. 
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2.7.3. The capital asset pricing model 
The CAPM is a significant asset pricing model, not only because it was the 
first equilibrium model of asset pricing under uncertainty, but also because it 
shows the importance of portfolio separation for tractable equilibrium models. 
Many scholars attempt to test the CAPM empirically. They find some support for 
the theoretical model. (Black, Jensen and Scholes, 1972; Fama and Macbeth, 
1973). However, with different time periods, there have been some mixed results 
as well (Banz, 1981; Basu, 1983; Rossenberg et al., 1985; Chan et al., 1991). Fama 
and French's study (1992) attempts to test the model empirically. Using 50 years 
of data on stock prices on three major US exchange markets, they find mixed 
results. There has been a positive relationship between beta and stock returns 
during the 1926-1968 period, however for the entire period of 1926-1990 they find 
no relationship between beta and returns. This result has been discussed in the 
Roll's (1977) analytical study. He argues that the positive relationship between 
beta and returns will be obtained if and only if the market proxy is exactly on the 
mean-variance efficient frontier. If the market proxy is off the efficient frontier, 
that relationship may be null. Since the exact efficient frontier can never be 
verified, he concludes that CAPM is of little practical use in explaining stock 
returns. 
The other area that usually involves risk in the studies is strategic 
management. Many scholars use the CAPM concept in strategic management 
literature. The considerable logic in directly applying CAPM concepts to problems 
in strategic management is when discussing about corporate diversification 
strategy or in situations where maximisation of stockholders wealth is taken as the 
primary objective of the firm. 
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The majority of studies explicitly employing a CAPM risk measure have 
employed one or more of the measures of systematic risk, unsystematic risk, or 
alpha to represent an independent variable in the models [Montgomery & Singh 
(1984), Aaker & Jacobson (1987), Lubatkin & O'Neill (1988), Barton (1988), 
Lubatkin & Chaterjee (1991)]. They directly incorporated the CAPM paradigm of 
risk in research directed at clarifying the relationships among diversification 
strategies and risk. 
In their study, Montgomery and Singh (1984) find that related and 
unrelated diversifiers differ along the risk-return relationship. The unrelated 
diversifiers tend to have higher levels of systematic risk than the related 
diversifiers do. They predict that high systematic risk associated with the unrelated 
diversification might be attributed to low market power, low capital intensity, and 
high debt position. Barton (1988) conducted a study that explicitly tests the 
relationship between those three variables and diversification strategy. The result 
supports the previous work. 
In reviewing strategic management articles involving risk during 1980- 
1995, Ruefli et al. (1999) find there are 53 studies employing the CAPM 
systematic risk as a company risk measure. This shows that the market based risk 
measure, as determined in the finance area, is generally accepted by strategic 
management scholars. 
The CAPM implies that unsystematic risk should not influence investors' 
decision. However, in a strategic context, Aaker and Jacobson (1987) argue that 
managers should not ignore this type of risk. The justification is that two of CAPM 
assumptions are inappropriate to strategy decisions. Firstly, the assumption 
regarding investors as price takers, who can invest as much as they like, by using 
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portfolio diversification, and receive expected returns. However, they are still 
bounded with the feasibility of the portfolio in the market. This implies that if 
investors do not find the expected returned for their investment by diversification, 
they might take the unsystematic risk into consideration in their investment 
decisions. 
Secondly, CAPM assumes that bankruptcy cost is zero and firms can sell 
their assets at their economic value. However, if a firm goes bankrupt, it may have 
to sell assets at prices below market price because of legal fees, expensive delays, 
or a premature collapse of sales. Therefore, in turn, investors may need additional 
return to compensate for those costs. This implies that to avoid bearing those 
additional costs, investors should invest in low unsystematic risk firms. 
Bettis and Hall (1982) argue that managers should be concerned primarily 
with the unsystematic risk. The management of this risk is at the heart of strategic 
management. Further, Aaker and Jacobson (1987) also argue that there are some 
incentives for managers to reduce unsystematic risks, such as bonuses or job 
security. 
In their study, Aaker and Jacobson (1987) investigate the relationship 
between systematic risk, unsystematic risk, and firm performance. They find that 
both components of total risk have substantial, significant, and different effects 
upon firm performance. The relationship between performance and systematic risk 
is found to be positive and significant, while the relationship between performance 
and unsystematic risk is found to be positive but not significant. 
A number of scholars employ Jensen's alpha [Johnson et al. (1987), 
Lubatkin & Rogers (1989), Amit & Wernerfelt (1990), Nayyar (1992), Woo et al. 
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(1992), Hoskisson (1993)]. They have similar results, which show that business 
risk has a negative effect on firm value. 
2.7.4. Accounting-based risk measures 
Ruefli et al. (1999) also record the variance as the second most widely used 
measure of risk in strategic management articles. What they mean with variance is 
simply the variance of time series of accounting returns. Beaver et al. 's study 
(1970) is among the first articles that discuss the accounting based risk measures. 
The motive behind their study is that there are some variances in security prices, 
which cannot be explained by CAPM. They argue that although CAPM provides a 
measure of security riskiness, the knowledge of risk determination is incomplete if 
the exogenous data (non-price data) is unknown. Therefore, by examining some 
accounting based risk measures, they expect to shed some light to the risk 
determination. The other reason why they investigate the accounting risk measures 
is that the accounting measures are used widely by investors as proxies for 
company risk. In this study, they also attempt to know to what extent a strategy 
selecting portfolios according to the traditional accounting risk measures is 
equivalent to the market based risk measures. 
Unlike CAPM, which can divide the total risk into its two important 
components, the accounting risk measures can be viewed as surrogates for the total 
variability of return of a firm's equity securities. Thus, accounting measures reflect 
both the systematic and unsystematic risk. Additionally, Bildersee (1970) argue 
that the accounting data can be considered as a summary of all company events 
and decisions. As such, it summarises, in some form, information basic to the 
measurement of total risk associated with the firm and with the securities 
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supporting the firm. Theoretically, it can be said that there should be an association 
between the accounting risk measure and the market beta. 
The study using accounting data faces a problem of selection of the 
appropriate accounting data and financial ratios. This problem arises as usually 
such ratios are often highly correlated. To avoid such a problem, Bildersee (1975) 
suggests selecting only one ratio from each class of ratios. In their study, Beaver et 
al. (1970) investigate 7 accounting risk measures: dividend payout, asset growth, 
leverage, liquidity, asset size, variability of earnings, and the covariability in 
earnings. 
It is often affirmed that firms with low dividend payout ratios are more 
risky. This can be justified as follows: if the firm sets a stable dividend payout 
policy, then firms with greater volatility of earnings will pay out a lower 
percentage of expected earnings. Therefore, the payout ratio can be viewed as a 
proxy for management's perception of the uncertainty linked to the firm's expected 
earnings. 
Asset growth is defined as the average of the annualised rate of change in 
assets over the time period. Expectedly, the more new assets invested within the 
firm, the more earnings they produce. However, Beaver et al. (1970) argue that the 
addition of new assets to the firm could mean an increasing uncertainty in expected 
returns. Therefore, they presume that there is a positive relationship between the 
asset growth and company risk. 
Modigliani and Miller (1965) show that the introduction of debt to the 
firm's capital structure induces greater volatility of the firm's earning stream for 
ordinary shares. It could be inferred that the firms' debt affects the riskiness of the 
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firms equity, hence, it is predicted that the higher the debt ratio of the firm, the 
greater the risk. 
Compared to fixed assets, current assets can be reckoned to have less 
volatile return. However, the relationship between current assets and current 
liability has a similar pattern to that of leverage. Therefore, it could be conjectured 
that the less liquid the firm, the greater the risk. However, it is presumed that the 
relationship between liquidity and risk tends not to be as high as that between 
leverage and risk (Beaver et al., 1970). 
It is widely believed that larger companies are less risky than smaller 
companies. In term of default risk, the evidence shows that the chance of failure 
has been lower for the large size companies (Assadian and Ford, 1997). 
Additionally, Ballantine et al. (1993) argue that firm size reflects the uncertainty in 
the firm's profit and loss rates. They find that small firms have greater variations in 
profits than large firms do. In their seminal paper, Fama and French (1993) also 
identify the firm's size as one of the risk factors in the common stock returns. 
As firm's earnings have been a main focus in risk, Beaver et al. (1970) 
include the variability in earnings in their analysis as a measure of risk. The proxy 
used is the standard deviation of the earning price ratio. The higher standard 
deviation of the earnings price ratio describes increasing risk. They also include the 
accounting beta into the analysis. It can be derived in a similar manner to the 
market beta with the earning price ratio as dependent variable and the market- 
earning price as the independent variable and is defined as the sensitivity of firm's 
share price to the changes in the market index. The higher value of accounting beta 
infers that the share price is more sensitive to the market index changes, which 
reflects the high riskiness of the firm's value. 
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In his study, Bildersee (1975) employ 10 accounting-based risk measures: 
the asset-to-equity ratio, the debt-to-equity ratio, the preferred-to-common equity 
ratio, the current ratio, the sales-to-equity ratio, the cash flow per debt plus 
preferred ratios, equity, asset growth, the standard deviation of the earning-price 
ratio, and the accounting beta. 
In terms of the source of company risk, there are some similarities between 
the approaches used by Beaver et al. (1970) and Bildersee (1975). Both studies 
agree with leverage, profitability, " liquidity, asset growth, and the earnings stream 
as sources of company risk. However, Bildersee put the efficiency and coverage of 
fixed obligations as other sources of risk. They also differ in employing financial 
ratios to those sources of risk. 
Both studies also end up with similar conclusions regarding the association 
between accounting- and market-based measures of risk. They find a high degree 
of association between both types of risk measures. Additionally, Beaver et al. 
state that a strategy of selecting accounting risk measures is essentially equivalent 
to a strategy of ranking those same portfolios according to market-determined risk 
measures. 
Although focusing mainly on risk with regard to corporate strategic 
management, Miller and Bromiley (1991) also employ some accounting risk 
measures. They identify nine measures of risk that have been used in research 
relevant to the strategic management area: systematic risk, unsystematic risk, the 
debt to equity ratio, capital intensity, R&D intensity, the standard deviation of 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), stock analysts' earning forecasts, 
and the coefficient of variation of stock analysts' earnings forecasts. They group 
the variables into three categories: stock return, financial ratios, and income stream 
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uncertainty. They argue that factor one is generally believed to be the measure of 
risk most relevant to general management. Factor two, stock return risk, captures 
risk from the perspective of shareholders. Factor three; strategic risk has risk 
implications for multiple external stakeholders groups. 
Similar to previous studies, Miller and Bromiley argue that the debt-to- 
equity ratio is a standard measure of corporate financial leverage, which reflects a 
company's risk of bankruptcy. The second financial ratio employed is the capital 
intensity. This measure is not included in previous studies. Miller and Bromiley 
argue that capital intensity increases company risk in two ways. Firstly, if a firm 
choose to produce a given output with high capital intensity and low amount of 
labour, it increases its fixed costs and lowers its variable costs. Thus, it increases 
company risk. Secondly, a firm using a large amount of capital runs a high risk of 
capital obsolescence. There have been some studies that attempt to seek the 
relationship between capital intensity and variability in returns (Lev, 1974; Hurdle, 
1974). Hurdle finds a negative association between capital intensity and variability 
in returns. In contrast, Lev (1974) finds a positive association between those 
variables. The different findings seem to stem from different ratios employed. 
While Hurdle uses the ratio of capital to sales as a proxy for capital intensity, Lev 
uses the ratio of fixed costs to variable costs. The first ratio shows that the higher 
the ratio, the riskier the firm. The second one shows the higher the ratio, the less 
risky the firm. In Miller and Bromiley's study, the ratio of total assets to sales is 
employed as a proxy for the capital intensity. 
The third accounting risk measure used is R&D intensity. This reflects the 
extent to which a company chooses to develop new processes or products. Miller 
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and Bromiley (1990) argue that since technology and markets keep changing, a 
firm face some level of uncertainty regarding its investment in R&D. 
The last accounting risk measures used in Miller and Bromiley's study are 
the standard deviation of ROE and ROA. These measures are used in some 
previous studies [Bowman (1980), Fiegenbaum & Thomas (1985), Woo (1987)]. 
Moreover, Miller and Bromiley try to compare the risk measures. Before 
processing the risk measures into the model, they run the factor analysis method. 
The result of the principal component analysis shows that several distinct empirical 
risk factors exist and are stable over time. Hence, three risk factors, income stream 
risk, stock return risk, and strategic risk, are substantially different and valid. This 
result implies that the three risk factors could be used as separate independent risk 
measures. 
Although the arguments above highlight some advantages of accounting risk 
measures, there are some limitations in using them as company risk measures. The 
critiques emphasise that a mean-variance approach of the firms' incomes, to 
estimating the relationship between return and risk, suffers from an identification 
problem (Ruefli, 1990). Moreover, the accounting returns reflect past investment 
decisions. They also do not appropriately capture the expected future cash flow 
that a firm's stock of assets could generate. Finally, the differences in tax laws 
across industries and in accounting conventions regarding R&D and advertising 
expenses may distort accounting based measures (Amit and Wenerfelt, 1990). 
2.7.5. Risk-return relationship 
Most investment textbooks explain the positive association between risk 
and the expected return of an asset. The riskier the assets, the higher the expected 
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return. However, studies of the influence of risk and performance have yielded 
mixed result. Bowman (1980) finds a negative association between risk and 
returns. In his study, he employs the variance in returns as a risk measure. Testing 
Bowman's (1980) risk-returns paradox, Fieganbaum and Thomas (1985) find that 
the risk-return relationship varied over time. In a subsequent study in 1986, they 
find no association between the systematic risk of a firm's stock returns and returns 
that is measured using accounting data. Aaker and Jacobson (1987) find a positive 
relationship between firm performance and its total risk. In this research, they use 
an accounting risk measure, the variance of the firms' earnings, as a proxy for the 
risk, and the return of the firms' share in the market, as a proxy to the firm's 
performance. 
Using different explanatory variables, Miller and Bromiley (1990) 
categorise risk into three groups (income stream uncertainty, stock return risk, and 
strategic risk). They also use industry classification as a dummy variable in the 
model. The accounting earnings figure is used as a proxy for firms' performance. 
The empirical evidence shows that there is a negative association between income 
stream risk variables and performance. On the other hand, the association between 
the strategic risk and performance varies across industries and performance levels. 
They find no relationship between the stock return risk and performance. 
From the above findings, it can be concluded that the risk-return 
relationship depends on the risk and returns measures employed in the study. This 
implies that different measures may capture different dimensions of risk. 
Furthermore, the relations among risk measures and between risk and performance 
may vary over time and across industries. 
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2.7.6. Risk, IPO valuation and performance 
There have been few IPO studies investigating the relationship between the 
risk and IPO valuation and performance. Based on the timing and the risk measure, 
such studies could be classified into 2 groups. The first group is studies that use the 
ex-ante risk and the second is ones that use the ex-post risk. Below is the review of 
such studies. The former group of studies is explained after the review of the latter. 
Ritter's study (1984) is the initial study, which examines the relationship 
between uncertainty and IPO underpricing in the US market. In this study, he 
argues that the ex post uncertainty is positively correlated to the degree of 
underpricing. He employs the standard deviation of daily returns for days two 
through five as a proxy for the ex post risk measure. The empirical result to this 
argument finds a significant positive correlation coefficient between this risk 
measure and the degree of underpricing. 
Using a sample of 510 US IPOs that went public in 1982-1983, Miller and 
Reilly (1987) also investigate the relationship between the uncertainty and the 
underpricing. They use the ex-post and ex-ante measures of risk. The ex-post risk 
employed is measured by two proxies, the trading volume and the bid-ask spread 
They argue that the level of trading may signify the extent to which 
investors disagree about the value of a security. If the underpriced issues are 
subject to the greatest uncertainty, this would 'imply that they should exhibit 
greater trading volume. They use daily trading volume as a proxy for the 
uncertainty. The empirical result is robust. The evidence shows that the 
underpriced issues experience significantly higher volume for days two through 
five. 
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The bid-ask spread is known to be a function of inventory risk and adverse 
information risk. Inventory risk depends upon the price volatility and the number 
of trades for each issue in inventory. Adverse information risk affect the bid-ask 
spreads since market makers are obliged to trade with investors who might possess 
superior information. The larger bid-ask spread exists when informed investors are 
present. This implies that the initial spread should be greater for IPOs that are 
underpriced because informed investors are involved in these offerings. 
In order to examine the relationship between the inventory risk and the 
underpricing, they use the absolute value of daily returns as a proxy for price 
volatility and the daily volume as a proxy for the frequency of trades. The result 
shows that on day one the underpriced issues have a significantly larger positive 
price volatility coefficient and a larger negative trading volume coefficient. 
However, this result is not significant for days two through five. As there is no 
explicit measure of adverse information risk in the model, they do not test this risk. 
In addition to the ex-post risk measure, Miller and Reilly (1987) also 
employ the ex-ante risk, which is proxied by the use of the inverse of gross 
proceeds. They likewise find a significant positive correlation between the ex ante 
uncertainty and the degree of underpricing. They also find a significant positive 
correlation between the ex ante uncertainty and the degree of underpricing. 
Carter et al. (1998) investigate the relationship between risk, the IPO 
underpricing and the long-run performance. Using the standard deviation of daily 
IPO returns for a year, they find that the IPO ex-post risk is related positively to 
the degree of underpricing and negatively to the IPO long-run performance. This 
result implies that the uncertainty during the early IPO period produces the 
improper pricing in this period. In the long run, with more information available, 
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the pricing error is corrected by the market, which is shown by the declining IPO 
returns. 
Based on the source of risk, the above studies employ measures using the 
IPO prices, returns, and trading volume data, which are the results of the investors' 
actions. However, for helping investors in pricing IPOs, it is more useful to 
examine the ex-ante risk. Below is a review of prior IPO studies that use the ex- 
ante risk. Most of the risk indicators used in the studies is related to the firm 
specific risk or business risk. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) attempt to relate the ex ante uncertainty and the 
IPO performance. They argue that as the value of an issue would not be revealed 
until it is traded, the IPO contains ex ante uncertainty. As the ex ante uncertainty 
increases, the winner's curse problem among investors intensifies. Following 
Rock's study (1986), the uninformed investors will only submit purchase orders, if, 
on average, the IPOs are underpriced. Consequently, in the case of an issue with 
greater ex ante uncertainty, the uninformed investors demand more money be `left 
on the table'. In other words, the greater the ex ante uncertainty, the greater the 
degree of underpricing. Furthermore, they emphasise that the ex ante uncertainty, 
which leads to the underpricing, does not correspond to the CAPM concept of 
systematic risk. 
In order to test the hypothesis empirically, Beatty and Ritter (1986) employ 
two proxies for the ex ante uncertainty: the log of one plus the number of uses for 
the proceeds, and the reciprocal of the gross proceeds. Most issuers disclose their 
intention of the usage of net proceeds received from the flotation in their IPO 
prospectuses. In the UK listing rules, the Financial Service Authority requires the 
disclosure of such information in the prospectus (FSA, 2001). Following Rock 
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(1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that providing investors with the number of 
proceeds usage reduces the uncertainty, which leads to reduction in IPO risk. The 
evidence shows that there is a negative relationship between the number of 
proceeds usage to the degree of underpricing. 
The second proxy for the ex ante uncertainty is the reciprocal of the gross 
proceeds. They argue that gross proceeds reflect the firm's size. It is understood 
that large firms are less risky than the small ones. The results confirm the positive 
relationship between the uncertainty and the degree of underpricing. Moreover, an 
implication of this finding is that, if the level of ex ante uncertainty is endogenous, 
an issuer has an incentive to reduce this uncertainty by voluntary disclosing 
information. 
Recently, Leone et al. (2003) investigate the disclosure of intended use of 
proceeds and the underpricing in more detail. They assess the paragraphs in 
prospectuses, which explain the firms' intentions regarding the use of the proceeds. 
They categorise the IPOs into 7 classes of usage, such as paying debt, paying old 
shareholders, investment, marketing, working capital, R&D, and others. Their first 
interesting finding is that IPOs that disclose higher percentage of proceeds to any 
specific use, tend to have lower initial return, while IPOs that vaguely disclose 
such information tend to have higher initial returns. The second result is that the 
use of proceeds for paying debt and investment is significantly related to the 
underpricing. The implication of this is that specific information disclosed prior to 
the IPO leads to reducing the uncertainty and then the error in IPO pricing. 
Other studies (Simunic and Stein, 1987; Beatty and Welch, 1996) employ 
the number of risk factors provided in the prospectus as a proxy to IPO risk. 
Usually, the risk factors mentioned in the prospectus are firm specific risks, such as 
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related operating risks. Although the more information disclosed in the prospectus 
means reducing uncertainty, the greater number of risk factors shows increasing 
firm riskiness. Both studies use US data and find a significant positive association 
between the number of risk factors and the IPO initial returns. 
Klein (1996) hypothesises that the IPO value is a decreasing function of 
firm risk. This implies that the riskier the IPO, the lower the price. Having 
examined a number of proxies for risk used in the IPO studies, she claims that they 
may mislead the result interpretation. In contrast to Beatty and Welch (1996), she 
disagrees with the use of the number of risks disclosed in the prospectus as a proxy 
for firm risk. Such a proxy implies that a firm, which discloses 4 types of risk in 
the prospectus, is twice as risky as another, which reports 2 types of risk. She 
argues that it misleads, as it is not always the case. Therefore, she proposes a 
dummy variable as a proxy for risk. In her research design, she assigns dummy 1 
for IPOs, which have a boldface risk reference on the prospectus cover, and 0 
otherwise. She argues that the disclosure of the risk reference on the prospectus 
cover shows the issuers' concerns of the business risk that they face. Therefore, it 
should draw the investors' attention when they buy the IPOs. 
Using a sample of 193 IPOs during the period 1980-1991 on the NYSE, the 
results on the offer and market price show support for the hypothesis, which 
confirms the negative relationship between firm risk and the offer and market 
prices. 
The studies reviewed above use risk measures derived directly from the 
prospectus provided by issuers. There are a couple of studies that try to use several 
risk measured derived from the accounting information which is also disclosed in 
the prospectus. 
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Myers and Majluf (1984) investigate the corporate financing and 
investment decisions under information' asymmetry. For their IPO sample, they 
find that debt does not play a signalling role to the firm's value. Their analysis 
implies that leverage increases with the extent of information asymmetry. Since 
prior studies show a positive relationship between underpricing and information 
asymmetry, they postulate that underpricing is positively related to the debt ratio. 
In line with Myers and Majluf (1984), Su (1999) examines the role of pre- 
IPO leverage in explaining the underpricing puzzle. He employs three different 
proxies (the debt to total asset ratio, the debt to equity ratio, and the debt to net 
asset ratio). Using a data set from China, he finds a similar result to the above 
study. The evidence shows that firm's pre-IPO leverage is positively related to the 
degree of underpricing (or IPO initial returns). However, only the debt to net asset 
ratio is found to be significantly related to the IPO initial return. 
A similar study using UK data is conducted by Khurshed et al. (1999). 
They use the pre-IPO debt ratio as a proxy for the firm financial "risk among other 
explanatory variables to explain the variation in IPO long-run performance. They 
find a negative relationship between the debt ratio and IPO buy and hold returns. 
However, the relationship appears to be insignificant. 
In contrast to the two studies above, Hedge and Miller (1996) argue that the 
firm's pre-IPO debt has an important role in signalling the firm's value. They 
argue that prior to going public, the issuers of high-quality firms use debt to signal 
inside information about the expected value and standard deviation of returns on 
assets. A larger debt ratio allows the issuers of high-quality firms to increase the 
expected return on equity. Therefore, debt is a credible signal of firm quality. This 
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argument is in line with Slovin and Young (1990), who find that low-risk firms 
signal their type by borrowing prior to IPO. 
Based on this argument, Hedge and Miller (1996) posit three hypotheses. 
Firstly, they expect that the risk of a firm is a decreasing function of its pre-IPO 
debt ratio. Secondly, the expected value of a firm is an increasing function of the 
level of its pre-IPO debt. And thirdly, the degree of underpricing is negatively 
related to the pre-IPO debt ratio. To test these hypotheses, they use the post-market 
value of equity (i. e., the number of shares outstanding times the first day closing 
price) as a proxy to the firm value, the standard deviation of daily share returns 
over the first 15 trading days as a proxy for the firm risk. They employ 2 measures 
for debt; the level of pre-IPO book value of debt and the debt ratio, which is 
computed as the pre-IPO book value of debt divided by the sum of debt and post- 
market value of equity. 
Using 890 IPOs in the US during the period 1981-1985, they find that there 
is a negative and slightly significant association between the firm's risk and the 
pre-IPO debt ratio. Moreover, they find robust results for the second and third 
hypotheses. The level of pre-IPO debt appears to be positively related to the post- 
IPO firm's value, and the pre-IPO debt ratio is negatively related to the degree of 
underpricing. This result implies that the leverage plays a significant role in IPO 
signalling. 
Conclusion 
IPO literature documents three anomalies in the market; the persistent 
underpricing, the long-run underperformance, and the hot market. There is no 
single consensus hypothesis that could explain the anomalies. The current 
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explanations of the underpricing are mostly based on the information asymmetry 
among the market participants, which leads to mis-pricing the IPOs on the early 
days of trading. 
Although the evidence of the long-run underperformance of IPOs is less 
consistent than the underpricing facts, some studies, assuming markets are 
efficient, suggest that the anomaly is a result of a market correction of the IPO mis- 
pricing. The hot market anomaly, so far, is only confirmed in studies of the US 
market. The current explanations are also related to the investors' behaviour in 
certain economic states, which, in turn, results in the underpricing and eventually 
in the long-run underperformance. 
This study aims to fill some gaps in the literature. Firstly, this is the first 
UK study to use the accounting-based valuation model. Most IPO valuation studies 
investigate the pricing of the IPO on the first trading day, only few attempts to 
examine the offer price (e. g., Klein, 1996; Beatty et al., 2002). This study offers an 
explanation of the pricing of the UK IPOs both, at the firm level and the market 
level. Finally, most IPO studies try to examine the association of the IPO 
underpricing and the long run performance. This study examines the relationship 
between the IPO pricing and the underpricing, and/or the association between the 
IPO pricing and the underpricing and the long run performance, in the hope that it 
could provide new explanations to the IPO anomalies. 
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Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 
Research Design 
Introduction 
This chapter will explain the research methods and the data used to carry 
out the investigation into IPO valuation and performance in the UK main market. 
A number of IPO valuation models have been discussed in the literature review 
as well as current explanations regarding IPO performance. The next section 
outlines and discusses the research models used in this study. The exposition 
includes a discussion of the theoretical foundations of the models, the IPO 
valuation models, the initial return models, and the long run performance 
models. This chapter also describes and defines each research variable used in 
the empirical models. The working hypotheses that the IPO valuation and 
performance models are designed to evaluate are presented in the second section. 
This is followed by a section that discusses the research methods used, the main 
features of the UK institutional framework, and the sample of IPOs used in the 
empirical analysis. 
3.1. Research models 
This section discusses the models used in this study. The section starts 
with a discussion of the theoretical foundation on which the empirical models are 
based. This is followed by a discussion of the empirical models for IPO 
valuation, short-run performance and long run performance. 
3.1.1. Theoretical Foundations 
Going public is often a long and hectic process for a firm that wishes to 
raise funds by offering its shares to the public. There is a long list of 
requirements that have to be fulfilled before a firm can obtain permission to list 
its shares on the stock market. One requirement is to disclose all relevant 
information to the public in a document, called the prospectus. 
According to the UK Listing Authority, a prospectus for the admission of 
shares must contain a list of information items, including the issuer's assets and 
liabilities, financial position, profit and losses, and also the recent development 
and prospects of the f irm. (The Listing Rule, Chapter 6). 
Prior studies have examined the role of fundamental accounting figures 
(for example, pre-IPO and forecasted earnings, pre-IPO and pro-forma book 
value, pre-IPO and forecasted dividend), which are disclosed in the prospectus, 
on IPO valuation (Korean market: Firth, 1995; Firth et al, 1998; US market: 
Klein (1996); Kim and Ritter, 1999). From both regulatory and empirical 
perspectives, the impact of fundamental analysis on IPO valuation and long run 
performance is of central importance and it would therefore be valuable to 
undertake further examination of these issues. 
As discussed in the literature review, most IPO studies agree that the IPO 
underpricing is an increasing function of risk (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Clarkson 
and Simunic, 1994; Klein, 1996; Houge et al, 2001). Moreover, it can also be 
concluded that some variables reported by issuing firms can serve as effective 
signals regarding firm value (see Welch (1989), Carter (1990)). 
This study aims to investigate the impact of prospectus information that is 
proxied by the firm's fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors and signals, which are 
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available to the market prior to the admission, on IPO valuation and performance 
in the UK main market. The IPO valuation is examined using an accounting- 
based valuation model. To the researcher's knowledge, none of the prior IPO 
studies employ this model. This study also examines the impact of IPO pricing 
factors on the performance in the short run as well as in the long run. Keasey and 
Short (1992) investigate the association between the degree of underpricing and 
the level of ex-ante uncertainty in the USM market during 1984-1988. This study 
will analyse the impact of fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and signals, which 
are disclosed in the offering prospectus, on the initial returns (the degree of 
underpricing) in the UK main market during 1987-1997. Additionally, this study 
also investigates the relationship between the prospectus information and the 
long run performance, which are defined as the investors' abnormal returns in 
subsequent years. Before discussing the empirical models used in this study, the 
theoretical foundation will be explained first. 
A general motivating assumption behind this and most other models of 
financial decision making is that investors are risk averse. In IPO cases, it is also 
usually assumed that the issuers' objective when making an offering is to 
maximise the number of shares sold and their price in order to obtain the 
maximum possible amount of funds from new investors (Loughran and Ritter, 
2002). Based on those assumptions, the pricing of IPOs is (or should be) affected 
by firms' ex ante risk characteristics. In order to persuade investors to buy riskier 
IPOs, issuers and sponsors need to offer an incentive, which is a lower price. 
Therefore, it can be inferred that riskier IPOs are priced lower than less risky 
IPOs. 
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When IPOs come to the market, investors begin to estimate the prices 
based on their assessment of a firm's ex ante risk characteristics. As investors 
tend to avoid buying riskier assets, the demand for riskier IPOs can be expected 
to be lower than the demand for less risky IPOs. Hence, holding the supply of 
IPOs constant, the market-determined price of riskier IPOs would be lower than 
the market prices of their less-risky counterparts. As the number of shares of all 
IPOs is limited, there are some investors, who will be left with riskier IPOs. 
However, they would not be prepared to bid the same price as for the less risky 
IPOs. As a result, the market determines lower prices for riskier IPOs. Therefore, 
in line with Klein's hypothesis (1996), it could be posited that IPO prices (the 
offer prices and the market prices) are a decreasing function of firms' ex ante 
risk factors. 
Most IPO signalling studies show evidence of the role of underpricing as 
a signal of firm value. They conclude that there is a positive relationship between 
the degree of undepricing and firm value. Based on the risk-return relationship 
theory, in order to be induced to hold riskier assets, investors demand a higher 
return from such investments. Since the degree of underpricing will be 
negatively related to the expected rate of return for investors who buy the shares 
at the offering price and then sell them at the first day closing price, it could be 
posited that investors demand a higher degree of underpricing for riskier IPOs. 
In the long run, as more information about the quality of the firm 
becomes available in the market, the relationship between the ex-ante risk factors 
and IPO pricing is anticipated to weaken. However, the relationship is expected 
to follow the general risk-return hypothesis, which posits a positive association 
between risk and expected returns. 
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In addition to the fundamentals and the ex-ante risk factors, this study 
also examines the relationship between a number of signals and the IPO prices 
and performance. In IPOs, issuing firms try to reveal the firm value by 
signalling. From the firms' point of view, firm value is not determined solely by 
reference to current information, but rather the future prospects of the firm is also 
relevant. Since issuers are "insiders" that are better informed about the firms' 
prospect than potential outsider investors, the insiders of firms with good 
prospects will be motivated to reveal (i. e., signal) this valuable inside 
information to prospective investors. If the signal works effectively, it should 
influence investors' decision making in respect of IPO pricing, and perhaps be 
associated with reduced mispricing. If the signal influences the IPO pricing 
process, it can be expected to consequently also affect IPO performance in the 
short run and possibly also in the long run. 
3.1.2. The basic IPO valuation model 
As discussed in the literature review, many studies use different methods 
in valuing IPOs. From a practical perspective, McCarthy (1999) argues that the 
IPO pricing process contains both science and art. The scientific part enters the 
process when the underwriters and issuers utilise historical information provided 
by the firm to set the IPO price. The art component comes when market 
information such as price-earnings multiples of comparable firms are taken into 
consideration to value the IPO. From an academic point of view, Kim and Ritter 
(1999) analyse the usefulness of the comparable firms' multiple methods. They 
find that the comparable firms multiple methods are helpful. However, they 
conclude that adding the information regarding market demand into the analysis 
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will also enhance the pricing accuracy. In another study, Berkman et al (2000) 
find that the comparable firms multiples and the DCF methods provide similar 
accuracy levels in explaining the IPO prices. Using UK USM data, Keasey and 
Short (1997) examine the relationship between firm value and a number of 
signals, in particular focusing on the retained equity. 
This research will employ different valuation methods from the studies 
discussed above. Richardson and Tinaikar (2004) argue that the role of the 
accounting based valuation model has been of fundamental interest to analysts, 
investors and researcher alike. The accounting based valuation model, 
principally, argues that the value of the firm is a function of its book value of 
equity and the earnings. 
There have been many empirical models based on the accounting based 
valuation model (e. g., Easton and Harris, 1991; Ohlson, 1995; Francis and 
Schipper, 1999). Some of them expand the model by including a number of firm 
characteristics, such as negative earnings (Collins et al., 1997; Rees, 1999), 
capitalisation and leverage level (Rees, 1997), or taxes (Fama and French, 1998). 
While the applications of the accounting based valuation model have been used 
widely in non-IPO cases, to date it has been relatively little used in IPO studies. 
The advantages of using the application of the accounting-based 
valuation model to IPOs can be explained as follows. Firstly, unlike the 
comparable firms multiples and the DCF methods, this model is much simpler, 
as it does not require information regarding other firms nor cash flow 
forecasting, which are rarely available for young IPO firms. Secondly, the model 
allows the inclusion of other characteristics of the firms, such as IPO firms. 
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The basic valuation model used in this research is based on price as a 
function of book value of equity and earnings (Easton and Hams, 1991), as 
expressed below: 
P=f (BV, E) (1) 
P is the IPO price per share. Since there are two different levels of IPO 
prices, the offer price and the initial market price, P is defined as the offering 
price (Po) and the initial market price (P1). BV is the book value of equity and E 
is earnings. 
Prior studies show that the inclusion of negative earnings to the valuation 
model allows us to differentiate the impact of the loss making firms on the 
valuation (Hayn, 1995; Collins et al, 1997; Rees, 1999). Since most IPO firms 
are young, it is expected that some of them have not produced profits at the time 
of the IPO. Hayn (1995) argues that firm's losses are less informative than 
profits about firm's future prospects. Her study also proves that pooling 
profitable and loss making firm observations in the sample leads to a downward 
bias in the estimated earnings response coefficient. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
control for the negative earnings impact byý including a dummy for negative 
earnings (D) and the interactive term (D *E) into the model. 
Using non-IPO firm data, Rees (1997) finds that dividends, as a proxy for 
permanent income, give a significant and positive signal to the firm value. The 
research sample in this study is drawn from the UK main market, which includes 
big and small firms. Most big firms paid dividends prior to the IPOs and 
disclosed the dividends forecast in the prospectus, while most small firms did not 
pay dividends prior to the IPOs nor promised any dividend in the near future. 
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Therefore, the pro-forma dividend is included in the basic valuation model, to 
examine whether the dividends contains signalling information to the firm value. 
With inclusion of the dummy for negative earnings, the interactive term 
and the dividends, the basic valuation model could be expressed as 
P=f(BV, E, D, D*E, Div) (2) 
where P is the offer (initial market) price, BV is the book value of equity, E is 
earnings, D is a negative earnings dummy, D*E is an interactive term, and Div is 
the proforma dividends. 
To implement equation (2) to the empirical model, a number of 
considerations are taken to suit the IPO firms. Firstly, when the issuers/sponsor 
set up the offering price, they base the pricing on the enlarged number of shares 
(the number of firm shares following the admission), and so does the market on 
the first trading day. Therefore, other explanatory factors should be based on the 
enlarged number of shares'. Secondly, prior IPO literature show that the future 
accounting number, such as book value of equity post IPO (Kim and Ritter, 
1999) and earnings forecasts (Firth et al, 1998) have a higher predictability 
power to the valuation than the historic accounting numbers. Plausibly, it could 
also be argued that since IPOs are typically young and high growth firms, the 
expected future figures are likely to be more important than the reported pre-IPO 
figures. 
Considering the arguments above, the empirical basic IPO valuation 
model can be written as, 
P; =aopBV, +alfE; + a2 D; + a3D*jEi+a4pDivl+e (3) 
Thanks to Professor Michael Brennan for this valuable comment in an informal meeting with 
PhD students at Strathclyde University, 2000. 
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where Pf is the offer price (or initial market price) per share of IPO i, pBV; is the 
pro-forma book value of equity per share of IPO i, fE1 is forecasted earnings per 
share (EPS) of IPO i, Di is a dummy variable for forecasted negative earnings, it 
takes 1 where EPS is negative, D*JEI is an interactive term between the negative 
earnings dummy variable and forecasted EPS, pDiv; is pro-forma dividend per 
share of IPO i2, and 61 is the error term. 
It is mentioned earlier that the research sample that is taken from the UK 
main market is a mix of big and small IPO firms. The market capitalisation - as 
one of the proxies for firm size - of the research sample ranges between £4 and 
£5500 millions, with a mean of £167.39 millions and a standard deviation of 
539.86. It is clear that among the IPO firms in the sample, there is a scale 
difference, which may cause problems in interpreting the results. 
Brown et al (1999) and Rees (1999) argue that researchers have 
recognized the presence of scale effects in the firm level analysis. They also 
argue that using per share data - as suggested by Kothari and Zimmerman (1996) 
and Barth et al (1992) - can reduce the heteroscedasticity problem, but does not 
adequately control for the scale effects, as shares come in different sizes. Easton 
and Sommer (2003) put forward arguments for the need to overcome the scale 
effect. Barth and Kallapur (1996) suggest two ways for dealing with the scale 
effect: deflation by a scale proxy or inclusion of a scale' proxy as an additional 
independent variable. They explain, furthermore, that including a scale proxy as 
an independent variable can mitigate coefficient bias. However, researchers often 
2 Pro-forma book value disclosed in the prospectus is the firm's book value after the inclusion of 
net proceeds received from the offering. Forecasted EPS is a one year forecasted EPS disclosed 
in the prospectus. Pro-forma dividend is the last dividend payout ratio employed before the 
offering times the forecasted EPS. 
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deflate regression variables by scale proxies because deflation can mitigate 
heteroscedasticity as well as coefficient bias. 
Following the literature as discussed above, the method chosen to deal 
with the scale effect in the valuation model here is deflation by scale proxy. The 
justification to the choice is firstly, as pointed out by Barth and Kallapur (1996), 
deflation can mitigate heteroscedaticity as well as coefficient bias problems. 
Akbar and Stark (2003) identify four deflators previously employed in 
cross-sectional valuation models as proxies for scale: Sales (used in, for example, 
Hirschey, 1985); Number of shares (used in, for example, Rees, 1997; Hand and 
Landsman, 1999); Opening market value (used in, for example, Lo and Lys, 
2000); and Book value (used in, for example Green, et al, 1996; Easton, 1998; 
Danbolt and Rees, 2002; Core et al, 2003). 
Arguably, not all four deflators identified by Akbar and Stark (2003) 
above are appropriate to the research model in equation (3). The data used in this 
study is per share data, which automatically is deflated by a number of shares. 
However, as argued by Brown et al (1999) per share data does not adequately 
control for the scale effects, as shares come in different size. Therefore, the 
number of shares is not an appropriate deflator for the research model. 
Using the opening market value as a deflator might be problematic in this 
study. This study analyses the IPO valuation on both the offer and initial market 
prices. Applying the opening market value as a deflator in the IPO offer price 
analysis results in a constant dependent variable of 1 (Po/Po)- then the analysis 
should be carried out using more complicated model, such as WLS regression, as 
suggested by Easton and Sommer (2003). Applying the opening market value as 
a deflator in the IPO initial market analysis results in a returns-form dependent 
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variable (P1/Po), which has been a separate analysis as a part of this research (the 
IPO initial returns analysis). 
Based on Barth and Kallapur's (1996) suggestion on dealing with the 
scale effect, it is clear that as a scale factor, book value is more appropriate than 
the opening market value or sales for two reasons. Firstly, it is included as an 
independent variable in the research model (equation 3), which, according to 
Barth and Kallapur (1996) could mitigate the coefficient bias. Secondly, using 
the book value as a deflator, transform the dependent variable to price to book 
ratio, which is a more common ratio used in the valuation, rather than price to 
sales ratio, or a constant (price to price ratio). 
If the book value is used as a deflator, the question now is which book 
value (pre-IPO book value or pro-forma book value) to employ. Prior non-IPO 
valuation studies use the actual book value of equity (BVt). Using IPO data, Kim 
and Ritter (1999) find that using the market to book value post IPO increases the 
predictive power of their valuation model, which is based on the comparable 
multiple within industry. The book value post IPO used in Kim and Ritter (1999) 
is measured by adjusting the book value pre-IPO with the net proceeds received 
from the offerings. Keasey and McGuiness (1992) also deflate their price model 
by the net assets at the IPO - including net proceeds - as disclosed in the 
prospectuses. There have indeed been a number of studies using the book value 
of equity post IPO - which is measured exactly in the same way as the deflator 
used by Keasey and McGuiness, 1992 - as a scale factor (e. g., Firth and Liau- 
Tian, 1998; Chen and Firth, 1999; How and Yeo, 2000). Since the objective of 
this study is to value the IPOs based on the information that is available at the 
IPO date, it uses the pro-forma book value, as it is disclosed in the prospectus. 
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As explained in footnote 2, the pro-forma book value is the firm's book 
value of equity after the inclusion of net proceeds from the offering. One might 
argue that the pro-forma book value contains a signalling attribute, which could 
lead to an issue of whether the pro-forma book value is a biased factor. However, 
having taken the IPO sample that was brought to the market by offer for sale 
and/or placing methods, it could taken as virtually certain that the firms get the 
expected net proceeds after the offerings. Moreover, the empirical data shows 
that only 3 out of 161 IPOs in the final sample actually- received a different 
amount of money from -the expected net proceeds3. The mean value of the 
expected net proceeds - recorded from the prospectus - is £93.97 millions, and 
the mean value of the realised net proceeds - recorded from the KPMG new 
issues statistics - is £94.05 millions. The difference is small and a statistical test 
shows that it is not statistically different to zero, which implies that the mean 
value of the expected net proceeds is not different to the realised net proceeds4. 
Therefore, it is sufficient to say that the pro-forma book value is not biased. 
The basic valuation model is as follows, 
BV - 
a° 
PBV 
+ a' 
JE' 
+ a2D1 + a3 
D 
Br 
+ a4 
PBV` 
+ Er (4) 
p, P V, PBVr piPI 
The description of variables is similar to the ones in equation (3) deflated by pro- 
forma book value per share. Since many prior valuation studies employ the 
realised book value as the scale factor, this study also runs equation (4) using the 
book value pre IPO as a sensitivity analysis. This is discussed further in section 
3 All 3 IPOs received more net proceeds that expected. The deviation ranges from £700 
thousands to £4.30 millions, or approximately about 0.5% - 7.1% 
°A statistical test for a mean difference of paired sample is undertaken. The result cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of the equal mean of the expected and the actual net proceeds at 95% level. 
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4.7.2 of Chapter 4. It should be noted that the results are generally insensitive to 
the choice of pro-forma book value of book value pre IPO as scale factors. 
3.1.3. The IPO valuation model 
The main objective of this research is to analyse the impact of risk factors 
and signal variables on IPO valuation and performance. As discussed in the 
literature review chapter, to some extent, firms' ex ante risk can be expected to 
affect the IPO valuation as well as its subsequent performance (Johnson and 
Miller, 1988; Ritter, 1984; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Klein, 1996). Many IPO 
signalling studies use a range of different signals to value IPOs and' find that 
some signals have been very significantly related to IPO valuation. This section 
presents empirical models, which are used to test the research hypothesis, 
particularly, on IPO valuation. The empirical models, which explain the 
relationship between ex-ante risk factors, signals and IPO performance, will be 
presented in the next two sections. 
Firstly, using equation (4) above, the model tests the relationship between 
the fundamental accounting information to the IPO offer price (Po) and the 
closing price on day one or the initial price (P1). The model will be then extended 
to include the ex-ante risk factors and signals variables. As explained in 'the 
introduction chapter, the ex-ante risk factors proxies employed in this study are 
based on the Arthur Andersen Business Risk Model (AABRM). However, after 
doing a thorough content analysis of the prospectus obtained, only 5 out of 55 
risk factors identified in the AABRM appear to be consistently disclosed and 
measured in the documents. A detailed content analysis of the prospectuses on 
the AABRM is presented in section 3.4 of this chapter. The 5 ex-ante risk factors 
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identified are divided into two groups; financial risk and non-financial risk 
factors. The financial risk factors are leverage risk and capital availability risk. 
The non-financial risk factors are efficiency risk, capacity risk, and industry risk. 
The leverage risk factor (Lev) is the risk that occurs because of the 
external capital used by firms. Modigliani and Miller (1966) show that 
introducing debt increases the systematic risk of a firm's equity. As more debt is 
used in firms' capital, consequently firms are liable to pay more interest. 
Moreover, increasing debt in a firm's capital structure means a higher probability 
of the firm going bankrupt. Therefore, it is commonly accepted that the higher 
the leverage, the riskier the firm's equity. As discussed in the literature review 
chapter, there have been a number of studies, which have examined the 
relationship between firm leverage and valuation, although few have been done 
for IPO samples. Rees (1997) examines the value relevance of debt for non-IPO 
firms. Using debt to book value as a proxy for leverage, he does not find robust 
evidence that equity value is affected by the level of debt. Still, give the 
possibility of leverage increasing the risk of equity, this study employs the debt 
ratio as a proxy for firm's ex-ante leverage risk., Since the listing rules require 
that the IPO prospectus should disclose at least three years pre-IPO financial 
statements, the ex-ante leverage risk employed in this study is the average of the 
pre-IPO debt ratios from all financial statements disclosed in the prospectus to 
capture the information content of all disclosed financial statements5. 
The other financial risk factor examined in this study, is capital 
availability (Cap). There are two sources of capital; internal and external. As 
5 Although the listing rules require a disclosure of at least the last three years pre-IPO financial 
statements, it is possible to present less than three years statement if the firms are young. 
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described above, using external capital, such as debt, increases the firm's 
financial risk. Meanwhile, internal capital, such as retained earnings, is less 
risky. Therefore, a larger fraction of earnings retained in the firm means higher 
capital availability and less financial risk. The capital availability risk is 
measured by an average of the ratios of retained earnings over net income from 
the financial statements disclosed in the prospectus. Mathematically, the ratio of 
retained earnings over net income could be expressed as one minus the firm's 
payout ratio. 
Additionally, the IPO valuation model also includes a number of non- 
financial risk factors. The first non-financial risk factor examined is the 
efficiency risk (Effr), which describes the firms' production effectiveness. In 
economic terms, production effectiveness-is measured as a production cost. The 
more efficient the firms' operation, the less is the production cost and efficiency 
risk. As discussed earlier in the literature review chapter, a number of studies 
show a positive relationship between the production effectiveness and' the 
economic performance of the firms. Jain and Kini (1994) specifically examine 
the operating performance of IPO firms after listing. They find that IPOs, which 
are more underpriced, tend to have worse operating performance. The inclusion 
of the efficiency risk factors into the IPO valuation model is because very little 
information regarding a firm is available prior to the offering. Such information 
can help investors to assess the IPOs value. The efficiency risk is measured by an 
average of the pre-IPO ratios of the cost of good sold over firm sales from all 
financial statements disclosed in the prospectus. The greater ratio describes the 
larger efficiency risk, which means that the IPO firms operate less efficiently. 
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The main reason why firms go public is to raise more funds for their 
operations. Most issuing firms claim that the proceeds received from the offering 
is proposed to fund a specific investment projects for business expansion. 
However, in many cases part of the IPO proceeds is used for other non- 
investment activities, such as to redeem preference shares, repaying, debt or to 
provide an exit of the pre-IPO investors. A number of IPO studies investigate the 
impact of the IPO net proceeds on the IPO underpricing or prices (e. g. Beatty 
and Ritter, 1986; Klein, 1996; Espenlaub et al, 1999; Leone et al, 2003). This 
study examines the impact of the proportion of net proceed that is allocated in 
the investment plan, which is called Capacity risk (Cpy) on the IPO values. In the 
AABRM, capacity risk is defined as the risk of new firm projects to the firm's 
capacity. In this study, Cpy shows the risk of the utilisation of the IPO net 
proceeds. The bigger the part of IPO proceeds used for investment activities, the 
bigger uncertainty of the return of the investment, hence the higher the capacity 
risk. This study uses the ratio of proposed investment plan over IPO proceeds as 
a proxy for capacity risk. The greater the ratio indicates higher capacity risk. To 
some extent, the use of this variable is unique, since none has ever looked at the 
investment plan figures that are disclosed in the prospectus as a research 
variable. 
Beaver et al (1970) argue that the accounting (firm) Beta (ß) is an 
essential element to assess the riskiness of the firm's value. The firm ß is defined 
as the sensitivity of the firm's share price to changes in the level of the market 
index. However, due to limited information of the firms' share price before the 
admission, the industry ß used here provides a proxy to the pre-IPO firm P. 
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Moreover, the Arthur Andersen Business Risk Model (AABRM) includes the 
riskiness of the industry as the firm's risk factor. Therefore, the inclusion of the 
industry ß in this model is not only for the proxy of the firm ß, but also as a 
measure of the industry risk. The quarterly ß of the industry on the offering date 
is used as a proxy for industry risk. The 0 is obtained from the Quarterly Risk 
Measurement Service from London Business School. 
Signal variables used in the models are the commonly used variables 
from previous studies of IPO signalling models, such as sponsor reputation 
[Beatty and Ritter (1986), Byrne and Rees (1994), Keasey and McGuiness 
(1992)], firm age (Feltham et al, 1991), and the proportion of equity sold at the 
flotation [Welch (1989), Firth and Liau-Tan (1998)]. 
In addition to the robust empirical evidence from previous studies, the 
inclusion of sponsor reputation into the IPO valuation model also has a 
theoretical foundation. Baron (1982) explains how investment bankers take a 
significant role in determining the subscription and allocation of the shares on 
IPOs. However, the underwriting contract also reflects a certain degree of firm 
quality certification. By sponsoring an TO, the investment banker is bound into 
a contract with the issuing firm to market the shares being offered. If the issue is 
fully underwritten, investment bankers will make great efforts to sell all shares 
since any shares that are left unsold will become their responsibility. Since 
investment bankers know the risk of underwriting these contracts, the prestigious 
investment banker will only sponsor good quality firms. Hence, lower quality 
firms would be sponsored by less prestigious sponsors since they could not bear 
paying the high fee for the prestigious sponsor. Therefore, in this study, sponsor 
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reputation is chosen as one among other credible signals of firm value. It is 
posited that IPOs, which are sponsored by prestigious sponsors, will be priced 
higher than IPOs brought to market by less prestigious sponsors. In this study a 
dummy variable is used as a proxy for sponsor reputation taking the value of 1 
for prestigious sponsors and 0 for less prestigious ones. The reputation 
classification is a modification of the method used by Keasey and McGuiness 
(1992). The classification is based on how many IPOs were sponsored by an 
investment bank in a preceding quarter period, prior to an IPO comes to the 
market. Investment banks that sponsor more than 3 IPOs during the specified 
quarter are classified as prestigious sponsors and investment banks that sponsor 3 
IPOs or less are classified as less prestigious sponsors. 
There have been many attempts to use firm age as a variable to explain 
the IPO anomalies. However, very little empirical evidence shows a significant 
relationship between firm age and the IPO anomalies. In this study, age is viewed 
as a non-financial ex ante risk factor. It is presumed that firm age reflects the 
extent of experience gained by firms regarding the business operations, which in 
turn indicates the stability of the business. In terms of business risk, it could be 
said that more stable fines have lower risk. Older firms are expected to have 
more experience, which facilitate the business stabilisation and thus lower risk. 
Hence, firm's age could influence the IPO valuation. Another reason for the 
insertion of age in the model is that one of IPOs main characteristics is that they 
tend to be young firms. Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether firm age 
explains the variability between the offer and initial IPO prices. A proxy for fine 
age is measured as years since it was incorporated up to the flotation date. 
107 
Initially, Leland and Pyle (1977) propose that the proportion of shares 
retained by insiders on equity offerings contains important information for 
investors. This is even more important for IPO cases since very limited 
information regarding the firm's value is available prior to the offering. Most 
stock exchanges (markets) require a certain minimum fraction of shares to be 
sold to the public. This also means that there is a maximum proportion of shares 
that could be retained by the existing shareholders and managers (hereafter, 
insiders). Leland and Pyle (1977) perceive that insider's decision on ownership 
retention indicates insiders' expectations of the firm's future prospects. When 
insiders are more confident regarding the firm's prospects, the more shares they 
will want to retain. Alternatively, it could be said that the greater the fraction of 
shares sold at the IPO, the less confidence of insiders' in the firm's prospects. 
The prior empirical evidence on the association of retained ownership and IPO 
valuation is robust. There have been a number of proxies for retained ownership 
used in IPO signalling studies. This study employs the percentage of shares sold 
at the offering as an inverse proxy for the retained ownership variable since this 
is ready information available in the prospectus. 
Previous studies show that privatisation IPOs have significantly different 
value and performance in the market [Keasey and McGuiness (1992), Dewenter 
et al (1997)]. According to Martin and Parker (1997), UK privatisations have a 
significant impact on corporate performance. They find that there is an 
increasing performance after privatisation. Based on those results, it is important 
to control for the privatisation IPOs effect on the research sample. Most of UK 
privatisation IPOs took place between the late 80s and early 90s, which overlaps 
with the research period used in this study. During the sample period, there were 
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23 privatisation IPOs, 10 of which are included in the research sample. The 
model includes privatisation as a control variable. A dummy variable is included, 
where 1 is allotted for privatisation IPOs and 0 for private IPOs. 
The empirical model used to test the relationship between the IPO 
valuation and risk factors and signal variables is formulated in the following 
equation: 
P' 
= ao 
pBV' + a, r+ a2D, + a3 
D fE' 
+ a4 
pDiy, 
+ 
pBV! pBV, pBV, pBV, pBV; 
+a5Levr +a6Capj + a7Effr, + a8Cpy; +ca9lndl + (5) 
+a, oSpor +a, Age, +a12Egt +a13Priv, +e; 
where Levi is the ex-ante leverage of a firm proxied by the average of the natural 
log of the pre-IPO debt ratios, Cap; is the availability of internal capital of a firm 
prior to flotation proxied by the average of the ratio of retained earnings to net 
income, EJTh is the ex-ante efficiency risk proxied by the average of the ratio of 
the cost of goods sold to sales, Cpy; is the IPO proceed utilisation plan proxied 
by the ratio of the cost of specific investment plan disclosed in the prospectus to 
net proceeds, hid; is the industry risk of a firm at the flotation proxied by industry 
j3 
, Spo; 
is a dummy variable for the sponsor reputation taking 1 when IPO is 
sponsored by prestigious investment banks, Age; is the age of a firm, Eq; is the 
percentage of equity sold at the flotation, and Priv; is a dummy variable taking 1 
when an IPO is a privatisation. The measure of each risk factors and signals are 
described above and summarised in table 3.1 below. 
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Table 3.1. Research variables, measures and data sources 
Variables Measure Source 
PO1pBV The offer price scaled by proforma book value Prospectus 
of equity per share 
Pi/pBV Share price on the 1" trading day scaled by Prospectus-Datastream 
proforma book value 
IR Natural log of Po/P1 Prospectus-Datastream 
BHRxy Buy and hold return of an IPO from day 1 to x Datastream 
year (x=1,2,3) 
fE/pB V Forecasted EPS scaled by pro-forma book Prospectus 
value of equity per share 
D Dummy variable for negative forecasted - 
earnings. I for negative earnings 
D*fE/pBV Interaction term of negative forecasted - 
earnings 
Leverage (Lev) An average of the natural log of total debt to Prospectus 
assets ratio for all financial statements 
disclosed in prospectus 
Capital availability risk An average of the ratio of retained earnings to Prospectus 
(Cap) net income for all financial statements 
disclosed in prospectus 
Efficiency risk (Effr) An average of the ratio of cost of good sold to Prospectus 
sales for all financial statements disclosed in 
prospectus 
Capacity risk (Cpy) An average of the ratio of investment plan cost Prospectus 
to IPO net proceed ratio for all financial 
statements disclosed in prospectus 
Industry risk (Ind) Beta for industry on the yearly quarter when Risk Measurement 
IPO taken place Services 
Sponsor reputation Dummy variable for Sponsor reputation. 1 for KPMG new issues 
(Spo) prestigious investment bankers (underwrite statistics 
more than 3 IPOs in preceding quarter) 
Firm age (Age) Natural log of company age at the IPO Prospectus 
Equity sold at the IPO % of equity sold at the IPO to the post- IPO Prospectus 
(Eq) (enlarged) number of shares 
Privatisation (Priv) Dummy variable for privatisation. I for Prospectus 
privatisation IPO 
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3.1.4. The IPO initial returns model 
The IPO valuation model aims to answer the question of whether the 
issuers/sponsors, and investors use the prospectus information to price the IPOs. 
Moreover, it is also expected to highlight the divergence of opinion among the 
market participants regarding the usefulness of prospectus information in pricing 
the IPOs. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse whether the opinion divergence 
has any significant impact on the IPO performance in the short run as well as, 
subsequently, in the long run. 
As discussed widely in the IPO literature, the persistence of underpricing 
on the first day is still an unresolved puzzle. Many studies also show that the 
underpricing continues up to 5 days after the first trading. The IPO initial return 
model tries to examine whether the source of the opinion divergence 
(fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors and signals) could resolve the underpricing 
problem. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the underpricing degree is an 
increasing function of IPO ex-ante uncertainty, while Feltham et al (1991) show 
that the firm risk characteristics disclosed in the prospectus significantly 
influence the IPO underpricing. 
The role of earnings forecasts on IPO valuation has been discussed 
widely in the previous section and the literature review chapter. However, very 
few scholars examine the impact of earnings on the IPO after-market 
performance (Firth, 1998). Using the earning forecasts, Firth (1998) finds that 
the accuracy of earning forecasts is positively related to the 1-year post-IPO 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Furthermore, he expands his investigation 
up to 3-year returns and finds that the impact of the pre-IPO earning forecasts 
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loses its significance. Using non-IPO data, Easton and Harris (1991) investigate 
the earnings-return relationship. They find a positive and significant association. 
As previous studies show robust evidence of the role of earnings on returns, this 
study also aims to investigate the earnings-returns relationship for IPO cases. 
While a number of studies have discussed the relationship between the 
earnings forecasts and IPO returns, none have looked at the impact of the book 
value of equity on the IPO returns. Therefore, to some extent, this study 
contributes a new insight of the book value of equity role in IPO performance. 
While the IPO valuation model in equation 5 includes a negative earnings 
dummy and dividends as parts of the fundamentals information, the IPO Initial 
Returns (IR) model only includes the forecasted earnings and the pro-forma book 
value of equity variables. The reason for the exclusion of the negative earnings 
and dividends is to make the IR model simple. Further analysis has been 
undertaken including those variables into the IR model, however the result 
indicated the variables were not significant. Therefore, the IR models used in this 
study exclude the negative earnings and dividends. Moreover, it, is believed that 
the forecasted earnings to price ratio and the pro-forma book to market ratio 
provide adequate information for the fundamentals, which have been used in 
prior studies. 
The ex ante risk factors mentioned in the valuation model above are also 
expected to have a significant relationship with the IPO initial return. Su. (1999) 
finds a positive relationship between a firm's pre-IPO leverage and the degree of 
underpricing (or IPO initial returns). However, from three different proxies (debt 
to total asset ratio, debt to equity ratio, and debt to net asset ratio), only the debt 
to net asset ratio is found to be significantly related to the IPO initial return. In 
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line with general hypotheses on the risk impact on initial return, this study 
anticipates a positive relationship between leverage and IPO initial return. 
As explained in the previous section, the availability of internal capital is 
viewed as a financial risk factor. It is expected to influence the decision on IPO 
pricing and also the initial return. The more internal capital available to the firms 
reflects lower risk, so lower initial return is expected. 
To date, no study has discussed the relationship between the IPO initial 
returns and the pre-IPO operating efficiency. Jain and Kini (1994) examine the 
after-market operating efficiency of IPO firms. They find that IPOs, which have 
greater initial returns, tend to be less efficient after the offering. Since it is likely 
that operation efficiency affect the whole performance of the firms, it exposes the 
firm to a degree of risk. Therefore, it is expected that the efficiency risk is 
positively related to IPO initial returns. 
A number of IPO studies discuss the association between the net IPO 
proceeds and the underpricing. In some studies, IPO net proceeds are also used 
as a size control. However, this study argues that it is more important to view the 
utilisation of the IPO proceeds since it could expose a degree of risk in the 
future. As disclosed in the offering prospectuses, an investment purpose is the 
most common reason why firms go public. The fraction of the IPO net proceeds 
proposed for investment discloses a degree of risk, so called capacity risk. The 
higher fraction reflects the lower capacity risk, which in turn is expected to result 
in a lower initial return. 6 
6 As part of the robustness check, the net proceed has been included as an independent variable in 
the IPO valuation model in Chapter 4, section 4.7.2. The results show that the net proceed is not 
significantly to the IPO prices. 
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Many IPO studies document the robust industry effect on the underpricing. 
This study does not investigate the industry effect in a similar way to the 
previous studies. The reason is to preserve the degree of freedom. Since the 
research sample is restricted to 161 IPOs, using the industry dummies (5 standard 
industry classifications) reduces the model degree of freedom substantially. 
However, this study examine the impact of the industry risk on the IPO initial 
returns. As discussed earlier in the previous section, the quarterly industry ß at 
the IPO date is used as a measure of the industry risk as well as a proxy to the 
firm P. The higher the industry ß, the riskier the industry, and the higher the 
initial returns is expected. 
There has been robust evidence on the underpricing of privatisation IPOs. 
This study attempts to contribute more evidence on the different impact of 
privatisation IPOs compared to other IPOs. Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) argue 
that the significant underpricing of privatisations could lead to a verdict of 
government deliberation in the pricing of privatisation IPOs. However, they do 
not find any evidence to support their hypothesis. Although this study does not 
try to test the government deliberation, it still holds that there is a positive 
relationship between privatisation and initial returns, as a result of underpricing. 
Johnson and Miller (1988) 'investigate the relationship between the 
investment banker prestige and the underpricing. They find that IPOs brought to 
market by prestigious bankers tend to be less underpriced than IPOs brought by 
less prestigious bankers. Age and size also significantly affect the degree of 
underpicing (Feltham et al., 1991). Finally, Koh and Walter (1992) find that 
equity retained by shareholders is negatively related to the underpicing. 
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In addition to those variables mentioned above, this study also considers 
unobservable variables, which may affect the underpricing. Although this study 
specifically investigates the relationship between fundamentals, a number of risk 
factors and signals and IPO initial returns, it is important to also examine other 
factors, which may have an impact on IPO performance. Therefore, similar to 
Beatty et al (2002), this study includes an unobservable variable into the IPO 
initial return model. Since the underpricing happens as a result of different 
valuation on the offer price and the initial market price, the standardised residual 
errors from the IPO valuation model on offer price is included into the IPO initial 
return model. It is expected that the greater the residuals, the lower the initial 
returns. In other words, the initial return is expected to be negatively related to 
the valuation residuals. 
Considering the possible influence of fundamentals, risk factors, signals, 
and offer price residual errors, the IPO initial return model is formulated as 
follows; 
+ IR, =ao +a, 
y 
+a2p' +a3Lev, +a4Cap, +a5Efr, +a6Cpy; +a71nd, 
por 
or 
+a8Spo, +a9Agee +a, oEq, +aPrivv +a12 Res, +a 
(6) 
IRi is the initial return on the first trading day of IPO;, which is measured by 
the natural log of the initial market price (PI) divided by the offer price (Po), or 
in mathematical term it could be expressed as, 
IR! =Ln(P, IP0) (7) 
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The fundamentals used to explain the variation in the IPO initial returns 
are proforma book value of equity and forecasted earnings, both scaled by the 
offer price (Po). The variables, then, become the book-to-market and the earning- 
price ratios. 
The description of ex ante risk factors and signals are as explained in the 
IPO valuation model section above and summarised in table 3.1, while Res; is a 
proxy to unobservable ex-ante factors of firm i, and measured as the standardised 
residual from the IPO valuation model with the offer price as the dependent 
variable. 
3.1.5 The IPO long run return model 
Besides the puzzle relating to the high initial market return, the IPO 
market is also perplexed by the apparent underperformance of IPOs in the long 
run. This suggests that investors, who buy the IPO shares and hold them for up to 
three years, will benefit less than investors who hold comparable firms or the 
market index. In addition, Ritter (1991) found that there is a significant negative 
relationship between the degree of underpricing and the long run performance. In 
other words, it could be said that IPOs that are heavily underpriced tend to have 
lower return in the long run, which implies the evidence of reversion in the long 
run. However, the empirical evidence show mixed results (see table 1.2) 
In contrast, signalling theory suggests that the good quality firms use 
underpricing as a signal of their true values. This implies that the good quality 
firms will have greater initial returns. They are also expected to perform better in 
the long run, and resulting in higher long run returns. 
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In this study, it is realised that the impact of fundamentals, ex-ante risk 
factors and signals on the IPO long run performance is likely to be weaker than 
on the short run performance, since more information is available to the market 
to price the IPOs in the long run. However, some variables may still have an 
effect in the long run. 
Earnings are often observed as signals to the quality of firms in the 
valuation process. Usually, the earning forecast disclosed in the prospectus is 
supposed to reveal the insider's information about the firms' prospects. It is 
assumed that the higher earning forecasts reflect the higher quality of the firms. 
The high-quality firms are expected to perform well in the long run. Therefore, it 
could be hypothesised that the disclosure of earning forecasts is positively related 
to the IPO long run performance. However, such impact is not expected to last 
longer than 1 year, since the actual earnings figures will be available to the 
market after that. 
It is also interesting to examine the impact of the pro-forma book value of 
equity on the IPO long run returns. Prior studies show mixed results on the 
relationship between the book-to-market ratio and share returns. Fama and 
French (1995) argue that the book-to-market ratio also measures the riskiness of 
the shares. They find that there is a positive association between the book-to- 
market ratio and the share returns. This study also posits the similar hypothesis, 
however parallel to the forecasted earnings, the impact of book-to-market on the 
IPO long run returns is not expected to be of significance on the IPO returns for 
2 and 3 years, as new book-to-market figures become available to the market 
after the firms publish their post-IPO reports. 
117 
In this study, the general assumption of a positive risk-return relationship 
is used to investigate the association between the ex-ante risk factors and IPO 
long run returns. There have been no empirical results investigating the impact of 
pre-IPO firm's leverage to IPO long run performance. However, as discussed in 
the previous section, leverage is a common variable used as a risk indicator. The 
higher the leverage, the higher the financial risk of the firm. In line with the 
theoretical explanation on the impact of risk factors on IPO long run 
performance, it is expected that higher leverage expose the firm to higher risk, 
which in turn is expected to result in higher long run returns. Khurshed et al 
(1999) are among the first to investigate the impact of pre-IPO firm's leverage on 
the long run performance, however, they do not find any significant relationship. 
The explanation of the impact of other risk factors (capital availability 
risk, efficiency risk, capacity risk, and industry risk) on IPO long run returns is 
similar to the explanation written in the previous section. This study is among the 
first to examine the ex-ante risk factors mentioned above in relation to IPO long 
run performance. Given a positive risk-returns relationship, it is expected that the 
relationship between the ex-ante risk factors and the IPO long run performance is 
positive. 
Menyah et al (1995) present evidence on the long run performance of UK 
privatisations. They conclude that they are different from private IPOs, and 
privatisations IPOs do not underperform the market. Martin and Parker (1997) 
also confirm the difference in corporate performance in the long run regarding 
UK privatisations. It could be inferred that somehow privatisation has a different 
impact on long run performance. 
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As discussed in the previous section, firm age could be a proxy for 
business stability. Rationally, it is expected that a stable firm could perform 
better in the long run. Therefore, here it could be conjectured that firm's age has 
a positive relationship with the IPO long run performance. Khurshed et al (1999) 
investigate the impact of firm age on IPO long run performance. However, they 
find an insignificant result in relation to a statistical association between firm age, 
and IPO long run performance. 
Based on previous studies, a number of signal variables seem to have 
some impact on IPO long run returns, such as agent reputation (Brav and 
Gompers, 1997), and equity retained by insiders at the flotation (Koh and Walter, 
1992). 
Carter et al (1998) investigate the association between underwriter 
reputations on IPO long run performance and find a robust significant positive 
relationship. They argue that in the long run as more information becomes 
available in the market, there are adjustments to the more underpriced IPOs (as a 
consequence of less prestigious underwriter contract), which result in lower long 
run returns. Therefore, this study also posits a positive relationship between 
sponsor reputation and IPO long run performance. 
Additionally, this study also re-examines the association between the 
ownership and IPO long run performance. Based on financial signalling theory, 
the retained ownership is an effective signal regarding the firm's true value. The 
higher proportion of shares retained by the old shareholders reflects their insider 
information regarding the firm's good prospects. Therefore, it is expected that 
there will be a positive relationship between the retained ownership and IPO long 
119 
run performance. The inclusion of the ownership variable in the IPO long run 
model in this study is to re-examine such a relationship with UK data. 
Considering fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and signals, the IPO long run 
return model is as follows: 
BHAR 
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where BHARXY 1 is the market adjusted IPO long-return of 1PO; from day 1 to x 
=1,2, and 3 years, which is measured by the equation below: 
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(9) 
where Rt i is the monthly dividend adjusted returns of IPO; in month t, MRt is the 
Financial Times Small Companies (FTSCO) market index returns in month t, n is 
12,24, and 36 months. When IPOs are delisted before their 1S`22nd, or 3rd 
anniversary, the buy and hold returns are calculated up to the last month before 
they were delisted. Other variables in equation (7) are as described on the initial 
return model and summarised in table 3.1. 
As discussed earlier in the literature review chapter, both buy and hold 
returns (BHR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) have some limitations in 
calculating the long run return. However, Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest that 
BHR is a better measure compared to CAR, since the CAR appears to be a 
biased predictor for the BHR. Therefore the BHR is used in this study. In 
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addition, FTSCO is used here as a benchmark. This index is replacing the Hoare 
Govett index for small companies, which is used by others (Levis, 1993; 
Khurshed, 1999). Since most of the research sample are small companies, using 
FTSCO index is likely more appropriate than using broader indices such as the 
FTSE all share index7. The benchmark choice has also been a long-standing 
debate in the IPO literature. Espenlaub et al (2000) re-examine the UK IPO long 
run abnormal returns using 5 different benchmarks. The results show that the 
outcomes are very sensitive to the benchmark used. Therefore, using the FTSCO 
index as the benchmark in this study is acknowledged to have some degree of 
limitation. To minimize such effect, a control variable, Size, is used in the IPO 
long run performance models, as applied in other studies (e. g., Gleason and Lee, 
2002). In this study, the normal log of the market capitalisation at the IPO is used 
as a proxy for Size 
Many IPO studies have investigated the relationship between the IPO 
underpricing (initial returns) and its performance in the long run. Based on the 
signalling hypothesis, the high-quality firms use the underpricing as a signal of 
their value. It is also anticipated that the high-quality firms perform well in the 
long run, which results in higher long run stock returns. Therefore, signalling 
theory suggests a negative relationship between the IPO initial returns and long 
run returns. However, Welch (1989) does not find any support for this 
hypothesis. In fact, Ritter (1991) and Levis (1993) find that there is a significant 
negative relationship between the IPO underpricing (initial returns) and the long 
run performance. They argue that the underpricing is a result of optimistic 
7 The analysis is also done using the FTSE All share index as the benchmark. The main results 
remain robust. 
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investors, and then as more information becomes available in the wider window, 
the returns are corrected by the market as a mean reversion effect. This study 
also tries to re-examine such a relationship and seeks to narrow the divergence of 
opinion on the relationship between IPO initial returns and the long run returns. 
The inclusion of variables Size and IR in the long run model is expressed 
as follows: 
a, 
pB y+ 
a2 
t`+ 
a3Size, BHARJ, 1 = ao +a, 
" 
Poi Po, 
+a4Lev, +a, Cap, +a6Effr, +a7Cpyi ++a8Ind1 (10) 
+a9Spo, +a, 0Age, +aEq, +a, ZPriv1 +a13 Res +a14IRl +a 
where BHARxr is the buy and hold returns of IPO; for period x, as measured in 
equation (9). IRr is the initial return of 1PO;, as measured in equation (7). Other 
variables are identical to those explained and measured in the previous section. 
3.2 Hypothesis development 
This section tries to outline the development of testable research 
hypotheses. Based on the literature review and research models formulated 
above, the research hypotheses can be divided into three main hypotheses as 
presented in figure 1 (see Introduction chapter). The first main hypothesis is that 
the IPO valuation is related to the offering prospectus information. It is also 
expected that such information may provide the explanation to the IPO short run 
performance, however it is anticipated that the impact of the prospectus 
information in the long run is minimal. The second hypothesis is related to the 
underpricing anomaly, which is that if any mispricing is identified on the first 
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trading day, it is expected that the underpricing is negatively related to the 
valuation residuals. The last main hypothesis is related to the IPO long run 
performance, which is that if any mispricing is identified on the first trading day, 
the market corrects the IPO prices in the long run. 
The three main hypotheses are explained in more detail in a number of 
working hypotheses, which are presented and discussed in the next section. 
3.2.1 Hypotheses regarding IPO valuation. 
The hypotheses regarding IPO valuation are tested using the models in 
equations (4) and (5). Based on previous empirical studies and the basic model 
shown in equation (1), it could be inferred that price is an increasing function of 
the book value of equity and earnings. This leads to the formulation of the first 
two hypotheses (Hla and Hlb) 
Hl a: There is a positive relationship between IPO offer (initial) prices and 
pro forma book value of equity, 
and 
Hl b: There is a positive relationship between IPO offer (initial) prices and 
forecasted earnings. 
Next are the dummy variable and the interactive term. Previous studies 
show that negative earnings give a significantly different impact on share 
valuation. Hayn (1995) argues that losses (negative earnings) are less informative 
than profits (positive earnings) about the firm's future prospect. Therefore, the 
coefficient of interactive term (D*JE/BV) in the valuation model is expected to be 
more or less equal to the forecasted earnings (fE) coefficient, so that the two 
offset each other, and the negative earnings are expected to have little impact on 
the IPO prices. When earnings are negative, the book value of equity may 
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become more important as a predictor of firm value. Consequently, the negative 
earnings dummy is expected to be positive. 
H2: The negative earnings dummy is positively related to the IPO prices, 
while the negative earnings interactive term is expected to be 
negatively related to the IPO prices with the magnitude approximately 
equals to the forecasted earnings coefcient. 
The last variable of the fundamentals are dividends. Prior studies find a 
significant role of dividends in seasoned stock and IPO valuation. Moreover, as 
dividends could be categorised as permanent earnings, the inclusion of dividends 
describes how the transitory and permanent earnings could explain the variation 
in share price. Similar to the earnings variable, the dividends are also expected to 
be positively related to the 1PO prices (H3) 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the offer (market) prices 
and the pro- forma dividends 
As explained earlier, it is hypothesised that the riskier the IPOs, the lower 
the market price (H4). The rational explanation of this is based on the risk- 
aversion assumption. The risk-aversion assumption holds that based on available 
information, investors attempt to avoid risk. This implies that risky assets will 
face low demand in the market that result in lower market price. From the 
issuers' perspective, in order to sell the IPO shares, the riskier issuers will set a 
lower offer price. Below are working hypotheses on the association between 
each risk factor and the IPO offer (initial) prices. 
H4a: There is a negative relationship between firm's pre-IPO leverage and 
IPO offer (initial) prices. 
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H4b: There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO capital 
availability and IPO offer (initial) prices. 
H4c: There is a negative relationship between firm's pre-IPO efficiency 
risk and IPO offer (initial) prices. 
H4d: There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO capacity risk 
and IPO offer (initial) prices. 
H4e: There is a negative relationship between industry risk and IPO offer 
(initial) prices. 
Based on previous studies and the discussion in section 3.1.2.2, it could 
be posited that the signals are expected to give positive impacts on the IPO 
valuation (H5). A number of working hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between signal variables and IPO valuation is set below. 
H5a: Sponsor reputation is positively related to IPO offer (initial) prices. 
H5b: Firm age is positively related to IPO offer (initial) prices. 
H5c: Percentage of equity sold at the IPO is negatively related to IPO offer 
(initial) prices. 
Prior studies show that privatisation IPOs are priced differently to other 
IPOs. From the government's point of view, privatisation is a way to get more 
funds from the public. In order to ensure that privatisation IPOs could achieve 
the target of proceeds received and to ensure that investors would participate in 
subsequent privatisations, government may have underpriced the IPOs. In this 
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study, the privatisation dummy variable is expected to have a negative 
association with the IPO valuations (H6) 
H6: There is a negative relationship between the privatisation dummy 
and the IPO offer (initial) prices. 
3.2.2 Hypotheses regarding initial return model 
Based on a discussion regarding the relationship between fundamental 
accounting and the stock returns in the prior section, a number of working 
hypotheses of such a relationship are set out below. 
In the IR model, the pro-forma book value of equity to offer price ratio is 
used. Higher value of this ratio implies that the issuers/sponsors set the offer 
price at a low multiple to the book value of equity. Therefore, it could be 
hypothesised that the higher book-to-market ratio may suggest greater 
underpricing (H7a). 
H7a: The pro forma book value of equity to offer price ratio is positively 
related to IPO initial returns 
Prior studies show the important role of earnings in explaining the variance 
of stock returns (e. g. Easton and Harris, 1991). In this study, it is expected that 
the earning forecasts is positively related to the IPO initial returns (H7b) 
H7b: The forecasted earnings to offer price ratio is positively related to 
IPO initial returns 
Based on previous studies [Ritter (1984), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Miller 
and Reilly (1987)], it could be posited that the riskier firms will experience 
greater initial return (H8). A number of testable hypotheses on risk factors and 
IPO initial return are established as follows. 
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H8a: There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO leverage and 
IPO initial returns. 
H8b: There is a negative relationship between firm's pre-IPO capital 
availability risk and IPO initial returns. 
H8c: There is a positive relationship between firm's pre IPO efficiency risk 
and IPO initial returns. 
H8d: There is a positive relationship between firm's pre IPO capacity risk 
and IPO initial returns. 
H8e: There is a positive relationship between industry risk and IPO initial 
returns. 
A number of signalling studies on IPOs show that the signal variables 
used in this study, to some degree, are expected to signal the true value of the 
firms. Therefore, the signals are expected to reduce the information asymmetry 
and lead to a reduction in the probability of mispricing, hence lower subsequent 
initial returns are expected (H9). 
Carter et al (1998) explicitly test the relationship between the underwriter 
reputation and the underpricing. They find that the more prestigious the 
underwriters, the less the underpricing. Although using different proxies for 
underwriter reputation, other studies also reach similar conclusions (Johnson and 
Miller, 1988; Carter and Manaster, 1990). From the investors' point of view, 
the sponsor reputation gives a particular certification to the offer. Investors 
believe that prestigious investment banks only sponsor good firms' IPOs. 
Regarding the pricing, investors believe that prestigious sponsors set the IPO 
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price more appropriately than others do. Therefore, this study sets the following 
hypothesis: 
H9a: Sponsor reputation dummy is negatively related to IPO initial 
returns. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) find that the firm's age is significantly related to 
the underpricing. Here, age is assumed to be one of the risk factors that may 
affect the IPO performance in the short-run and long run. Age describes how 
long a firm has been established before it goes public. Older firms are assumed to 
have more business experience, which in turn reducing the business risk. Hence, 
it is expected that older firms are less underpriced than younger ones as it states 
in the next hypothesis. 
H9b: Firm age is negatively related to IPO initial returns. 
The very well known signal used in IPO signalling papers is the insider 
retention, which in this study is proxied by the percentage of equity sold at the 
flotation (Eq). Previous studies conclude that the more shares retained by 
insiders at the flotation give a good signal to investors. In this study, the 
percentage of shares sold at the IPO is used as a proxy to an inverse of insider 
retention. Therefore, this study also tests the following hypothesis: 
H9c: The percentage of equity sold at the flotation is positively related to 
IPO initial returns. 
It is argued in section 2.1, that in order to ensure the privatisation IPOs 
achieve the target proceeds, government set the IPO offer price lower than its 
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true value. Therefore, it is expected that the privatisation IPOs experience greater 
initial returns than private IPOs (H10). 
H10: There is a positive relationship between the privatisation dummy and 
the IPO initial returns. 
The initial return model (Eq. 9) includes the unobservable variable, Resi 
that is measured by the residual of the full IPO valuation model with the offer 
price as the dependent variable. The relationship between the residual and the 
IPO initial return is explained as follows. A positive residual indicates the IPO 
was offered at a high issue price relative to other IPOs in relation to their 
fundamentals. This may indicate over pricing of the IPOs and hence, it is 
anticipated that the residual is negatively related to the IPO initial return. 
H11: There is a negative relationship between the residuals and IPO initial 
returns. 
3.2.3. Hypotheses regarding the IPO long run performance 
The hypotheses relating to the long run performance model are tested 
using equation (9). In the long run, more information is available in the market 
that could be used by investors in their pricing decision. Therefore, as argued 
previously, the impact of the three groups of variables (fundamental, ex-ante risk 
factors, and signals) prior to and on the IPO, on the IPO long run performance, 
tends to be weaker. However, prior studies also show that the impact of some 
variables could last longer than others. Therefore, this study tries to examine the 
relationship between the three groups of variables and the IPO long run 
performance. In general, it is expected that the relationship between the three 
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groups of variables and the IPO long run returns are similar to the ones in the 
initial return model. 
Fama and French (1995) find a positive association between the book-to- 
market ratio and stocks returns. They argue that the book-to-market ratio could 
be used as a proxy to risk factors in returns. The high book-to-market ratio is 
usually related to a distress firm. Therefore, based on the risk-return relationship, 
it is posited here that the pro-forma book-to-offer price ratio is expected to be 
positively related to IPO buy and hold abnormal returns. 
H12a: The pro forma book value of equity to offer price ratio is positively 
related to IPO long run abnormal returns 
The disclosure of earnings forecasts in the prospectus is usually 
considered as a way by which a firm may signal its future prospect to the market. 
It is shown by prior studies that there is a positive relationship between the 
earnings forecasts and the stock valuation. It implies that the higher earnings 
forecasts reflect the high-quality firms. It is presumed that high-quality firms 
perform better in the long run than their counterpart firms. Therefore, in the long 
run, it is expected that firms that disclose higher earnings forecasts produce 
higher returns. 
H12b: The forecasted earnings to offer price ratio is positively related to 
IPO long run abnormal returns 
The next variable in the IPO long run performance model is size. Fama and 
French (1992) argue that simultaneously book-to-market ratio and firm size 
contain information of the riskiness of the shares. In this study, firm size is 
proxied by the normal logarithm of the market capitalisation at the IPO. The 
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lower market capitalisation is defined as riskier IPOs. Therefore, based on the 
positive risk-return association, it is posited in this study that the small firms are 
expected to produce higher returns (H 13) 
H13: There is a negative relationship between the size and IPO long run 
abnormal returns 
Based on previous studies, it could be inferred that to some extent the firm 
specific risk factors are related to the IPO long run performance. The general 
risk-return relationship is used in developing the hypotheses of the relationship 
between the ex-ante risk factors and the IPO long run returns. Thus, it is posited 
that the buy and hold returns is an increasing function of the ex-ante risk factors 
(H14) 
A number of testable hypotheses regarding risk factors and IPO long run 
performance are set below. 
H14a: There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO leverage 
and IPO long run abnormal returns 
H14b: There is a negative relationship between firm's pre-IPO capital 
availability risk and IPO long run abnormal returns 
H14c: There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO efficiency 
risk and IPO long run abnormal returns 
H14d: There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO capacity 
risk and IPO long run abnormal returns 
H14e: There is a positive relationship between industry risk and IPO long 
run abnormal returns 
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A number of working hypotheses regarding signals and IPO long run 
performance are listed below. The issuers/sponsors employ the signals to reveal 
the firm true value. The signals are aimed at making a separation between the 
good firms to the bad ones. Therefore, it is expected that the signals affect the 
firm long run performance in positive ways (H15) 
Similar to the explanation above, the firm's chosen sponsor is also 
understood as a way to signal the quality of the firm. Another explanation is that 
investment bankers often choose the firms that they would like to sponsor. The 
prestigious sponsors may tend to choose sponsoring the high-quality firms in 
order to preserve their credibility in the market. Therefore, in the long run the 
IPOs that are sponsored by the prestigious investment bankers are expected to 
have higher long run returns. 
H15a: There is a positive relationship between the sponsor reputation 
dummy and IPO abnormal long run returns 
As discussed earlier, firm's age is usually used as a proxy for the firms 
experience in business. It is anticipated that the more experienced firms tend to 
have stable profits. As it is assumed that investors are risk averse, they tend to 
put higher demand for the IPOs of the more experienced firms, which results in a 
higher market price. In the long run, if the perception of investors regarding the 
firms' value is retained, it is anticipated that the IPOs of more experienced firms 
perform better. 
H1 Sb: There is a positive relationship between firm age and IPO long run 
abnormal returns 
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The retained ownership is a common signal used to reveal the firm true 
value. It is presumed that the higher the percentage of equity sold at the flotation 
reflects the old shareholders' doubts regarding the future value of the firms, 
which is understood by investors as low-quality firms. Therefore, it is posited 
that there is a negative relationship between the percentage of equity sold at the 
flotation and the IPO long run returns. 
H15c: There is a negative relationship between the percentage of equity 
sold at the flotation and IPO long run abnormal returns 
Based on a number of studies of UK privatisations, it could be inferred 
that on average privatisation firms show better performance than their 
counterpart firms (private firms). Using two measures of long run return and 
three types of benchmarks, Saurat (2000) finds that privatisation IPOs 
overperform the benchmarks. While Levis (1993) finds that all IPOs 
(private and 
privatisation) underperform the market, it could be conjectured that on average 
the long run performance of privatisation IPOs behaves differently to the private 
IPOs (H 16). 
H16: The privatisation dummy is positively related to IPO long run 
abnormal returns 
The IPO long run performance models include the valuation residual 
(Resi) in the analysis, to capture any "mispricing" that takes place on the first 
trading day. However, this study assumes that the market is efficient, so any 
"mispricing", eventually is corrected in the long run. Therefore, it is expected 
that the IPOs with higher residuals (overvalued relatively to their fundamentals) 
on day 1, will have lower returns in the long run. (H17) 
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HI 7: Valuation residuals are negatively related to the IPO long run 
abnormal returns. 
The IPO long run returns model includes the initial returns as an 
explanatory variable. Prior studies show that a mean reversion effect takes place 
in the IPO market, which means that IPOs that are more underpriced tend to have 
lower long run returns. However, the IPO signalling theory argues that the high- 
quality firms use the underpricing as a signal td their values. Therefore in the 
long run, they are also expected to perform better than the low-quality firms do. 
Thus, the increasing initial returns reflect the higher quality of the firms, and in 
turn result in higher returns in the long run. Based on the assumption that the 
market is efficient, this study posits a negative association between IPO initial 
returns and its long run abnormal returns. 
H18: There is a negative association between IPO initial returns and the 
long run abnormal returns. 
In sum, this section presents the development of a number of testable 
hypotheses in this study. The hypotheses are built on the theoretical framework 
considering the results of prior studies. Tables summarising the working 
hypotheses summary are presented in the appendix (see table A. 3.1, A. 3.2, and 
A. 3.3). 
The next section presents the research method, which includes the market 
institutional framework and the research sample. 
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3.3. Research method 
3.3.1. UK Institutional Framework 
A firm seeking admission to the London Stock Exchange (LSE) before 
1995 could choose either to list in the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) or the 
official list. The USM was created in 1981, prior to the `Big Bang' in 1986. It 
was intended to accommodate small firms looking for additional funding through 
providing them with a relatively low-cost method of seeking outside equity. 
These firms were characterised by their small size, unknown and/or risky nature 
and, often, the lack of an earnings record. Conditions for listing in the USM were 
simpler, cheaper, and less onerous than on the official list (Michie, 1999). 
However, in the wake of the 1987 stock market crash, small firms listed 
on the USM were the ones that suffered most. Faced with these difficulties, small 
firms ceased to make new issues, as they were poorly received. Consequently, 
capital raised by USM firms dropped from £ 308m in 1988 to only £ 11.6m in 
1991. Due to fewer firms being listed and less capital raised on the USM, the 
Stock Exchange announced its plan to close down the USM in 1993. At the end 
of 1996, the USM was abolished and replaced by the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), which had been launched in 1995. Similar to the USM, the AIM 
was designed to facilitate small, new, and growing firms to seek outside equity 
investors. Meanwhile the Stock Exchange continued the operation of its global 
market for big firms, the official list, which eventually was renamed as the main 
market (Michie, 1999). As a comparison, table 3.2 below highlights the main 
differences in the admission criteria for the main market and the AIM. 
135 
Table 3.2. Main differences in the admission criteria 
for the Main market and the AIM 
Criteria Main market AIM 
Minimum shares in Minimum 25% of shares No minimum shares 
public hands 
Trading record Normally 3 year trading No trading record required 
record required 
Shareholder approval Prior shareholder approval No prior shareholder 
required for substantial approval required for 
acquisitions and disposals transactions 
Admission documents Pre-vetting of admission Admission documents not 
documents by the UKLA pre-vetted by Exchange or 
(UK Listing Authority) UKLA 
Minimum market Minimum market No minimum market 
capitalisation capitalisation of £700,000 capitalisation 
Source: Financial Service Authority (2002) 
Besides the market type, the issuing firms could also choose the marketing 
method used to bring the offers to the market. The most common methods used 
in the UK IPO market are the offer for sale and placing8. In an offer for sale, 
issuers could offer the shares at fixed price or tender. In a fixed price offer, the 
sponsor (and the issuer) fixes the offer price about two weeks before the 
admission date and undertakes the distribution of the shares at this price. In a 
tender offer, the offer price is set in a certain range and investors are invited to 
bid. However, most offer for sale IPOs in the UK market use the fixed price 
method. While applications for the offer for sale are invited from the public, the 
issue is sub-underwritten, at the same price, by a group of financial institutions. 
The placing is the most popular marketing method used on the LSE. The sponsor 
$ Other marketing methods available are introduction, offer for subscription, and intermediaries 
offer. The introduction method is used when a firm simply wishes to obtain a stock exchange 
quotation for its existing shares without issuing new shares to the market. An offer for 
subscription is an invitation to the public by an issuer to subscribe for shares not yet in issue or 
allotted. This method is usually used for investment trust IPOs. An intermediary offer is a 
marketing of shares already or not yet in issue, by means of an offer by the issuer to 
intermediaries for them to allocate to their own clients. 
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underwrites the entire issue for a short period and distributes them to specified 
persons or its clients. 
3.3.2. Research Sample 
The research sample is taken from UK firms that went public by either 
offer for sale and/or placing between 1986 and 1997 in the Official market. A 
total of 1653 equity offerings were floated on the LSE during the period. Similar 
to other IPO studies, the research sample excluded financial firm IPOs and 
closed-end mutual fund offerings. This results in a total of 811 IPOs. In relation 
to the marketing method description that is discussed in the UK institutional 
framework section, only offer for sale, placing, and the combination of both are 
appropriate to be included in the research sample. The reason is that the 
Introduction method is used by firms wishing only to have a quotation on the 
LSE and not wanting to raise any funds from investors, while offers for 
subscription is only distributed to very limited institutional investors. Therefore, 
excluding marketing methods other than offer for sale and/or placing results in 
492 IPOs, which spread across the years (Panel -A - table 3.3), industry sectors 
(Panel B- table 3.3), and firm size (Panel C- table 3.3) as indicated in the tables 
below. 
Panel A shows the distribution of the IPO population over the research 
periods. The number of firms that went public during the period varies across the 
years. According to Michie (1999) after the `Big Bang' in the late 1980s, many 
firms went to the market, and then during the recession period in the early 1990s 
very few firms went public. This is reflected in the research population 
distribution as shown in panel A. The early period shows a reasonable number 
137 
Table 3.3. The distribution of research population 
Panel A 
Year Number of IPOs 
1987 42 
1988 39 
1989 35 
1990 14 
1991 20 
1992 30 
1993 51 
1994 80 
1995 53 
1996 71 
1997 57 
Total 492 
Panel B 
Industry sector Number of IPOs 
Consumer goods 73 
General Industries 124 
Mineral extraction 36 
Services 226 
Utilities 33 
Total 492 
Panel C 
Percentile (£million) Number of IPOs 
Smallest 50 
10.24-14.05 49 
14.05-18.67 49 
18.67-23.39 49 
23.39-29.80 49 
29.80-40.45 49 
40.45-53.64 49 
53.64-88.66 49 
88.66-224.09. 49 
Largest 50 
Total 492 
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of IPOs taking place in the UK main market. The figures went down in the later 
period (early 1990s), as a result of the economic recession. Then, in the late 
period, the data shows an increasing number of firms that went public on the UK 
official market. 
Panel B shows the IPO population spread over the main industry sectors. 
Each firm is assigned to a specific industry sector according to the 1995 FTSE 
Actuaries industry classification. Excluding the Financial sector, the 
classification includes the Consumer goods sector, the General industries sector, 
the Mineral extraction sector, the Services sector, and the Utilities sector. Panel 
B demonstrates that the number of IPOs in each sector varies. Almost half of the 
IPOs (49.5%) that came to the market during the research periods were firms in 
the Service sector. It is followed by the General industries sector (25.2%), the 
Consumer goods sector (14.8%), the Mineral extraction sector (7.3%), and the 
Utilities sector (6.7%). It is worth noting that most of the firms (28 out of 33 
firms) in the Utilities sector were the UK privatisation IPOs, such as the 
electricity and water firms. 
Panel C shows the distribution of the IPO population based on the firm 
size. The market capitalisation of the IPO firms in the research periods ranges 
from £1.05 to £5,500 millions, of which about 90% of the population are 
relatively small firms with a market capitalisation below £ 224 million. The 
privatisation IPOs, the Utilities firms, the Mineral extraction firms are among the 
largest 50 firms. 
As mentioned earlier in the Introduction chapter, one of the study 
objectives is to examine the impact of the firms' ex-ante risk factors on the IPO 
valuation and the long run performance. Following the ICAEW study (1998), the 
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Arthur Andersen Business Risk Model (AABRM) is used in this study as a 
framework to assess the firms' ex-ante risk factors. The risk assessment is 
conducted by undertaking a detailed content analysis of each of the offering 
prospectuses, to try to identify the disclosure regarding each of the 55 risk 
factors. This is discussed further in section 3.4. This is a very time consuming 
task, and consequently this study draws a research sample. 
The initial sample is chosen randomly from the population, by numbering 
each of the 492 IPOs consecutively, and then using the three-digit random 
numbers table, to draw a random sample of 200 IPOs. The chosen 200 IPOs are 
distributed over the research period, industry sectors, and firm size as shown in 
table 3.4 below. The table shows the actual number of IPOs in each classification 
(year, industry sector, and firm size) in the initial sample together with the 
number of observations one would have expected in each category if the sample 
of 200 were a perfect representation of the overall population of 492 (i. e., as it 
would have been drawn using the stratified sampling method). For example, in 
1987, there were 42 IPOs out of 492 IPOs in the research period (about 8.54% of 
the population). If a sample of 200 IPOs had been drawn using the stratified 
sampling method, one would expect to have the same population proportion of 
IPOs in the sample of 1987, which is about 17 IPOs. 
Panel A shows that the initial sample is spread across the years in a 
similar fashion to that found in the underlying population. The yearly expected 
number of IPOs based on 200 IPOs is shown in column 3 of panel A. Although, 
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Table 3.4 The distribution of actual and expected initial sample of 200 IPOs 
Panel A- Year 
Year Actual number of IPOs Expected number of IPOs 
in the initial sample based on 200 IPOs 
1987 16 17 
1988 15 16 
1989 16 14 
1990 7 6 
1991 8 8 
1992 12 12 
1993 20 21 
1994 33 33 
1995 21 22 
1996 31 29 
1997 21 22 
Total 200 200 
Panel B- Industry sector 
Industry sector Actual number of IPOs Expected number of IPOs 
in the initial sample based on 200 IPOs 
Consumer goods 31 30 
General Industries 50 50 
Mineral extraction 12 15 
Services 94 92 
Utilities 13 13 
Total 200 200 
Panel C- Firm size 
Decile (£million) Actual number of IPOs 
in the initial sample 
Expected number of IPOs 
based on 200 IPOs 
Smallest 19 20 
10.24-14.05 19 20 
14.06-18.67 21 20 
18.68-23.39 19 20 
23.40-29.80 18 20 
29.81-40.45 20 20 
40.46-53.64 18 20 
53.65-88.66 21 20 
88.67-224.09 22 20 
Largest 23 20 
Total 200 200 
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only three out of 11 years show that the actual number IPOs in the initial sample 
match the expected number of IPOs based on the underlying population, the 
deviations in the remaining 8 years are trivial. It is clear that the overall yearly 
distribution of the number of IPOs is very similar. A chi-square test is carried out 
to check the similarity of the distribution of the actual and the expected initial 
sample. The result, which is discussed further below, shows that there is no 
significant difference in the distribution across years of the population and the 
initial sample. 
Panel B of table 3.4 shows the distribution of IPOs across the industry 
sectors. Similar to the population distribution, the initial sample spreads among 
the 5 non-financial industry sectors. Moreover, similar to the order of the 
population distribution, the firms in the Service sector dominate the initial 
sample, followed by the General industries sector, the Consumer goods sector, 
the Utilities sector, and the Mineral extraction sector. Panel B also exhibits the 
expected number of IPOs in each industry sector based on the characteristics of 
population distribution. Although, the comparison between the expected and the 
actual distribution demonstration a little variation, in general it could be said that 
the initial sample is distributed across the industry sectors similarly to as the 
expected sample. 
Panel C shows the distribution of the initial sample based on the deciles 
of firm size. The deciles classification used in Panel C is the one applied to the 
population (see table 3.3 Panel Q. The number of IPOs in the actual initial 
sample marginally varies across the percentile groups. Only the £29.80-40.45 
millions group perfectly match the number of IPOs in the actual sample and what 
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one would have expected if the sample perfectly matched the population. 
However, the variations in the other percentile groups are small. 
Each panel in table 3.4 shows some small variation between the actual 
and the expected initial sample. According to Snedecor and Cochran, (1989) a 
goodness of fit test can be used to test if a sample of data comes from a 
population with a specific distribution. Therefore, a number of goodness of fit 
tests are carried out to verify whether the initial sample of 200 IPOs is 
statistically representative to the research population. The general null 
hypothesis (Ho) states that the data follows a specified distribution. Applied to 
this study, the null hypothesis states that the distribution of the actual initial 
sample is similar to the distribution of the expected initial sample. If the test 
cannot reject the Ho, then it could be concluded that the actual and the expected 
initial samples have similar distributions, and vice versa. 
The test statistics for the Goodness of fit test is as follows, 
k 
(D; -E; )2 /E; 
r=ý 
where, 
O; is the observed/actual frequency 
E; is the expected frequency 
k is the number of classification 
x2 is the chi-square score with the degree of freedom of k-1 
Using the information in table 3.4, the results of the goodness of fit tests 
are summarised in the following table: 
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Table 3.5 Results of Goodness of fit test for the initial sample of 200 IPOs 
Distribution Null hypothesis (Ho) x2 score Statistical 
base (p-value) conclusion 
Yearly The yearly distribution of the 1.09 Cannot reject Ho 
actual initial sample is similar (0.99) 
to the one of the expected 
initial sample 
Industry The distribution of the actual 0.598 Cannot reject Ho 
classification initial sample in the industry (0.96) 
classification is similar to the 
one of the expected initial 
sample 
Firm size The distribution of the actual 1.228 Cannot reject Ho 
initial sample in the Size (0.99) 
percentile groups is similar to 
the one of the expected initial 
sample 
Since the tests cannot reject the null hypotheses, the results mean that the 
initial sample follows the distribution of the population. In other words, the 
initial sample is statically representative to the research population. 
The crucial point of data collecting in this research is to obtain the 
offering prospectuses. The main source to obtain the prospectuses is the Global 
Access online database. However, at the time of data collection, the database 
only provides the documents from 1992 onwards. Therefore, other means of 
collecting the IPO prospectuses was required for the 1986-1991 period. The first 
mean used is to contact the firms directly. Only 38 out of 51 sample firms for 
year 1987 to 1991 were still in business. However, only 35 prospectuses could be 
collected from those firms. Three other firms replied that they no longer hold any 
copy of their IPO prospectuses. 
A significant effort has been exercised to obtain 16 prospectuses (for 3 
firms were in business and 13 firms had gone out of business at the time of data 
collection the prospectuses) through various organisations, such as Companies 
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House, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (ICAS), the Institute of 
Chartered Accountant sin England and Wales (ICAEW), and the Mitchell library 
in Glasgow. However, they do not keep the offering prospectuses. After 
undertaken various attempts to collect the prospectuses, only 184 prospectuses 
from 200 IPOs initially planned, are available, and four of them are mini 
prospectuses (pathfinders), which contain very limited information They are, 
therefore, considered as incomplete prospectuses. This reduces the sample to 180 
IPOs. 
Most of the research variables are drawn from the prospectus manually; 
however there is still a number of missing data items, such as forecasted EPS. 
There are 13 prospectuses that do not disclose the EPS forecasts. Because of the 
specification of the research model that employs the EPS forecasts, IPOs that do 
not disclose the information are excluded from the sample. This leaves the 
sample to 167 IPOs (see table 3.6). 
Similar to other finance research using accounting numbers, the data set 
contains a number of outliers, which results in skewed distributions of some 
variables. The outlier in this study is defined as any observation that has extreme 
values in any research variable9. A Trimming method is used to treat the outliers. 
The outliers are eliminated with a cut-point of 1.5% at the top and bottom of the 
distribution of all variables. The deletion of the outliers reduces the final sample 
to 161 valid cases as detailed in table 3.6 below. 
'After examining the distribution of each variable, the extreme values are defined as observations 
that have values within 1.5% top and bottom of the distributions. In this study, 6 outliers are 
detected (2 observations in the Po/pBV and Pl/pBV distributions, 1 observation in the Lev 
distribution, 1 observation in the BHR1y distribution and 2 observations in the BHR2y 
distribution). 
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The distribution of the final sample over the research periods, the 
industry sectors, and the firm size percentile is as shown in table 3.7 below. For 
comparison, the table also includes the number of observation one would have 
expected in each category had the final sample of 161 IPOs been distributed in 
an identical fashion to the underlying research population of 492 IPOs. 
Panel A demonstrates that there are some differences between the 
expected and the actual number of IPOs in the different years. As explained 
earlier, this is due to the fact that the prospectuses are not available in the 
database. Prior to 1992, prospectuses had to be hand collected from various 
sources (as discussed above). However, it was not possible to obtain all 
prospectuses, particularly when firms had gone out of business when the data 
collection took place. -Nonetheless, from 1992 onwards, the actual sample 
distribution is relatively similar to the expected distribution. 
Since the final sample loses 39 cases (about 19.5% of the initial sample 
of 200 IPOs), another goodness of fit test is carried out to verify the 
representation of the final sample. The results are shown in table 3.8 below. 
Panel A of table 3.8 shows that the probability of the actual final sample 
is distributed similarly to the expected one is 98%, which leads to the results of 
acceptance of the null hypothesis. Therefore, it can be clearly concluded that 
regarding the yearly distribution, the final sample of 161 is representative. 
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Table 3.7. The distribution of actual final sample of 161 IPOs 
Panel A 
Year Actual number of IPOs 
in the final sample 
Expected number of 
IPOs based on 161 
IPOs 
1987 7 14 
1988 13 13 
1989 6 11 
1990 2 5 
1991 6 7 
1992 10 10 
1993 17 17 
1994 31 26 
1995 19 17 
1996 29 23 
1997 21 19 
Total 161 161 
Panel B- Industry sector 
Year Actual number of IPOs 
in the final sample 
Expected number of 
IPOs based on 161 
IPOs 
Consumer goods 23 24 
General Industries 39 41 
Mineral extraction 8 12 
Services 86 74 
Utilities 5 11 
Total 161 161 
Panel C- Firm size 
Decile (£million) Actual number of IPOs 
in the final sample 
Expected number of 
IPOs based on 161 
IPOs 
Smallest 16 17 
10.24-14.05 14 16 
14.06-18.67 15 16 
18.68-23.39 15 16 
23.40-29.80 14 16 
29.81-40.45 16 16 
40.46-53.64 15 16 
53.65-88.66 20 16 
88.67-224.09 20 16 
Largest 16 16 
Total 161 161 
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Table 3.8 The results of Goodness of fit test for the final sample 
Panel A 
Distribution Null hypothesis (Ho) x2 score Statistical 
base (p-value) conclusion 
Yearly The yearly distribution of the 0.598 Cannot reject Ho 
actual final sample is similar to (0.98) 
the one of the expected initial 
sample 
Panel B 
Distribution Null hypothesis (Ho) x2 score Statistical 
base (p-value) conclusion 
Industry The distribution of the actual 6.383 Cannot reject Ho 
classification final sample in the industry (0.17) 
classification is similar to the 
one of the expected initial 
sample 
Panel C 
Distribution Null hypothesis (Ho) x2 score Statistical 
base (p-value) conclusion 
Firm size The distribution of the actual 2.694 Cannot reject Ho 
final sample in the Size (0.97) 
percentile groups is similar to 
the one of the expected initial 
sample 
Panel B of table 3.7 exhibits the actual and the expected distribution 
based on the industry classification. There are some variation between the actual 
and the expected distribution; the order of the IPOs based on industry sector is 
similar to the one of the population. There are, however, more services firms and 
fewer mineral extraction and utilities firms in the final sample than one would 
expect based on the underlying population. 
The largest difference in the proportion of IPOs in the sample and the 
population is to be found in the Utilities sector. From 13 Utilities firms that are 
included in the initial sample, only 6 prospectuses can be obtained. The other 
seven uncollectable prospectuses are due to a number of reasons, such as merger 
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after the offerings (of 2 water companies and 2 regional electricity firms - these 
companies refused to send the prospectuses) or no respond. From 6 Utilities 
firms of which the prospectuses are available, 1 firm is excluded from the final 
sample due to missing data. As explained earlier, most the firms in Utilities 
sectors are privatisation IPOs. While the Utilities may be somewhat under 
represented, it should be noted that the five Utilities firms in the final sample are 
all the privatisation IPOs. Prior literature suggests that privatisation IPOs may be 
priced differently to other IPOs. Later on, in the research analysis, this study 
conducts separate analysis for the non-privatisation IPOs (Menyah et al, 1995; 
Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997). This effectively restricts the analysis to the other 
four industries represented in the sample for which the actual distribution is 
closed to the expected. 
A goodness of fit test is undertaken for the final sample distribution based 
on the industry category. The result of the test (table 3.8 - panel B) shows that 
the probability of the actual distribution to be similar to the expected one is low. 
Nevertheless, the result is not enough to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, 
statistically it could be concluded that the distribution of the actual final sample 
is similar to the expected one. 
The distribution of the final sample of 161 based on firm size is shown in 
panel C of table 3.7. The distribution of the final sample is similar to that 
expected, with only small differences. The goodness of fit test (table 3.8 - panel 
C) confirms that the differences are insignificant, which leads to the conclusion 
that the actual distribution of the final sample based on the firm size is similar to 
the expected one. 
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In sum, during the research period, 492 of the non-financial firm IPOs in 
the UK official (main) market are identified as the research population. Since 
most of the research data are collected manually from the offering prospectus, 
the research sample is limited to 200 IPOs. An initial -sample of 200 IPOs is 
manually and randomly selected from the research population. A number of 
statistical analyses confirm that the initial sample is a representative sample of 
the research population across the years and industry sectors. 
While collecting and analysing the data, the initial sample loses 39 IPOs 
that makes a final sample of 161 IPOs due to various reasons (see table 3.6 and 
table 3.9) Although there are some differences, statistical analyses confirm that 
both the initial and the final samples are representative samples of the research 
population. 
Table 3.9 IPO Sample derivation 
All new listed offerings during 1987-1997 
Financial firms and closed-end offerings during 
1987-1997 
Introduction and offer for subscription IPOs 
Offer for sale and placing IPOs 
Initial sample - random sample from 492 IPOs 200 
Collected Prospectus 184 
Unreadable prospectus 4 
Final sample 180 
Missing data 12 
Outliers deletion 7 
Valid cases 161 
1653 
811 
319 
492 
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3.4. Content analysis for the Arthur Andersen Business Risk Model 
This section aims to provide a detailed explanation of the prospectus 
content analysis undertaken to assess the firms' ex-ante risk factors. As 
mentioned in the introduction chapter, the prospectus information is categorised 
as fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and signals. It should be noted that the ex- 
ante risk factors used in this study are adopted from the Arthur Andersen 
Business Risk Modelf (AABRM) (Appendix A. 3.5). 
The AABRM is widely used by practitioners as a model to assess the 
firm's business risk. According to Mingay (2003), the model is a useful generic 
framework that needs to be customised for specific industries and enterprises. 
Originally, the model is used by the risk auditors of Arthur Andersen to help 
their clients to self assess their own business risk. A number of methods of 
assessment are needed to apply the model, such as analysing the firm's 
documents (annual reports, company circulars), interviewing managers and 
employees, and observations on daily activities. 
The AABRM has not attracted much academic attention. To my 
knowledge, there have been 2 studies by ICAEW trying to look at the 
implication of the model. The first study (ICAEW, 1997) is a proposal of 
reporting risk in the firm annual reports. Having examined annual reports from 5 
firms, they find that to some extent firms do report their business risks as defined 
in the AABRM. As a follow-up to the results found in the first study, they 
conduct another study (ICAEW, 1999) to compare the risk reporting in the 
offering prospectus and the firms annual reports published after the IPOs. The 
analysis uses the AABRM as a framework to assess the business risks of 5 non- 
financial firms from different industries and of different size. The method used is 
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content analysis of the offering prospectus and the annual reports. The result 
shows that firms tend to disclose business risk more in the prospectus than in the 
annual reports. It also finds that the type of risk factors disclosed vary across the 
firms observed. Examining 5 prospectuses, they find only a total of 23 risk 
factors are disclosed in the documents, of which only 18 factors provide the risk 
measures. The number of risk factors disclosed in each prospectus ranges from 9 
to 19 risk factors. 
The fact that more risk factors are found in the offering prospectus than in the 
annual reports becomes one of the motivations of this study to use the AABRM 
as a tool to assess the ex-ante risk factors disclosed in the prospectus. A number 
of IPO studies find a positive relationship between the risk and the underpricing 
(e. g., Beatty and Ritter, 1996). However, they use the standard deviation of the 
IPO prices for the first 5 days as a proxy to the risk, which indicate the ex-post 
risk of the IPOs. One objective of this study is to examine the ex-ante risk, as 
part of the prospectus information, which is available to the market at the IPO. 
Other studies use the number of risk factors disclosed in the prospectus as a 
proxy to the risk factors (e. g., Feltham et al., 1991). However, as they 
acknowledge, the measure is a "crude" proxy, which could lead to 
misinterpretation of the results. This measure implies that the more risk factors 
disclosed in the prospectus, the riskier the firm, which is questionable. The 
AABRM, as it is shown in the ICAEW's study (1999) enables the users to 
identify the risk factors and the measures. In this study, the ex-ante risk factors 
should be identified and measured based on the prospectus information, as it 
requires the ability to identify which firms are riskier than others. 
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The AABRM identifies three main sources of risk: environment, process, 
and information for decision making risk. Environment risk arises from external 
factors, while process and information for decision making arise from internal 
factors. The ICAEW studies find that the process risk is the risk most reported in 
the offering documents and the annual reports, while the environment risk is the 
one least reported. 
Using the AABRM, this study conducts a content analysis of the 180 
collectable and readable prospectuses. The analysis is undertaken in two stages. 
The first stage is to identify each of the AABRM risk factors in the prospectuses 
by looking at any statement that mentions or points to the risk factors. For 
example, the Customer satisfaction risk factor is derived from the following 
quoted statement: "The market demand for most of the Group's existing pottery 
products, particularly the Botanic Garden and Pomona designs, has been higher 
than production capacity in recent years" (page 6 of the offering prospectus of 
Portmeirion Potteries, 1988). The statement indicates that there was a positive 
trend of market demand for the products, and possible customer satisfaction risk. 
The second stage is to look whether the risk factor is measured or not. It is 
important to have a measure for each of the risk factors because it enables me to 
compare the risk levels of each firm in the sample. For example, the Customer 
satisfaction risk factor is derived from the following quoted statement: "Unipalm 
currently has approximately 2,450 active customers with between 80 and 100 
new customers being added each month. In the six months ended 31 S` October 
1993, the ten largest customers accounted from 11.2 to 15.7 per cent of sales by 
Unipalm ". The statement indicates growing customer satisfaction, and also 
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provides the measure (percentage of sales from the largest customers). The result 
of the content analysis is shown in the table 3.10 below. 
Table 3.10 The results of content analysis of 180 IPO prospectuses 
Risk factors Indentified? Measured? 
Yes No Yes No 
Environment risk 
Competitor 31 149 11 20 
Sensitivity 0 180 - - 
Shareholder relations 5 175 0 5 
Catastrophic loss 0 180 - - 
Soveregin/Political 0 180 - - 
Legal 0 180 - - 
Regulatory 7 173 0 7 
Industry 180 0 180 0 
Financial markets 0 180 - - 
Process risk 
Customer satisfaction 91 89 72 19 
Human resources 176 4 164 12 
Product development 86 94 19 67 
Efficiency 180 0 180 0 
Capacity 180 0 180 0 
Performance gap 0 180 - - 
Cycle training 0 180 - - 
Obsolescence/Shrinkage 0 180 - - 
Compliance 0 180 - - 
Business interruption 0 180 - - 
Product/Service Failure 0 180 - - 
Health and Safety 75 105 0 75 
Leadership/Authority 17 163 0 17 
Performance incentives 0 180 - - 
Communications 0 180 - - 
Relevance 0 180 - - 
Integrity 0 180 - - 
Access 0 180 - - 
Infrastructure 0 180 - - 
Fraud/Illegal acts 0 180 - - 
Reputation 23 157 0 23 
Interest rate 169 11 169 0 
Currency 119 61 119 0 
Equity 180 0 165 15 
Financial instrument 0 180 - - 
Liquidity 180 0 180 0 
Capital availability 180 0 180 0 
Default credit 180 0 180 0 
Settlement 0 180 - - 
Collateral 36 144 22 14 
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Risk factors (continued) Identified ? Measured? 
Yes No Yes No 
Information for decision 
making risk 
Pricing 0 180 - - 
Performance measurement 0 180 - - 
Alignment 0 180 - - 
Completeness & accuracy 0 180 - - 
Budget & Planning 0 180 - - 
Accounting information 180 0 0 180 
Financial reporting evaluation 180 0 0 180 
Taxation 180 0 0 180 
Pension fund 63 117 0 180 
Investment evaluation 0 180 - - 
Regulatory reporting 0 180 - - 
Environmental scan 51 129 - 51 
Business portfolio 123 57 101 22 
Valuation - 180 - - 
Organisation structure 159 21 0 159 
Resource allocation 0 180 - - 
Planning 0 180 - - 
Lifecycle 4 176 0 4 
In general, table 3.10 shows that not all the risk factors in the AABRM 
are disclosed in the prospectuses, particularly for the environment and the 
information for decision making risks. This is similar to the results found by 
ICAEW (1999), as discussed previously. 
Table 3.10 demonstrates that from the prospectuses examined, only 4 
environment risk factors are found. Additionally, only the competitor and 
industry risk factors provide measures of the level of risk. 
Fifteen process risk factors are identified in the prospectus, of which only 
12 risk factors are measured. From the information for decision making, 8 risk 
factors are found, and only the business portfolio risk factor provides a measure 
of the level of risk. 
In sum, a total of 31 risk factors of the comprehensive AABRM 
framework are identified from the 180 prospectuses, and of those, companies 
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provide a measure of the risk for only 15 risk factors. Therefore, since only few 
of the AABRM risk factors are identified, at this point the research cannot pursue 
the application of the AABRM as a whole. It is, therefore, decided to focus only 
on the 15 measurable risk factors. 
Further examination shows that out of the 15 measurable risk factors, 
only 6 risk factors appear to be consistently identified and measured in the 
prospectuses. The other risk factors are identified, however few prospectuses 
provides the risk measures, therefore they are excluded in the further analysis. 
This left only 6 risk factors (industry risk, efficiency risk, capacity risk, liquidity 
risk, capital availability risk, default credit risk) to be examined further. The 
correlation analysis among the 6 risk factors is carried out. The result shows that 
the liquidity risk is highly correlated to the default credit risk (see table 3.11). 
This is understandable as both risk factors measure the leverage of a firm. 
Therefore, only one leverage risk factor will be used in the research model. 
Using a number of leverage risk measures, Su (1999) finds that the debt ratio is 
significantly related to 
Table 3.11 - Correlation matrix of 6 risk factors 
Industry Efficiency Capacity Credit Liquidity 
Efficiency 0.029 
Capacity -0.119 0.154 
Credit -0.007 -0.109 0.209 
Liquidity 0.016 0.083 -0.106 --0.797 
Capital -0.013 -0.117 0.021 0.171 -0.218 
availability 
Note: the coefficients in bold and italic are significant at the 10% level 
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the IPO values and underpricing, while the current ratio appears to be 
insignificantly related to either IPO value or underpricing. Therefore, based on 
the prior empirical result, this study chooses the default credit risk factors - as 
proxied by debt ratio - to be included in the research model. 
In sum, the study objective is to examine the impact of the prospectus 
information on the IPO valuation and performance. The prospectus information 
is defined as fundamentals, risk factors, and signals. Motivated by prior studies 
by ICAEW, initially this study uses the AABRM as a framework to identify the 
firm's risk prior to the admission. However, the result from the content analysis 
of 180 prospectuses shows that only 31 risk factors are reported in any of the 
prospectuses, and only 15 risk factors are measured. It is, therefore, decided not 
to pursue the whole AABRM application in this study, but only focus on the risk 
factors found and measured in the prospectuses. Due to the sample size and the 
further statistical limitation, further selection of risk factors is undertaken. The 
research only includes the risk factors that are consistently found and measured 
in all prospectuses. This selection results in 6 risk factors. The correlation 
analysis of the risk factors shows that the liquidity and the credit default risk 
factors are highly correlated. Based on prior study (Su, 1999), the liquidity risk 
factor is excluded for further analysis. The results in a final selection of 5 risk 
factors (industry risk, efficiency risk, capacity risk, capital availability risk, and 
default credit risk) that are included in the research models in the main analysis. 
Later in the analysis (chapter 4- IPO valuation), a number of robustness 
tests are undertaken to examine whether the number of risk factors disclosed in 
the prospectuses affect the IPO valuation. These tests provide evidence as to 
whether the more risk factors could be identified in the prospectuses would affect 
158 
the IPO valuation. The disclosure indices are developed for each risk factor 
group (Environment risk, Process risk, and Information for decision making risk) 
as well as total disclosure index. They are put in the left hand side of the model 
equations, as predictors, to substitute for the 5 ex-ante risk factors included in the 
main analysis. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explains the methodology applied to this study. Firstly, a 
theoretical explanation is presented in order to justify the inclusion of each 
variable into the model and how it fits to the objectives of the study. 
The explanatory research variables can be grouped in to three groups of 
variables; fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and signals. In addition, two more 
variables, privatisation and firm size, are also included as control variables. 
A number of empirical models are also presented in this chapter. The 
three general empirical models are the valuation model, the initial return model, 
and the long run performance model. The valuation model analysis is developed 
in two stages. Firstly, the analysis only includes the basic fundamental 
information and the IPO offer and initial price. Secondly, the model is expanded, 
to the full valuation model, by an inclusion of ex-ante risk factors, signals, and 
the control variables. The IPO valuation analysis will also includes a number of 
robustness test by considering alternatives measures (proxies) for predictors as 
well as the deflator. 
The initial return model analyses the relationship between the initial 
return and the three group variables. Additionally, it also examines the impact of 
the residual from the IPO valuation model on the initial returns. 
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The long run returns model is developed to investigate the relationship 
between the three groups of variables and the IPO long run returns. In order to 
re-examine the relationship between the IPO underpricing and the long run 
performance, the long run returns model is expanded by including the initial 
return to the model, based on signalling theory. 
This chapter also describes the definition and the measures of each 
research variables and the development of working research hypotheses and is 
followed by a discussion of the UK institutional framework. A detailed sampling 
procedure is presented the research sample section. Finally, this chapter provides 
a broad discussion of the use of the AABRM as a tool in the prospectus content 
analysis to identify and measure the IPO ex-ante risk factors. 
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Appendices 
for 
Chapter 3 
Appendix 
Table A. 3.1 Working hypotheses for the IPO valuation models 
Hypothesis Variables Expected 
signs 
H1 
IPO valuation is an increasing function of IPO firms 
future fundamentals 
Hla 
There is a positive relationship between IPO offer pBV/pBV 
(initial) prices and proforma book value of equity 
Hlb 
There is a positive relationship between IPO offer fE^/pBV 
(initial) prices and forecasted earnings 
H2 
The negative earnings dummy is positively related to the D/pBV 
IPO prices, while negative interactive term is expected 
to be negatively related to IPO offer (initial) prices. D*fE/pBV 
H3 
There is a positive relationship between IPO offer pDIV/pBV 
(market) prices and proforma dividend 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
H4 
IPO valuation is a decreasing function of the ex-ante 
risk factors 
H4a 
There is a negative relationship between firm's pre IPO Lev 
leverage and IPO offer (initial) prices 
H4b 
There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO Cap + 
capital availability risk and IPO offer (initial) prices 
H4c 
There is a negative relationship between firm's pre-IPO Effr 
efficiency risk and IPO offer (initial) prices 
H4d 
There is a negative relationship between firm's pre-IPO Cpy 
capacity risk and IPO offer (initial) prices 
H4e 
There is a negative relationship between industry risk Ind 
and IPO offer (initial) prices 
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Hypothesis Variables Expected 
signs 
H5 
Signals are significantly related to the IPO valuation 
H5a 
Sponsor reputation is positively related to IPO offer 
(initial) prices Spo + 
H5b 
Firm age is positively related to IPO offer (initial prices 
H5c 
Percentage of equity sold at the IPO is negatively 
related to IPO offer (initial) prices 
Age + 
Eq - 
H6 
Privatisation IPOs are priced lower than private IPOs Priv 
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Table A. 3.2 Working hypotheses for the IPO initial returns model 
Hypothesis Variables Expected 
signs 
H7 
IPO initial return is an increasing function of IPO firms 
fundamentals 
H7a 
The pro forma book value of equity to offer price ratio is pBV/Po + 
positively related to IPO initial returns 
H7b 
The forecasted earnings to offer price ratio is positively fE/po + 
related to IPO initial 
H8 
IPO initial return is an increasing function of the ex-ante 
risk factors 
H8a 
There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO Lev + 
leverage and IPO initial returns 
H8b 
There is a negative relationship between firm's pre-IPO Cap 
capital availability risk and IPO initial returns. 
H8c 
There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO Effr + 
efficiency risk and IPO initial returns 
H8d 
There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO Cpy + 
capacity risk and IPO initial returns 
H8e 
There is a positive relationship between industry risk and hid + 
IPO initial returns 
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Hypothesis Variables Expected 
signs 
H9 
Signals are significantly related to the IPO initial returns 
H9a 
Sponsor reputation is negatively related to IPO initial Spo 
returns 
H9b 
Firm age is negatively related to IPO initial returns Age 
H9c 
Percentage of equity sold at the flotation is positively Eq + 
related to IPO initial returns 
H10 
There is a positive relationship between privatisation Priv + 
dummy and IPO initial returns 
H11 
There is a negative relationship between the residuals Resi 
and IPO initial returns 
164 
Table A. 3.3. Working hypotheses for the IPO long run performance 
model 
Hypothesis Variables Expected 
signs 
H12 
IPO long run return is an increasing function of IPO 
firms fundamentals 
H12a 
The pro forma book value of equity to offer price ratio is pBV/po + 
positively related to IPO long run abnormal returns 
H 12b 
The forecasted earnings to offer price ratio is positively 
related to IPO long run abnormal returns fE/po + 
H13 
There is a positive relationship between size and IPO Size 
long run abnormal returns 
H14 
IPO long run return is an increasing function of the ex- 
ante risk factors 
H14a 
There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO Lev + 
leverage and IPO long run abnormal returns 
H14b 
There is a negative relationship between firm's pre-IPO Cap 
capital availability risk and long run abnormal returns 
H14c 
There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO Effr + 
efficiency risk and IPO long run abnormal returns 
H14d 
There is a positive relationship between firm's pre-IPO Cpy + 
capacity risk and IPO long run abnormal returns 
H14e 
There is a positive relationship between industry risk and Ind + 
IPO long run abnormal returns 
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Hypothesis Variables Expected 
signs 
H15 
Signals are significantly related to the IPO long run 
returns 
H15a 
There is a positive relationship between sponsor spo + 
reputation dummy and IPO long run abnormal returns 
H15b 
There is a positive relationship between firm age and Age + 
IPO long run abnormal returns 
H15c 
There is a negative relationship between percentage of Eq - 
equity sold at the flotation and IPO long run abnormal 
returns 
H16 
Privatisation dummy is positively related to IPO Priv + 
abnormal returns 
H17 
Valuation residuals is positively related to IPO abnormal Resi + 
returns 
H18 
There is a negative association between IPO initial IR 
returns and the long run abnormal returns. 
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Table A. 3.4 Privatisation IPOs in the research sample 
No Company name IPO date 
1 British Airways 11-02-1987 
2 British Airport Authority (BAA) 28-07-1987 
3 Corus (British Steel) 05-12-1988 
4 Kelda (Yorkshire Water) 12-12-1989 
5 Severn Trent 12-12-1989 
6 International Power (National Power) 12-03-1991 
7 Powergen 12-03-1991 
8 Viridian (Northern Ireland Electricity) 21-061993 
9 British Energy 15-07-1996 
10 AEA Technology 26-09-1996 
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Appendix A. 3.5 
The Arthur Andersen Business Risk ModelTM 
ENVIRONMENT RISK 
Competitor Sensitivity Shareholder Relations Catastrophic loss 
Sovereign/Political Legal Regulatory Industry Financial Markets 
PROCESS RISK 
OPERATIONS RISK 
Customer satisfaction 
Human resources 
Product development 
Efficiency 
Capacity 
Performance gap 
Cycle training 
Obsolescence/Shrinkage 
Compliance 
Business interruption 
Product/Service Failure 
Health and Safety 
EMPOWERMENT RISK 
Leadership/Authority 
Performance incentives 
Communications 
INFORMATION 
PROCESSING/ 
TECHNOLOGY RISK 
Relevance 
Integrity 
Access 
Infrastructure 
INTEGRITY RISK 
Fraud/ 
Illegal acts 
FINANCIAL RISK 
Interest rate 
Currency 
Equity 
Financial Instrument 
Liquidity 
Capital Availability 
Default credit 
Settlement 
Collateral 
INFORMATION FOR DECISION MAKING RISK 
OPERATIONAL FINANCIAL STRATEGIC 
Pricing Budget and planning Environmental scan 
Performance measurement Accounting information Business portfolio 
Alignment Financial reporting Valuation 
Completeness and evaluation Organisation structure 
accuracy Taxation Resource allocation 
Pension fund Planning 
Investment evaluation Life cycle 
Regulatory reporting 
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Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 
IPO Valuation analysis 
Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined how the empirical analysis in this research 
into IPO valuation has been carried out. Chapter 3 provides the general theoretical 
explanation regarding the role of risk factors and signals in the IPO valuation 
process and the analysis of subsequent IPO performance. This was followed by a 
presentation of the empirical models used in this study and the working hypotheses 
empirically evaluated. Finally, the chapter discussed the criteria and the process of 
selecting a suitable research sample for the study. 
This chapter discusses the research data, and the results and analysis of the 
IPO valuation model. It aims to answer the first research question of whether the 
prospectus information is useful to value the IPOs. As described in figure 1 in the 
Introduction chapter, the main hypothesis in the IPO valuation analysis is that the 
IPO price is related to the prospectus information. As explained in the previous 
chapter, the prospectus information is categorised into three groups: the 
fundamentals, the ex-ante risk factors, and the signals. The accounting based 
valuation model is used to analyse the IPO valuation. Thirteen testable hypotheses 
that are set in the IPO valuation analysis have been presented in the Research 
design chapter (chapter 3). The empirical models used in this chapter are the basic 
valuation and the IPO valuation models as set out in equations 4 and 5 (see 
Research design chapter). Two levels of IPO prices, which are the offer price (Po) 
and the initial market price (P1), are examined. A summary of what is done in this 
chapter is presented in the following diagram (figure 4.1). 
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The chapter begins by presenting descriptive statistics relating to the variables used 
in the valuation models. This is followed by a discussion of the hypotheses and 
their empirical evaluation using the basic valuation model. The next section is a 
discussion of the impact of a number of ex ante risk factors and signals on the full 
IPO valuations. This is followed by a section that reports the results of sensitivity 
analyses, which are undertaken to examine whether the main analysis is sensitive 
to the choice of measures (proxies) used in the IPO valuation models. Finally, a 
brief summary of the main findings of this chapter is presented. 
4.1 Data 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the valuation models are 
shown in table 4.1 below. The observations for the IPO sample are cross-sectional 
during the period 1987-1997. For the IPO sample, the offer price scaled by pro- 
forma book value variable (P-/pBk) has a mean value of 3.15, which ranges 
between 0.858 and 9.274, and a standard deviation of 3.136. Compared to PQ/pBV, 
the initial market price scaled by pro-forma book value variable (PI/pBP) has a 
higher mean value of 3.637, which ranges between 0.874 and 10.454. The higher 
mean value indicates the possibility of the existence of the underpricing anomaly 
in the IPO sample. Furthermore, the simple statistical paired t-test shows that the 
IPO offer price scaled by pro-forma book value is statistically and significantly 
lower than the initial market price scaled by pro forma book value'. This result 
1 The analysis uses the hypothesis testing of paired sample. The Ho is that the mean of IPO prices 
between the two different periods (day 0 and day 1) is equal, with the mean of difference of -0.324, 
and a standard deviation of 0.453. The test shows that a mean of difference between PO/pBV and 
P1/pBV is different to zero with the t-statistics of -9.08, and p-value of 0.00. Hence, it rejects the 
Ho. 
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suggests that the IPO sample is underpriced at the offering, compared to the initial 
market price. 
Table 4.1a. Descriptive Statistics of research variables 
in IPO valuation model 
The table contains descriptive statistics for the IPO sample of variables in the 
valuation analysis. PO/pBV refers to the offer price scaled by pro-forma book 
value, P1/pBV to the initial market price to pro-forma book value, fE/pBV to 
forecasted earning per share scaled by pro-forma book value, D to a negative 
forecasted EPS dummy variable, D*JE/pBV to the interactive term between 
dummy variable and forecasted EPS scaled by pro-forma book value, Div/pBV to 
pro-forma book value, Lev to ex ante leverage risk, Cap to ex-ante capital 
availability risk, Effr to ex ante efficiency risk, Cpy to ex-ante capacity risk, Ind to 
ex ante industry risk, Priv to privatisation dummy variable, Lii(age) to firm's age, 
Spo to sponsor reputation dummy variable, and Eq to percentage of equity sold at 
the IPOs. 
Variables N Mean Median Std. dev Min Max 
Po/pBV 161 3.150 2.732 1.981 0.858 9.274 
P1/pBV 161 3.474 3.050 2.241 0.799 11.861 
fE/pBV 161 0.189 0.183 0.183 -0.481 0.757 
D 161 0.087 - - - - 
D*fE/pBV 161 -0.016 0.000 0.068 -0.481 0.000 
Div/pBV 161 0.037 0.013 0.056 0.000 0.331 
Lev 161 -0.444 -0.375 0.516 -3.730 1.506 
Cap 161 0.685 0.762 0.492 -1.213 3.063 
Effr 161 0.656 0.688 0.230 0.037 1.420 
Cpy 161 0.380 0.336 0.338 0.009 0.963 
Ind 161 0.898 0.900 0.068 0.740 1.090 
Priv 161 0.056 - - - - 
Age 161 2.229 2.080 1.036 -2.300 4.200 
Spo 161 0.678 - - - - 
Eq. 161 0.426 0.370 0.205 0.070 1.000 
The descriptive statistics of earnings forecasts (fE/pBT, ) shows that on 
average the IPO sample takes a value of 0.189. The descriptive statistics of the 
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negative earnings dummy variable (D) and the interactive term (D *JE/pB P) shows 
the IPO sample records 8.7% of firm reported forecasted losses. The dividends 
variable (Div/pBP) takes a low average value. It should be noted that only 99 out 
of 161 firms paid dividends prior to the admission. 
The remaining variables reported in table 4.1 a are the ex ante risk factors 
and signals. These variables are used in the full IPO valuation model and the IPO 
performance models. As explained in the previous chapter and summarised in the 
research variables table, the Lev variable is measured by the natural log of the 3- 
year arithmetic mean of the firm's debt ratios. The descriptive statistics show high 
figures of mean and median values, of -0.465 and -0.393, respectively 
(approximately an average of 62.81% and 67.51% debt ratios). These figures 
indicate that IPO firms are typically exposed to quite high financial risks. This 
sample statistics are far higher than prior studies. Using US data, Miller and 
Hedge (1996) find an average of 17.86% debt ratios across their sample, while a 
sample of Chinese IPO reports a 37.0% debt ratio (Su, 1999). 
The next variable, Cap, is a proxy for the capital availability risk. As IPO 
firms are characterised as young firms that need more investment, the availability 
of capital is important for the continuation of the firms. Cap is measured by an 
average of the ratio of retained earnings over net income for the last 3 years prior 
to going public. The mean value is 0.653, while the median value is 0.750. These 
figures show that most IPO firms tend to retain their earnings and re-invest in the 
firm, rather than distributing it as dividends. This corroborates the reading of the 
pro-forma dividend statistics. 
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Besides the financial risks mentioned previously, there are a number of 
non-financial risk measures used in this study. Effr is a proxy for production 
efficiency risk, which is measured by the ratio of cost of goods sold (production 
cost) over the firm's sales. The sample mean value of Effr is 0.647 and the median 
value is 0.673. It means that on average, the production cost of the IPO firms is 
approximately 64.7% of the sales they produce. The lower the Effr value shows the 
more efficient production system and the less efficiency risk. 
As described in the previous chapter, most firms state that part of the IPO 
proceeds are intended to fund investment activities within the firms. Cpy is a proxy 
for capacity risk. It is measured by the ratio of the value of the investment plan 
disclosed in the prospectus, over the net IPO proceeds. The greater the fraction of 
IPO proceeds planned for investment activities indicates higher capacity risk. The 
descriptive statistic table shows that a maximum of 96.3% and a minimum of 0.9% 
of net IPO proceeds are planned for the investment activities. An average of 38.1% 
of net IPO proceeds is proposed-for investment activities. 
The Industry risk factor is surrogated by industry beta in the corresponding 
quarter when an IPO takes place. The maximum value for Ind is 1.09 (British Steel 
plc) and the minimum value is 0.74 (Bum Steward Distillers plc). The average 
value for Ind is 0.896. 
As described in the literature review and research design chapters, most UK 
privatisations took place between the mid 1980's up to the mid 1990's. 
Additionally, previous studies show that the privatisation IPOs are different to 
private IPOs. There are 10 privatisations included in the research sample, and a 
dummy variable is included to control for the possible privatisation effect. 
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Many studies refer to IPO firms as young firms. In this research, the firm's 
age is measured as the number of years from when a firm was incorporated until 
the IPO date in year. It is recorded that the youngest firm in the research sample 
was only incorporated for 3 months when it went public, while the oldest was 
about 75 years. Because of such a gap, the natural log of firm age is used as a 
proxy for the age risk factor. 
The sponsor reputation, as a signal variable, is proxied by a dummy 
variable. The investment bankers, which sponsored more than 3 IPOs in the quarter 
prior to the quarter when an IPO took place is categorised as a prestigious 
investment banker. In this research sample, there are 122 IPOs, which were 
sponsored by prestigious investment bankers. 
The percentage of equity sold at the IPO is also a signal variable. The 
descriptive statistics of Eq show that on average, IPO firms sold 42.6% of the 
enlarged number of outstanding shares to the public at the IPOs. However, the 
median value is lower, at only 37.0%. The mean figure above is affected by 
privatisations, which most sold 100% of equity at the IPOs. If the sample excludes 
the privatisations, the percentage of equity sold drop to 38.89% on average. 
4.2. Univariate analysis 
Although the hypotheses testing will be based on the valuation models 
described in the previous chapter, the univariate analysis is aimed at explaining the 
simple correlation between each predictor and the IPO prices. 
Table 4.1b exhibits the (Pearson) coefficient of correlation between each 
variable in the full IPO valuation mode. In this section, the discussion focuses, 
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specifically, on the correlation between the predictors (fundamental, risk factor, 
and signals) and the IPO offer (initial) price. 
The fundamental univariate analysis shows expected correlations. The 
correlation coefficient of earnings forecasts (fE/pBP) appears to be positive and 
strongly significantly related to the IPO offer price at the 95% level of confidence 
(and to the initial market price at the 95% level of confidence). The coefficient 
demonstrates a moderate correlation between earning forecasts and the IPO prices. 
This implies that earnings forecasts figures disclosed in the prospectus appear to be 
used to some extent by the issuers, the sponsors, and the investors in their pricing 
decision process. The negative earning forecasts dummy (D) and negative earnings 
forecasts interactive term (D*fE/pBP) are correlated to the IPO prices as expected 
-a positive coefficient of D and a negative coefficient of (D*JE/pBV) - but appear 
to be statistically insignificant. The pro-forma dividend is positively correlated to 
the IPO offer (initial) price. The coefficients demonstrate that the pro-forma 
dividend has a weaker correlation to the IPO prices than does the earning forecasts, 
suggesting that the earnings forecasts seem to be more important than the dividend 
in the pricing decision. This may be related to high-growth IPO firms that tend to 
pay small dividends, and reinvest the remaining incomes within the firms. 
The correlation coefficients of risk factors and the IPO prices appear to be 
generally insignificant. Only the leverage risk seems to be correlated to the IPO 
offer price, while the leverage risk and the efficiency risk are significantly 
correlated to the IPO initial market price. However, the coefficients of correlation 
between the leverage and the IPO prices are, unexpectedly, positive and significant 
at 95% level of confidence, suggesting that the higher leverage, the higher the offer 
(initial) price. This contradicts the theoretical expectation, which posits that the 
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leverage risk as a risk factor is negatively related to the IPO prices. However, this 
is in line with the theory of the signalling role of debt, which is proposed by Slovin 
and Young (1990). They argue that prior to the IPO, firms tend to increase their 
borrowing from financial institution, such as bank. This action is observed as a 
third party certification to the credibility of the firms. Additionally, this 
corroborates the findings by Hedge and Miller (1996). 
The correlation between the efficiency risk and the IPO initial market price 
appears to be negative - as expected - and slightly significant. This implies that 
firms that operate less efficiently are to some extent priced lower in the market. 
Although the coefficient is insignificant, the correlation between the capital 
availability risk and the IPO prices is as expected, and so is the capacity risk. The 
correlation between the industry risk and the IPO prices is positive, which suggests 
that the IPO firms from riskier industries are priced higher by issuers and sponsors 
and also in the market. This is contrary to expectation, although the correlation is 
statistically insignificant. 
The correlation between the signals and the IPO prices are as expected, but 
only the percentage of equity sold at the IPO appears to be significant. Even 
though the correlation coefficient suggests that IPOs brought to market by 
prestigious sponsors are priced higher, statistically, the sponsor reputation is not 
significantly related to the IPO prices. Although the correlation coefficient is 
positive, as expected, the firm's age also seems insignificant in valuing IPOs. 
The correlation matrix (table 4.1b) demonstrates that the percentage of 
equity sold is negatively related to the IPO offer (initial) price. This implies that 
the IPOs that sell a higher percentage of equity are priced lower by the market. 
This is clearly supporting the signalling role of the ownership retained. The 
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percentage of equity retained by the old shareholders signals their confidence in 
the future prospect of the firm. Therefore, the higher percentage of equity retained 
indicates higher firm value. 
Finally, table 4.1b exhibits the correlation coefficients between 
privatisation, and IPO prices. Previous studies demonstrate that the privatisation 
IPOs are priced differently to the private IPOs. In this study, the correlation 
between the privatisation dummy and the IPO offer (initial) price is negative and 
strongly significant. In the relation to the IPO offer price, the result suggests that 
the privatisation IPOs are underpriced. It could be speculated that privatisation 
IPOs are underpriced in order to ensure the net proceeds is achieved and to 
enhance the market's participation in the subsequent privatisations. However, 
while the result shows the persistence of underpricing in privatisations, no one has 
evidence for the government's deliberation. 
In sum, the univariate analysis demonstrates mixed results of the 
correlation between each predictor and the IPO prices. The fundamentals are 
correlated to the IPO prices as expected. Of the risk factors, only leverage and the 
efficiency risk appear to have significant relations to the IPO prices, while of the 
signal variables, only the percentage of equity sold at the IPOs is related 
significantly to the IPO prices. However, the result of univariate analysis is not 
aimed to test the research hypotheses listed in the research design chapter. The 
hypotheses testing are based on the proposed valuation models, which is discussed 
in the next three sections. 
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4.3. Basic valuation analysis 
The univariate analysis above provides a description of the relationships 
between the individual predictors used in the valuation model (basic and full 
models). However, such an analysis is not enough. Since this study tries to 
examine the relationship between the three groups of prospectus information 
(fundamentals, risk factors, and signals) and the IPO offer (initial) prices, 
multivariate analysis is used to allow the interaction of a group of predictors in IPO 
valuation. This section discusses the results of the basic valuation analysis, while 
the IPO full valuation analysis is discussed in the next section. 
Principally, the basic valuation models analyse the fundamental 
relationship on share valuation. This kind of model is usually used in non-IPO 
shares valuation, which as discussed in the literature review tend to work very 
well. From the practical point of view, McCarthy (1999) argues that accounting 
data, such as earnings and book value are vital information, which is used by the 
investment bankers and the issuers to set up the offer price. 
The basic valuation model is expressed by equation (4) in the research 
design chapter. The empirical results of the basic valuation model are presented in 
table 4.2 below. The table itself is divided into 2 panels. The first panel (Panel A) 
exhibits the result of the basic valuation model for the entire IPO sample on both 
the issue price and the initial market price. Since prior studies find that the 
privatisation IPOs are somehow differently priced, this study discusses separate 
analyses for the full sample and the non-privatisation sample. Panel B exhibits the 
results of the basic valuation model for the non-privatisation sample. 
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Table 4.2. Regression results for Basic IPO valuation model 
The table contains output from OLS regression of the offer price and initial market price 
scaled by pro-forma book value (Po/pBV and Pj/pBV) on pro-forma book value scaled by 
pro-forma book value (pBV/pBV), forecasted earnings scaled by pro-forma book value 
(JE/pBV), a dummy variable for negative earnings (D), an interactive term of negative 
earnings scaled by pro-forma book value (D*JE/pBV), and pro-forma dividend scaled by 
pro-forma book value (Div/pBV). All variables are in per share value. Heteroscedasticity- 
adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Panel A- All IPO sample 
Variable Po/pBV Pt/pBV 
pBV/pBV 
fE/pB V 
0.280* 
(1.96) 
12.345*** 
0.347* 
(1.88) 
13.128*** 
(16.66) (14.51) 
D 2.524*** 3.097*** 
(2.82) (2.70) 
D*fE/pBV -15.896*** -15.909*** 
(-4.53) (-3.59) 
pDiv/pBV 1.508 3.075 
(0.75) (1.24) 
N 161 161 
Adj. R2 0.729 0.670 
Wald 1733.42 242.20 
(p-value) (p-value=0.00) (p-value=0.00) 
Note: *** significant at 1%; *significant at 10% 
Panel B- Non-privatisation IPO sample 
Variable Po/pBV P1/pBV 
pBV/pBV 0.354** 0.415** 
(2.33) (2.07) 
fE/pBV 12.222*** 13.033*** 
(15.96) (13.88) 
D 2.763*** 3.425*** 
(3.13) (2.98) 
D*fE/pBV -15.043*** -14.894*** 
(-4.32) (-3.36) 
pDiv/pBV 1.211 2.765 
(0.59) (1.09) 
N 151 151 
Adj. R2 0.723 0.662 
Wald 304.79 219.28 
(p-value) (p-value=0.00) (p -value=0.00) 
Note: *** significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10% 
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In each panel of table 4.2, the first column lists the accounting information 
variable (pro-forma book value of equity, forecasted earnings and pro-forma 
dividends) and other important variables (negative earning dummy and the 
interactive term). The second and third columns demonstrate the regression 
coefficients of variables listed in the first column, with two levels of IPO price; the 
offer price (Po) and the initial market price (PI). 
The second column of table 4.2 panel A shows the results of the basic 
valuation model with the offer price scaled by pro-forma book value of equity 
(Po/pBV) as the dependent variable. The intercept is positive and significantly 
related to the offer price. Based on the basic model discussed in the research design 
chapter, the intercept coefficient of the model represents the impact of book value 
of equity on the share price - in this case, it would be the impact of the pro-forma 
book value of equity on the IPO offer price. The coefficient shows a value of 0.280 
(between 0 and 1), which is both theoretically and empirically normal for the 
valuation model. The impact of book value is also significant at the 10% level. 
The result of the book value of equity is consistent with the theoretical 
model. It confirms the hypothesis HI a, which predicts a positive relationship 
between the IPO offer price and the book value of equity. Moreover, since the 
book value figures used in this study are the pro-forma book values, this result 
evidences the usefulness of the future value of book value on valuation and 
confirms the findings from previous studies (e. g., Firth, 1998). 
The regression coefficient of the fE/pBV exhibits a positive impact of 
forecasted EPS scaled by book value variable on the dependent variable, Po/pBV. 
The regression coefficient of, fE/pBV has a value of 12.345, which is somewhat 
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higher than the usual empirical figures for non-IPO cases from prior studies (e. g., 
Rees, 1997)2. 
The high-growth characteristic of IPO firms results in the higher 
coefficient of earnings than what is normally observed for non-IPO firms. 
Moreover, since the accounting information that is available to investors prior to 
the IPO is very limited, it is possible that the investment bankers and the issuers 
emphasise the potential earnings growth in the IPO valuation and put a greater 
weight on earnings valuation and lesser weight on book value of equity. The 
hypothesis test shows a robust significant result offE/pBV, which also confirms the 
hypothesis HI b. 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, prior IPO valuation studies, 
which examine the role of earnings in valuing IPOs, could be divided into two 
groups. The first is a group that use the pre-IPO accounting earnings (Klein, 1996; 
Beatty et al, 2002) and the other is a group that use the earnings forecasts disclosed 
in the prospectus (Firth, 1995; Kim and Ritter, 1999, How and Yeo, 2001). 
Although different measures of earnings are applied between the two groups of 
studies, the results suggest similar conclusions, in that earnings (or earnings 
forecasts) could explain a large portion of the variance in the IPO offer (initial) 
price. However, a sensitivity analysis is undertaken to examine whether the 
historic earnings explains the IPO valuation better than the forecasts. The results - 
as presented later in the sensitivity analysis section (section 4.8) - shows that using 
2 Using a UK non-IPO sample, Rees (1999) finds an average earnings response coefficient of 9.896, 
which varies yearly between 6.530 and 12.257 during the 1987-1997 period. 
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historic earnings do not alter the implication of the main results, but it produces a 
substantially lower explanatory power. 
Kim and Ritter (1999) find a mixed result when they deliberately compare 
the result of IPO valuations based on historical earnings and the analyst earnings 
forecasts. They show that historical earnings figures explain little of the variance in 
the IPO initial market price and the model explanatory power increases 
significantly when the earnings forecasts and pro-forma book value are used. 
In this study, the measure of earnings used is the 1-year earning forecasts. 
The result shows the important role of forecasted earning on the IPO valuation, 
confirming the results of prior studies (Keasey and McGuiness, 1992; Firth, 1998; 
How and Yeo, 2001). The result also verify the findings by Kim and Ritter (1999), 
who conclude that using the forecasted accounting numbers is more useful than 
using the historical numbers. 
The signalling theory argues that a good firm uses signals to reveal its true 
value to the market. Prior to the IPO, the issuers have an option to disclose the 
earnings forecasts in the prospectus or not. When they decide to disclose such 
information, they choose to employ the earning forecast as a signal to the firms' 
true values. Moreover, the theory also argues that the chosen signal is credible if it 
could separate a good firm from the bad ones, which means that not all earning 
forecasts are a credible signal. The result in this study shows the robust 
relationship between the earnings forecasts and the IPO offer price, which could be 
inferred that the earning forecasts serve as a credible signal to the firm's value. 
This signalling role of earnings forecasts is even clearer in the discussion of the 
initial market price (P1) below. 
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The next two rows of column 2 show the statistical results on the negative 
earnings forecasts dummy variable and the interaction terms. These variables allow 
the weighting parameter to vary for cases that have negative earnings. The result 
appears to be normal - the coefficient of negative earnings forecasts dummy (D) 
takes a positive value of 2.524, and the interactive term (D*JE/pBk) coefficient 
takes a negative value of 15.896 - which is more or less similar to the earnings 
forecasts (fE/pBk) coefficient. The result indicates that earnings forecasts have 
limited explanatory power when negative as the two earnings forecasts coefficients 
approximately offset each other. In these circumstances, the importance of book 
value of equity (here the pro-forma book value of equity) increases, as reflected in 
the positive coefficient of the negative earnings forecasts dummy (D). In other 
words, for cases where negative earnings forecasts appear, the investment bankers 
and issuers tend to draw attention to the firm's pro-forma book value figures. The 
statistical results on the negative earnings dummy and the interactive term confirm 
the hypothesis H2. Moreover, the result also corroborates the result from previous 
studies using non-IPO (e. g., Rees, 1999). 
The coefficient of dividends scaled by the pro-forma book value has the 
expected positive sign, but appears to be statistically insignificantly different from 
zero. The lack of significance of the dividends in this valuation model suggests that 
the investment bankers and issuers consider that dividends, which feature 
permanent incomes, are less important to highlight the potential growth of the 
firms than forecasted earnings itself. The empirical result indicates that in the 
presence of the forecasted earnings, dividend becomes less important, as the 
manager expectation has been reflected in the forecasted earnings. Additionally, as 
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many IPOs are young firms, they do not have a record of dividends3; therefore 
dividend becomes irrelevant to most IPOs. The result does not support the working 
hypothesis H3. 
One might argue that the lack of significance of the dividends variable 
could be as a result of spurious effect. Small firms are usually trying to grow and 
do not pay dividends, while large and more mature firms tend to pay dividends. To 
address this issue, some sensitivity analyses have been undertaken and the results 
show that dividends remain insignificantly related to the IPO prices across the 
firm-size groups4. Another analysis has also been undertaken by restricting the 
sample to the 99 firms that paid dividends prior to the offering. The results are 
similar to the ones using the full sample of 161 IPOs, with dividends remaining 
insignificant. 
Overall, the basic valuation model on the offer price seems to have a high 
explanatory power. The adjusted R-square shows that the fundamental accounting 
information (pro-forma book value, forecasted earnings, and pro-forma dividends) 
explains up to 72.9% of the offer price variance. This shows that the accounting 
information has important roles in the IPO pricing process. The result is also 
supported by the Wald statistic, which demonstrates the validity of the model and 
the robust joint impact of fundamentals on the IPO offer prices. In sum, the result 
of the basic valuation model on the offer price is consistent with the underlying 
3 From 161 IPO sample, 62 firms have not paid any dividend in the year prior to the admission. A 
value of zero is applied to the proforma dividends for those firms. 
To examine whether the impact of dividends may be different across the firm size based on the 
firms' market capitalisation at the IPOs, the sample is split into three groups (small, medium, and 
large). There is approximately 43% of the small groups are zero dividends firms, and respectively, 
44% and 28% of the medium and the large firms. The results of the basic valuation model for each 
firm-size group show that the dividends remain insignificantly related to both IPO offer and initial 
market prices. 
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model where the pro-forma book value and positive forecasted earnings are value 
relevant. The result also shows that when negative forecasted earnings appear, the 
investment bankers and issuers pay more attention to the pro-forma book value 
figures. 
The third column of table 4.2 shows the empirical results of the basic 
valuation on the initial market price scaled by pro-forma book value (Pj/pBVI). 
Almost all variables produce slightly higher coefficients, except for the 
interaction term (D*JE/pBk). The statistical significance of each variable 
remains the same as the result on the offer price. The model result on the initial 
market price indicates that forecasted earnings, pro-forma book value and pro- 
forma dividend are even more important factors used by investors to price the IPOs 
on the first day of trading. 
The intercept coefficient, which represents the book value of equity 
response coefficient, takes a positive value, implying that IPOs that report higher 
pro-forma book value of equity in the prospectus are priced higher in the market. 
This result verifies hypothesis HI a as it is demonstrated in the offer price (Po) 
result. 
The forecasted earnings coefficient also shows the value relevance of the 
earnings on the initial market price. This result is consistent to findings from prior 
studies (Firth et al, 1995; Firth, 1998; Ghikas, 2000). The negative earnings 
dummy and the interaction terms also demonstrate a consistent result to the 
theoretical framework. The dividends coefficient appears to be much higher for the 
market price than for the issue price, suggesting that in fact the market puts more 
weigh on the dividend as, other studies suggest they do for the non-IPO shares. 
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The t-statistics also shows a greater value, although it is not enough to reject the 
null hypothesis in the hypothesis testing. 
Although the results of the basic valuation model appears to be similar for 
both IPO price levels, the coefficient of determination for the basic valuation 
model on the initial market price is lower (adjusted R-square = 67.0%). It implies 
that although fundamental accounting information is important in pricing the IPOs, 
investors do consider other factors' influence on the IPO prices. This is understood 
as more information is revealed as IPOs are traded in the market. 
Similar to the IPO offer price results, the Wald statistic of the model on the 
initial market price demonstrates the validity of the model and the strong impact of 
the fundamentals on the initial market price. However, the magnitude of the Wald 
statistics on the initial market price is lower than the one on the offer price, which 
implies that the fundamentals affect the offer price more robustly than they do on 
the initial market price. 
Panel B of table 4.2 demonstrates the result of the basic valuation model 
using the non-privatisation sample of 151 IPOs. It shows a consistent result for 
both the issue price and the initial market price to the previous result for the full 
IPO sample. All the fundamentals coefficients are consistent with the theoretical 
hypotheses, however similar to the result for the full IPO sample, the dividends 
coefficient appears to be statistically insignificant. Therefore the non-privatisation 
results suggest that the fundamentals are priced similarly in PIPOs as well as in the 
private IPOs. However, as demonstrated by the Wald statistics, the joint restriction 
of the fundamentals on the IPO prices is less for the PIPOs. 
Although the results for both price levels (firm and market) and 
segmentation of the sample (full IPO and non-PIPO) appear to be similar, further 
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Table 4.3. Testing the difference of regression coefficient 
in the basic IPO valuation model results 
The table contains output from OLS regression of the difference of the initial market price 
and the offer price scaled by pro-forma book value [(Po - PI)/pBVJ and the initial returns 
(IR) on pro-forma book value scaled by pro-forma book value (pBY/pBTý, forecasted 
earnings scaled by pro-forma book value (fE/pBTý, a dummy variable for negative 
earnings (D), an interactive term of negative earnings scaled by pro-forma book value 
(D*JE/pBV), and pro-forma dividend scaled by pro-forma book value (pDiv/pBU), for all 
sample and non-privatisation sample. All variables are in per share value. 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Panel A- full IPO sample 
Variable (PI- Po)/pBV IR 
(full sample) (full sample) 
pBV/pBV 0.067 0.892*** 
(1.09) (6.03) 
fE/pBV 0.782*** -0.097 
(2.74) (0.33) 
D 0.573 -0.020 
(1.26) (-0.67) 
D*fE/pBV -0.013 -0.126 
(-0.01) (-1.17) 
pDiv/pBV 1.567* 0.173 
(1.83) (1.16) 
N 161 161 
Adj. R2 0.124 0.002 
Wald 13.20 9.87 
(p-value) (p-value=0.01) (p-value=0.04) 
Panel B- non-PIPO sample 
Variable PI-P/PBV IR 
(non-PIPO sample) (non-PIPO sample) 
pBV/pBV 0.061 0.812*** 
(0.89) (5.28) 
fE/pBV 0.811*** -0.012 
(2.75) (-0.21) 
D 0.662 0.099 
(1.34) (0.89) 
D*fE/pBV 0.149 0.295 
(0.09) (0.84) 
pDiv/pBV 1.555* 0.230 
(1.79) (1.58) 
N 151 151 
Adj. RZ 0.128 0.008 
Wald 6.47 3.40 
(p-value) (p-value=0.00) (p-value=0.49) 
Note: ***significant at 1% 
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analysis is examined to analyse the difference between the two price levels, and 
presented in Table 4.3. The analysis is undertaken by running the OLS regression 
analysis with the fundamentals as the regressors and the difference between the 
initial market and the offer prices as the dependent variable. The full sample and 
the reduced non-PIPO sample demonstrate similar results. 
The intercepts take positive values though they are statistically 
insignificant. It implies that there is no significant difference in the perception 
towards the value relevance of the book value of equity among the market 
participants during the early days of IPOs. Interestingly, there is a significant 
difference of the perception regarding the value-relevance of the forecasted 
earnings. The fE/pBV coefficients are positive and significantly different to zero at 
the 99% level of confidence. This suggests that although both the issuers/sponsors 
and the market believe that forecasted earnings could be used as a signal to the 
firms' true value, the market puts more weight on the forecasted earnings than the 
issuers/sponsors, which results in positive coefficients of forecasted earnings in the 
model. 
While the dividend appears to be insignificant in the basic valuation model 
result, surprisingly, it is positively and significantly related to the difference 
between the two levels of IPO prices. As discussed in the literature review 
chapter, many IPO studies propose a number of explanations to the IPO 
underpricing anomaly. Although later in this dissertation, the underpricing (initial 
returns) is discussed in more detail, this section includes an analysis of the 
differential impact of the fundamentals on the offer and initial market price. 
For comparison, table 4.3 also includes an overview of the initial returns 
[(P1-Po)/Po]" The result shows that the fundamentals do not work on the IR as well 
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as on the IPO prices. The constant is positive and strongly significant, suggesting 
the underpricing. However, the fundamentals are insignificant5. The result also 
demonstrates the low explanatory power of the fundamentals to explain the 
variation of IRs. Despite the lack of statistical significance, overall the Wald 
statistics show that at least the joint restriction of the fundamentals on the IR is 
significant for the full sample; yet, it has no influence in the initial returns of 
PIPOs. 
In sum, the basic valuation model appears to work well for IPOs. The 
future numbers of fundamentals (book value of equity and earnings) are positively 
related to the IPO prices both at the issue price (Po) and when initially traded (P1). 
The model featuring the role of negative earnings, also demonstrates their 
significance in valuing the IPOs. However, the dividend, which usually has an 
important role in non-IPO share valuation, appears to be insignificant in IPO cases. 
Similar results are found when applying the basic valuation model for the non- 
privatisation sample. Further analysis shows that the different perceptions towards 
the valuation exist among the market participants. The market seems to put more 
weight on the future incomes (forecasted earnings and pro-forma dividends) than 
the issuers/sponsors do. 
S Sensitivity analyses have been undertaken to examine whether the results are different across the 
firm-size groups by splitting the research sample into 3 groups (small, medium, and large). Overall, 
the results for each group remain the same. A slightly improved result of dividends is found in the 
large firms, however it still fails to obtain a significant result at the 10% level. 
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4.4. IPO full valuation analysis 
The basic valuation model discussed above exhibits a high explanatory 
power of the fundamentals on the IPO valuation. However, there are many 
independent variables that could still explain the variance in IPO offer and initial 
market prices. The main objective of this research is to analyse the influence of a 
number of risk factors and signals to IPO valuation. As discussed in the literature 
review chapter, there have been various studies that examine the relationship 
between the risk factors and the IPO underpricing and long run performance, 
although none appears to have been done on the IPO valuation. It is emphasised in 
the research design chapter that the risk factors examined in this research are 
categorised as business risk prior to the admission. This section discusses, 
particularly, the impact of each risk factors examined on the IPO prices. The 
impact of signals on the IPO valuation is discussed in the next section. 
Table 4.4 and 4.5 below present the results of the full valuation models, 
both on the offer price scaled by pro-forma book value (PQ/pBk) and the initial 
market price scaled by pro-forma book value (PI/pBV), as the dependent variables. 
The model is run in two stages. In first stage, the IR model only includes the 
prospectus information variables. The model is then extended to incorporate the 
privatisation dummy, to examine the impact of the PIPOs on the results. 
Compared to the results of basic valuation model (table 4.2), the inclusion 
improves the explanatory power of the model by 2.0% and 2.6%, respectively for 
Po/pBV and P1/pBV as the dependent variables. However, the inclusion of the 
privatisation dummy appears to have no impact on the overall explanatory power 
of the model. 
192 
Table 4.4 Regression analysis on the full IPO valuation model 
for the offer price (PdpPBV) 
The table contains output from OLS regression, of the IPO offer price scaled by pro-forma book 
value (Po/pBV) on pro-forma book value scaled by pro-forma book value (pBV/pBi), forecasted 
earning scaled by pro-forma book value ((E/pBV), a dummy variable for negative earnings (D), an 
interactive term of negative earnings scaled by pro-forma book value (D*E/pBV), pro-forma 
dividend scaled by pro-forma book value (Div/pBi7, leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk 
(Cap), efficiency risk (Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy 
(Spo), firm's age (Age), percentage of equity sold (Eq), and privatisation dummy (Priv), 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Variables Po/pBV Po/pBV 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
Fundamentals 
pBV/pBV 2.638** 2.546** 
(2.37) (2.26) 
fE/pBV 11.899*** 11.889*** 
(16.47) (16.47) 
D 2.589*** 2.590*** 
(3.05) (3.08) 
D*fE/pBV -14.059*** -14.133*** 
(3.73) (-3.74) 
pDiv/pBV 0.544 0.454 
(0.30) (0.25) 
Risk factors: 
Lev 0.161 0.145 
(0.86) (0.77) 
Cap 0.131 0.144 
(0.75) (0.82) 
Ef r -0.674* -0.672* 
(-1.81) (-1.81) 
Cpy 0.490** 0.531** 
(2.02) (2.16) 
Ind -1.416 -1.408 
(-1.31) (-1.31) 
Signals: 
Spo -0.041 0.029 
(-0.27) (0.18) 
Age 0.084 0.081 
(1.18) (1.10) 
Eq -1.130** -1.012 
(-2.86) (-1.55) 
Priv - -0.321 
(-0.75) 
N 161 161 
Adj. R-sq 0.749 0.748 
Wald regression (p-value) 591.16 (0.000) 566.11 (0.00) 
Wald fundamental (p-value) 314.52 (0.00) 318.17 (0.00) 
Wald e-a risk firs (p-value) 11.51 (0.04) 11.81 (0.04) 
Wald signals (p-value) 9.84 (0.02) 3.28 (0.35) 
Note: *** significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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The coefficients of the fundamentals have the same sign as in the analysis 
above; however their magnitudes change with the inclusion of the additional 
variables. The coefficients of book value of equity (the constant) increase to a 
value exceeding 1, while the forecasted earnings coefficients decrease slightly. The 
inclusion of other factors appears to have an impact on the importance of equity as 
a basis for IPO valuation. The dividend coefficients are smaller in value and 
remain insignificant. 
However, the impact of the fundamental accounting information on IPO 
valuation overall is robust, so the inclusion of other variables barely changes their 
impact on IPO valuation. In general, it is clear that there are no substantial 
differences in results for the offer price and the initial market price. All variables 
appear to have the same signs and significance of regression coefficients. 
Prior studies (e. g., Menyah et al, 1995) show that privatisation IPOs 
(PIPOs) are priced differently to other IPOs. Since, 10 out of 161 IPOs in the 
research sample are PIPOs, a sensitivity analysis has been undertaken by running 
the model using the non-PIPOs, as presented in table 4.6 below. The results of the 
fundamentals for non-PIPOs sub-sample are similar to the ones for the full sample. 
4.4.1. Ex-ante risk factor analysis 
As discussed in the research design chapter, the hypotheses developed for 
the risk factors are based on the risk aversion assumption. It is posited that the IPO 
value is a decreasing function of the ex-ante risk factor. Therefore, at the firm 
level, the riskier IPOs are priced lower at the offer price in order to persuade the 
investors to buy. At the market level, as the investors demand a compensation for 
holding the riskier investments, they are also priced lower. 
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Table 4.5 Regression analysis on the full IPO valuation model 
for the initial market price (Pj/pPBV9 
The table contains output from OLS regression, of the IPO initial market price scaled by pro-forma 
book value (Pj/pBV) on pro-forma book value scaled by pro-forma book value (pBV/pBV), 
forecasted earning scaled by pro-forma book value (fE/pBV), a dummy variable for negative 
earnings (D), an interactive term of negative earnings scaled by pro-forma book value (D*E/pBV), 
pro-forma dividend scaled by pro-forma book value (Div/pBV), leverage risk (Lev), capital 
availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk (Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor 
reputation dummy (Spo), firm's age (Age), percentage of equity sold (Eq), and privatisation 
dummy (Priv), Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Variables Pj/pPBV P1/PBV 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
Fundamentals 
pBV/pBV 4.150*** 4.102*** 
(2.94) (2.84) 
fE/pBV 12.633*** 12.629*** 
(14.73) (14.78) 
D 3.185*** 3.186*** 
(3.02) (3.03) 
D*fE/pBV -13.653*** -13.689*** 
(-2.93) (-2.92) 
pDiv/pBV 1.900 1.856 
(0.86) (0.83) 
Risk factors: 
Lev 0.203 0.194 
(0.86) (0.80) 
Cap 0.179 0.186 
(0.81) (0.83) 
EEr -0.779* -0.778* 
(-1.82) (-1.78) 
Cpy -0.696** 0.717** 
(-2.39) (2.41) 
Ind -2.750* -2.745* 
(-1.94) (-1.94) 
Signals: 
Spo -0.065 0.059 
(-0.33) (0.30) 
Age 0.095 0.093 
(1.13) (1.09) 
Eq -1.362*** -1.235* 
(-2.89) (-1.79) 
Priv - -0.165 
(-0.31) 
N 161 161 
Adj. R-sq 0.696 0.695 
Wald regression (p-value) 464.94 (0.000) 440.31 (0.00) 
Wald fundamental (p-value) 240.49 (0.00) 242.63 (0.00) 
Wald e-a risk ftrs (p-value) 15.89 (0.01) 15.78 (0.01) 
Wald signals (p-value) 9.80 (0.02) 3.88 (0.27) 
Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significan t at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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Table 4.4 shows that only 2 (Effr and Cpy) of the 5 ex-ante risk factors 
employed appear to be significantly related to the IPO offer price, while table 4.5 
shows another risk factor (Ind) appears to be related to the IPO initial market price. 
The coefficients for leverage (Lev) variable are positive, but insignificant. This 
result is inconsistent to findings from Fama and French (1998), who find a 
negative relationship between debt and firm values. However, they acknowledge 
that such a relation is sensitive to how the debt is measured. Using a model more 
similar to the one applied here, Rees (1999) also fails to find a significant 
relationship between debt and firm values. 
A number of IPO studies examine the impact of debt to IPO initial returns 
(e. g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Slovin and Young, 1990; Hedge and Miller, 1996). 
However, very few studies investigate the impact of the pre-IPO debt on the IPO 
valuation. Empirically, Hedge and Miller (1996) find a significant positive 
association between the pre-IPO debt and the after market IPO values. 
The positive coefficients for leverage found in this study imply that pre- 
IPO debt tend to have a signalling role rather than a risk factor. However, the 
impact appears to be insignificant. This result cannot confirm the previous results 
that show the impact of the firm's leverage on the IPO prices. 
The next risk factor examined is the capital availability (Cap). Table 4.4 
and 4.5 exhibit positive coefficients of Cap on both price levels, although its 
impact on the IPO values is statistically insignificant. As explained in the research 
design, the capital availability risk is measured by the ratio of retained earnings 
over net income. Fama and French (1998) argue that a pecking order is applied to 
the firms prior to their listings. The pattern is that firms finance the investments 
first with retained earnings, then with debt, and finally by issuing stocks. Greater 
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Table 4.6 Regression analysis of the full valuation model 
for Non privatisation IPOs 
The table contain output from OLS regression, of the IPO offer price and the initial market price 
scaled by pro-forma book value (P0/PBV and P, /PBV) on pro-forma book value scaled by pro- 
forma book value (PBV/PBV), forecasted earning scaled by pro-forma book value (E/PBV), a 
dummy variable for negative earnings (D), an interactive term of negative earnings scaled by pro- 
forma book value (D*E/PBV), pro-forma dividend scaled by pro-forma book value (Div/PBV), 
leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk (Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), 
industry risk (Inca), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's age (Age), and percentage of equity 
sold (Eq). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Variables P, /pPBV 
(t-stat) 
PI/PBV 
(t-stat) 
pBV/pBV 2.322** 3.872*** 
(2.09) (2.73) 
fE/pBV 11.917*** 12.688*** 
(16.22) (14.53) 
D 2.969*** 3.663*** 
(3.53) (3.49) 
D*fE/pBV -13.225*** -12.543*** 
(-3.45) (-2.94) 
pDiv/pBV 0.468 1.844 
(1.16) (0.83) 
Risk factors: 
Lev 0.245 0.314 
(1.16) (1.16) 
Cap 0.172 0.213 
(0.92) (0.89) 
Effr -0.736* -0.872* 
(-1.95) (-1.94) 
Cpy -0.589** -0.777** 
(-2.34) (-2.59) 
Ind -1.184 -2.470* 
(-1.06) (-1.79) 
Signals: 
Spo -0.043 -0.086 
(-0.26) (-0.42) 
Age 0.113 0.124 
(1.40) (1.32) 
Eq -0.824 -1.189* 
(-1.42) (-1.94) 
N 151 151 
Adj. R-sq 0.738 0.685 
Wald regression (p-value) 569.04 (0.00) 440.20 (0.00) 
Wald fundamental (p-value) 319.37 (0.00) 240.46 (0.00) 
Wald ex-ante risk factors (p-value) 13.02 (0.02) 16.49 (0.01) 
Wald signals (p-value) 3.88 (0.27) 4.40 (0.22) 
Note: ***significantat 1%; **significantat 5%; *significantat 10% 
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internal capital availability to the firms could be viewed as beneficial to the firms 
to continue their business. Therefore, the greater Cap could be inferred as lower 
business risk. The positive coefficients of Cap mean that higher capital availability, 
which indicates lower risk, results in higher IPO prices. The result is entirely 
consistent with the theoretical foundation and supports the working hypothesis 
H4b. However, the impact of Cap on IPO valuation seems to be insignificant. 
Table 4.1b detects no multicollinearity problem on the single correlation between 
Cap and any other predictor. Moreover, excluding the privatisation IPO from the 
sample (table 4.6) does not change the statistical significance. Another sensitivity 
analysis (see appendix tables A. 4.1a and A. 4.2b) also shows that Cap keeps the 
positive coefficients but fails to exhibits a significant impact on either, the offer or 
the initial market prices. Thus, the lack of significance of Cap is robust. 
Besides financial risk factors, this study also examines the non-financial 
risk factors, efficiency risk (Effr) and capacity risk (Cpy). As, explained in the 
research design chapter, Effr measures the firms' operational efficiency. The 
rationalisation is that the more efficient the firm runs its business, the more profit 
produced, and it, in turn, may increase the income for the shareholders. 
The ratio of the cost of goods sold over sales is used as a proxy for Effr. 
The result (table 4.4) shows that Effr is negatively and significantly related to IPO 
prices. This means that less efficient IPO firms are priced lower at the offering date 
and on the first trading day. The result demonstrates a significant impact of the 
firm's operational efficiency on the IPO prices, on both the offer and initial market 
prices. Hence, it supports the working hypothesis H4c. In relation to portfolio 
selection, this result indicates that it is not only the systematic risk that matters in 
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the pricing of securities, but also the unsystematic risk. By assessing the firms' 
unique risk before the selection, investors could have better portfolios. 
Table 4.4 and 4.5 show that the Effr coefficient on the offer price is smaller 
than the one on the initial market price, suggesting that the market price is more 
sensitive to the efficiency risk, which could be driven either by the operational 
efficiency or the pre-IPO sales. However, the difference between the coefficients 
appears to be statistically insignificant (see table 4.7). 
The correlation matrix (table 4.1b) shows that there is a positive and 
significant correlation between Effr and Priv, however the coefficient demonstrates 
a weak relationship. Therefore, no multicollinearity problem detected regarding 
this variable. Consequently, the result remains unchanged when the model is 
analysed using the non-privatisation sample. Another sensitivity analysis that 
includes only Effr into the model (see appendix table A. 4.1a and A. 4. lb) also 
exhibits consistent results to the prior analysis. 
The capacity risk (Cpy) shows the risk associated with the firms' decision 
regarding the use of the IPO proceeds. The empirical results (table 4.4 and 4.5) 
shows that the Cpy coefficients are negative and significant at the 5% level. This 
implies that IPO firms that propose a higher portion of IPO proceeds for 
investment activities are riskier; therefore they are priced lower by market 
participants (the issuers, the investment bankers, and the investors). In such a way, 
it also reflects the negative relationship between the risk factors and the IPO 
valuation, which in turn, confirms the working hypothesis H4d. 
Using a different proxy, Keasey and Short (1997) finds a positive 
association between the net proceeds and the IPO market value. They argue that 
the new proceeds (new money) as it is disclosed in the prospectus is a signal to the 
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firm's value. A similar result is also found by Leone et al (2003) who investigate 
the impact of the net proceeds usage to the IPO valuation. They use the amount of 
net proceeds usage disclosed in the prospectus as a proxy. They record that the net 
proceed usage varies from the investment purpose to daily operation expenses. 
They find that the firms that disclose a greater number of net proceeds usage are 
priced significantly higher in the market. Since this study is interested to examine 
the impact of the risk factors on the IPO valuation, the proxy used here is more 
fitting than the Leone et al's proxy as the proxy, particularly, observes the risky 
investment activities proposed by the firms. 
The Cpy coefficient on the initial market price is somewhat greater than'the 
one on the offer price. Furthermore, table 4.7 shows that the difference between the 
two coefficients is significantly different to zero, suggesting that Cpy is priced 
differently at the IPO offer price and at the initial market price. Table 4.1b 
demonstrates significant positive correlation coefficients between Cpy and other 
predictors: forecasted earnings, pro-forma dividend, privatisation, sponsor 
reputation, pre-IPO leverage, and pre-IPO efficiency risk. However, they show 
weak relationship; therefore the multicollinearity problem is not expected in 
relation to the result of Cpy. A sensitivity analysis using the non-privatisation 
sample (table 4.6) indicates the similar result to the main analysis. 
The last risk factor is the industry risk, Ind. This risk is proxied by industry 
betas (/1) in the quarter when the IPOs took place. The higher 8 suggests riskier 
industry. Therefore, a negative Ind coefficient on the IPO valuation model is 
expected (H4e). The evidence shows negative coefficients for Ind, which supports 
the negative relationship hypothesis between the pre-IPO risk factors and the IPO 
valuation. However, the impact of Ind on IPO valuation appears to be mixed. It is 
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statistically insignificant on the offer price (table 4.4), but significant at the 90% 
level on the initial market price (table 4.5). This suggests that the market put more 
weight on the industry effect than the issuers/sponsors do. The coefficients are 
significantly different to zero at the 95% level of confidence (table 4.7). 
The correlation matrix exhibits no multicollinearity problem between Ind 
and the other predictors. Consequently, the result remains unchanged when the 
valuation model is applied using the non-privatisation sample (table 4.6). Similar 
results are obtained in another sensitivity analysis that includes one ex-ante risk 
factor in the model at a time (see appendix tables A. 4. la and A. 4. lb). The impact 
of Lid on the offer price is negative but appears to be insignificant, although it 
keeps the significance on the initial market price. 
Despite the mixed results found with regard to the relationship between 
pre-IPO risk factors and the IPO valuations, the Wald statistics show that the joint 
restriction of the ex-ante risk factors is statistically significant at the 95% level of 
confidence (table 4.4 and 4.5). Therefore it could be concluded that the ex-ante risk 
factors have small, but significant impact on the IPO pricing. 
Although the impact of ex-ante risk factors on the offer price appears to be 
similar to the one on the initial market price, some risk factors shows a 
significantly different magnitude. Table 4.7 below presents the regression 
coefficients of fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and signals on the IPO price 
difference. The results of the fundamentals show an interesting difference to the 
prior results of the basic valuation model. As discussed above, the inclusion of the 
ex-ante risk factors and signals to the model shifts some weighs from forecasted 
earnings (fE) to the pro-forma book value of equity (pBII), which is shown in 
201 
Table 4.7 Testing the difference of regression coefficients in full IPO 
valuation model (all-IPO sample and non-privatisation sample) 
The table contains output from OLS regression, the difference of the initial market price and the 
offer price scaled by pro-forma book value [(Po- P, )/pBV] on pro-forma book value scaled by pro- 
forma book value (pBV/pBV), forecasted earning scaled by pro-forma book value (fE/pBV), a 
dummy variable for negative earnings (D), an interactive term of negative earnings scaled by pro- 
forma book value (D*JE/pBV), pro-forma dividend scaled by pro-forma book value (pDiv/pBV), 
leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk (Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), 
industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's age (Age), percentage of equity sold 
(Eq), and privatisation dummy (Priv). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are reported in 
brackets. 
Variables (PI PQ)/PBV (PI PQ)/PBV 
(Full IPO sample) (non-PIPO sample) 
pBV/pBV 1.556*** 1.551*** 
(2.95) (2.96) 
f13/pBV 0.739*** 0.771*** 
(2.77) (2.81) 
D 0.59 0.693 
(1.36) (1.44) 
D*fE/pBV 0.444 0.682 
(0.51) (0.39) 
pDiv/pBV 1.402* 1.376* 
(1.74) (1.67) 
Risk factors: 
Lev 0.049 0.069 
(0.58) (0.71) 
Cap 0.042 0.041 
(0.65) (0.59) 
Effr -0.106 -0.136 
(-0.73) (-0.86) 
Cpy 0.186** 0.189 
(2.08) (1.61) 
Ind -1.337** -1.287** 
(-2.48) (-2.36) 
Signals: 
Spo 0.029 0.043 
(0.49) (0.54) 
Age 0.013 0.011 
(0.49) (0.29) 
Eq -0.352* -0.364 
(-1.69) (-1.51) 
Priv 0.156 - 
(0.97) 
N 161 151 
Adj. R-sq 0.151 0.157 
Wald regression (p-value) 36.91 (0.00) 440.31 (0.00) 
Wald fundamental (p-value) 14.15 (0.01) 242.63 (0.00) 
Wald ex-ante risk factors (p-value) 3.88 (0.27) 15.78 (0.01) 
Wald signals (p-value) 3.28 (0.35) 3.88 (0.27) 
Note: *** significant at ]Yo,, ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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decreasing JE coefficients and increasing pBV coefficients6. Moreover, the pBV 
escalation is greater on the initial market price than on the offer price, and the 
difference of the two coefficients appears to be robustly significant. The impacts of 
the other fundamentals appear to be similar to the previous result (table 4.3), which 
shows the significant difference between the impact of forecasted earnings and 
pro-forma dividends on both the IPO offer and initial market prices. 
Leverage (Lev), Capital availability (Cap), and Efficiency risk (Effr) appear 
to have similar impacts on the offer price and the initial market price. However, 
Capacity risk (Cpy) and Industry risk (Ind) demonstrate significantly different 
impacts on the IPO prices. Both risk factors are significantly related to the IPO 
prices; however, the market appears to put more weighs on those risk factors than 
do those determining the IPO offer price. 
In sum, mixed evidence is found on the impact of the ex-ante risk factor on 
IPO prices. All risk factors appear to be of expected sign, except leverage risk. 
However, only two factors, efficiency risk and capacity risk, have significant 
impact on both levels of price, while Ind has a significant impact only on the initial 
market price. Although prior evidence shows that the privatisation IPOs are 
differently priced, the sensitivity analysis using the non-privatisation sample does 
not change the results of the ex-ante risk factors on IPO valuation. Another set of 
sensitivity analysis using different models (the model keeps all the fundamentals 
6 The results of the basic valuation model (table 4.2) shows that the forecasted earnings (fE) 
response coefficients are 12.345 and 13.128, on the offer price and initial market price, 
respectively, while they slightly decrease to 11.889 and 12.629 as a result of the inclusion of the ex- 
ante risk factors and signals in the full valuation model (table 4.5). Meanwhile, the pro-forma book 
value coefficients increase significantly from 0.280 and 0.347 on the offer price and the initial 
market price, respectively, to 2.546 and 4.102. 
203 
and a risk factor at a time - tables A. 4. la and 4.1b) also demonstrates the similar 
result to the ones in the main analysis. 
4.4.2. Signalling analysis 
Another set of predictors is a group of signals. In the research design 
chapter, it is explained that signals are the means chosen by the issuers to gesture 
the firm's value. The signalling theory argues that the chosen signal could be 
effective if it could separate the firm from others. The signals employed in this 
study have been widely used in prior IPO studies. In the UK, a number of studies 
(e. g., Keasey and McGuiness, 1992, Khurshed et al, 1999) demonstrate that the 
three signals work very well in explaining the IPO anomalies. However, only few 
examine them directly to the IPO valuation. Therefore, this study contributes to the 
explanation of factors influencing IPO prices. 
Despite different methods used to measure the reputation of the 
underwriters, prior studies in US, in general, conclude that the prestigious 
underwriters reduce the uncertainty of the IPO, which results in lower initial 
returns in the early days of IPOs. However, mixed results are found in other 
markets, including the UK. Using USM data, Keasey and McGuiness (1991) find 
no evidence of a negative relationship between sponsor reputation and the degree 
of underpricing, while Byrne and Rees (1996) using the UK main market and USM 
data find a significant association. 
In this study, the sponsor reputation is measured by a modified proxy used 
by Keasey and McGuinness (1991). Using the KPM `New Issues Statistics' from 
1987-1997, the sponsor is classified as the prestigious sponsor when it sponsors 
more than 3 IPOs in the quarter prior to the IPO date, and as the less prestigious 
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one when less than 3 IPOs are brought to the market. A dummy variable for 
sponsor reputation (Spo) is used in the valuation model. The dummy takes 1 for the 
reputable sponsors and 0 for the less reputable ones. The expectation is that the 
issuers hire the reputable sponsor - which it is assumed are paid more than the less 
reputable - to ensure the investors that the firms are the high-value ones. 
Consequently, the investors willingly pay higher prices for such IPOs. Therefore, a 
positive coefficient is expected for the dummy Spo. 
The result in tables 4.6 and 4.7 exhibit the positive coefficients of Spo on 
the offer price and the initial market price. This suggests that the IPOs brought to 
market by prestigious sponsors are priced higher at the offering date and the first 
day as posited in the working hypothesis HSa. This result is consistent with most of 
the previous IPO studies on agent reputation (e. g., Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Feltham 
et al, 1991; Carter et al, 1998). Specifically on IPO valuations, this result also 
supports the findings of Klein (1996). However, while the sign of the coefficients 
are as expected, they are statistically insignificant. Although the Spo coefficient on 
the market level is greater than the one on the offer price, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are very small, and the difference between the coefficients appears to 
be insignificantly different from zero (table 4.7). 
The correlation matrix (table 4.1b) demonstrates that there is a significant 
positive correlation between sponsor reputation and privatisation, but it appears to 
be a weak relationship. Hence, no multicollinearity problem is expected. The 
valuation model analysis using the non-privatisation sample shows a similar result 
of Spo on IPO prices. Positive but insignificant Spo coefficients are also found in 
the valuation model that includes the fundamentals and a single signal at a time 
(see appendix tables A. 4. la and A. 4. lb). 
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The inclusion of Age as a signal used by the issuers is because the issuers 
have options as to when they go public. It is expected that the older (more mature) 
firms have established business, so they have lower uncertainty in doing the 
business. The decision of when the firms go public is used by the issuers to signal 
the firms' value. The valuation analysis in tables 4.6 and 4.7 shows that the result 
of the Age variable is positive. This implies that the older firms are priced higher. 
Although Klein (1996) uses a different measure for Age, the result of this study is 
consistent to hers, which also finds a positive association between firm's age and 
the IPO prices. However, neither result appears to be statistically insignificant. 
Therefore this study could not confirm the working hypothesis H5b. 
The correlation matrix in table 4.1b exhibits that Age is significantly 
correlated to the forecasted earnings variable, the negative earnings dummy, the 
negative earnings interactive term and the capacity risk. However, they emerge to 
be low relationships. Therefore, no multicollinearity problem is detected. The 
sensitivity analysis using the non-PIPO sample demonstrates the similar result to 
the main analysis (see tables 4.8). Furthermore, other sensitivity analyses confirm 
the finding in the main analysis (see appendix - tables A. 4. la and A. 4.1b) 
The most popular signal used in the IPO studies is the ownership retained at 
the offerings. Prior studies demonstrate robust results of the impact of the 
ownership retention on the IPO prices and performance. In this study, the 
ownership retention is measured by the percentage of equity sold at the admission 
(Eq). The greater percentage of equity sold at the admission signals the lower 
belief of the old shareholders in the future firm values. Therefore, it is expected 
that the IPO valuation is a decreasing function of the percentage of equity sold at 
the admission, as hypothesised in H5c. 
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The result in table 4.4 and 4.5 exhibits a negative association between the 
proportion of equity sold at the admission and the IPO valuations, implying that 
IPOs selling greater percentage of equity are priced lower. This is completely 
consistent to the retained ownership theory, which suggests that the proportion of 
equity retained by the old shareholder reflects the value of the firms. The old 
shareholders tend to retain greater fraction of equities when they believe in higher 
firms' value in the future. While the Eq coefficient is significant at the 90% level 
of confidence on the IPO initial market, such an impact appears to be insignificant 
on the IPO offer price. The possible explanation could be the multicollinearity 
problem between the Eq and other predictors. 
Table 4.1b demonstrates that there is a strong correlation (+0.705) between 
the Eq and Priv. This is understandable since 9 of 10 PIPOs in the sample offer 
100% of the equity for sale at the offerings. Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect 
multicollinearity explains the lack of significance of the Eq coefficient for the offer 
price, when the model includes by the privatisation dummy (see table 4.4). 
However, the result using the non-PIPOs sample (table 4.6) demonstrates the 
similar result. The impact of Eq on the IPO offer price remains insignificant. 
Another sensitivity analysis using the IPO valuation as a function of the 
fundamentals and another single predictor (see appendix - table A. 4.1a) shows a 
robust result in which Eq is negatively related to the IPO offer price and significant 
at the 99% level of confidence. This is to confirm the evidence that the lack of 
significance of the Eq coefficient in the full valuation model is because of the 
existence of multicollinearity problem. 
The result of Eq is consistent to Byrne and Rees's (1996) finding. Using 
UK data, they find that the percentage of equity retained (sold) in the offering is 
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positively (negatively) and significantly related to the IPO offer price and market 
price for the full sample. However, when they split the sample by market, the 
results of the official list (now called the main market) sample show similar results 
to the ones in this study that the coefficient of the equity retained appears to be 
statistically insignificant on the IPO offer price, but becomes significant on the 
initial market price. Using US data, Klein (1996) finds that the ownership retention 
is positively and significantly related to the IPO offer price and market price. Other 
prior studies (e. g.: Firth et al, 1995; Firth, 1998) find a significant impact of Eq on 
the IPO market price. 
In sum, the results of the signal variables seem to be consistent theoretically 
and empirically to previous studies. However, only the impact of Eq on IPO 
valuations is found to be statistically significant. Despite mixed results found 
regarding the impact of the individual signals on the IPO prices, the Wald statistics 
show that collectively they put significant impact on the IPO offer price (table 4.4) 
and the initial market price (table 4.5) when the model does not include the 
privatisation dummy. However, the joint restriction of the signals becomes 
insignificant when the privatisation dummy is included in the valuation models. 
This is due to the high correlation between the percentage of equity sold at the IPO 
and the privatisation dummy. 
4.5. Privatisation 
The last variable in the full valuation model is controlling for privatisations. 
It is used as a control variable since previous studies (e. g., Dewenter et al, 1998) 
show that privatisation IPOs (PIPOs) are priced differently to private IPOs. 
Dewenter et al (1998) argue that governments deliberately underprice the 
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privatisation to achieve the target proceeds from the offerings. Their result shows 
that PIPOs in the UK are underpriced. However, they do not find evidence of 
deliberation. Other studies, with different motives, also demonstrate robust results 
of the PIPOs underpricing. Therefore, a negative coefficient of the privatisation 
dummy on the IPO values is expected in this study. 
The empirical result of the privatisation dummy is of the expected sign 
(negative), indicating that PIPOs are underpriced at the offer and the initial market 
prices. However, in contrast to prior findings, the impact of privatisation dummy 
appears to be statistically insignificant. 
Having observed the robust correlation coefficient between the 
privatisation and the offer and initial prices in the univariate analysis, it is 
surprising here that the privatisation dummy appears to be insignificant in the 
multivariate valuation model. However, as discussed above, the correlation matrix 
(table 4.1b) exhibits a high correlation coefficient between the privatisation 
dummy (Priv) and the percentage of equity sold at the offering (Eq) suggesting that 
a multicollinearity problem may exist between the two predictors Consequently, at 
least one variable could appear insignificant. The result of Eq appears to be mixed. 
The impact of Eq on the initial market price is significant, but loses the 
significance on the offer price. Here, the impact of Priv appears to be insignificant 
at both prices. Therefore, the result does not confirm hypothesis H6. The existence 
of multicollinearity is also supported by a sensitivity analysis in tables A. 4. la and 
A. 4.1b (appendix). When the valuation model analyses only the fundamentals and 
a single other predictors (Priv), the result shows that the impact of privatisation on 
both prices becomes statistically significant at least at the 10% level suggesting 
that PIPOs are indeed priced differently. As the Priv coefficients take negative 
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values, it could be inferred that PIPOs have lower prices at the offer price and the 
initial market price. 
4.6. Validity of the IPO valuation model 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 presents the Wald statistics of the full valuation model 
and the joint restriction of the predictor groups in the model. The Wald statistics of 
the full valuation model are statistically significant across the IPO prices (the offer 
and initial market prices) and the sensitivity analyses. It implies that the joint 
restriction of all predictors significantly affecting the pricing of IPOs on both the 
offer price and the initial market price. The model is predominantly explained by 
the fundamentals. 
Despite mixed results of the impact of the ex-ante risk factors on the IPO 
prices, the Wald statistics for the joint restriction of the ex-ante risk factors 
demonstrates that all together they are significantly related to the IPO prices. 
Furthermore, the Wald statistics show that the ex-ante risk factors are significantly 
relevant in pricing the IPOs for the full sample and the reduced using non- 
privatisation sample. 
As discussed above, the signals relationship to the IPO prices is vague. The 
joint restriction statistic for the signals shows that they are significantly related to 
the IPO offer price and the initial market price. However, when the model is 
controlled for the privatisation dummy, the signals relationship to IPO prices 
become unclear. This is confirmed in the results of the non-PIPO sample, which 
exhibits the insignificance of the Wald statistics of the signals' joint restriction. 
In sum, all predictors, jointly, are significantly related to the IPO prices for 
the full sample as well as for the non-PIPOs sub-sample. Undoubtedly, the 
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fundamentals are strongly relevant to the pricing. While the ex-ante risk factors 
also demonstrate a robust relationship to the IPO prices, the signals appear to have 
weak relationship, once privatisations are controlled for. 
Additionally, the researcher also attempts to run the model using the 
Stepwise regression. The results are presented in the appendix (table A. 4.2). The 
results of the Stepwise regression are consistent to the outcomes of the OLS 
regression. The fundamentals are strongly related to the IPO offer and initial 
market prices for the full sample and the non-PIPO samples. Mixed results are 
found for the ex-ante risk factors and the signals. 
4.7. Sensitivity analyses 
This section presents a number of robustness tests for the IPO valuation 
main analysis presented in previous sections. Some adjustments have been made 
in the IPO valuation models to suit the IPO firms' characteristics, such as the use 
of forecasted earnings rather than historic ones, the use of proforma book value as 
a model deflator rather than realised ones. Therefore, it is useful to check whether 
the use of competing variables results in different outcomes. 
4.7.1. Forecasted earnings vs. historic earnings 
The main analysis of the basic valuation model in this study employs the 
earnings forecasts, since a number of prior IPO studies (e. g., Firth and Liau-Tian, 
1998, Chen and Firth, 1999, How and Yeo, 2000) finds that earnings 'forecasts 
provides a better prediction of the price than the historic earnings does. However, 
using US data, Klein (1996) employs the earnings from the last audited financial 
statement prior to the IPO. With the tighter legal environment, usually the US 
firms do not provide the management's earnings forecast in the prospectus. 
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Moreover, prior non-IPO studies using the accounting-based valuation model 
usually employ the realised earnings. Therefore, as a robustness check, the basic 
valuation model (equation 4) is analysed using the historic earnings. The results 
are shown in table 4.8 below. 
Table 4.8. Regression results on the basic IPO valuation model 
using the historic earnings and dividend 
The table contains output from OLS regression of the offer price and initial market price 
scaled by pro-forma book value (Po/pBV and P, /pBP) on pro-forma book value scaled by 
pro-forma book value (pBV/pBV), Realised earnings pre-IPO scaled by pro-forma book 
value (E/pBT), a dummy variable for negative earnings (D), an interactive term of 
negative earnings scaled by pro-forma book value (D*E/pBP), and dividend scaled by 
pro-forma book value (Div/pBV). All variables are in per share value. Heteroscedasticity- 
adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Variable Expected Po/pBV P1/pBV 
sign (t-stat) (t-stat) 
pBV/pBV + 1.783*** 2.015*** 
(5.18) (5.37) 
E/pBV + 6.142*** 6.383*** 
(2.86) (2.82) 
D+1.342* 1.274* 
(1.81) (1.72) 
D*E/pBV - -7.835** -8.066** 
(-2.60) (-2.79) 
Div/pBV + 1.915 2.869 
(0.79) (1.02) 
N 157 157 
Adj. R-square 0.285 0.253 
Wald statistics 18.21 16.73 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) 
Note: *** significant at 1%; **si gnificant at 5%; *significant at 10% 
First of all, the valid case for the analysis is reduced from 161 IPOs to 157, 
due to the outliers of the E/pBV variable. Overall, the results are similar to the main 
results reported in table 4.2 (p. 182). All the fundamentals have the expected signs 
and retain their significance. The earnings coefficient takes a positive value, which 
confirms the results of prior study by Klein (1996). However, it takes lower values 
than the earnings forecasts coefficients in the main result. Although the inference 
of the results using the historic earnings is similar to the main analysis using the 
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earnings forecast, the explanatory power of the model is substantially lower 
(28.5% and 25.3% for the offer and initial market prices, respectively), compared 
to the main analysis (72.9% and 67% for the offer and initial market prices, 
respectively). This confirms that the main analysis has more information content, 
although the overall conclusions are the same. This result corroborates Kim and 
Ritter's findings (1999), which suggest that the future accounting numbers have 
higher explanatory power in explaining the IPO values than the historic numbers. 
The analysis is extended by including the ex-ante risk factors and signals to 
the model, and controlling for privatisation IPOs. The results are shown in table 
4.9. Similar to the basic valuation analysis, the outcome demonstrates similar 
inferences to the main results (table 4.4 and 4.5), although there are some 
differences. The historic earnings coefficients take lower values than the forecasted 
earnings, which confirm the greater price predictability of the earnings forecasts. 
The dummy for negative earnings take the expected positive sign although appears 
to be insignificant. However, the interactive term remains highly significant, which 
firms, as is also implied by the main results. 
Another difference is found in the signal, Eq on the offer price analysis. 
The main result shows that once the analysis controls for privatisations, the 
percentage of equity sold at the IPO (Eq) becomes insignificant for the offer price, 
although it remains significant for the initial market price. Using the historic 
earnings, Eq retains its significance for both prices, although it is marginally 
significant for the offer price. Similar to the findings of the main results, the Eq 
results in the expected negative coefficient suggesting that firms, which sell higher 
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Table 4.9. Regression analysis on the full IPO valuation model 
using the historic earnings and dividends 
The table contains output from OLS regression, of the IPO offer price scaled by pro-forma book 
value (Po/pBV) on pro-forma book value scaled by pro-forma book value (pBV/pBV), realised 
earnings pre-IPO scaled by pro-forma book value (E/pBV ,a 
dummy variable for negative earnings 
(D), an interactive term of negative earnings scaled by pro-forma book value (D*E/pBV), and 
dividend scaled by pro-forma book value (Div/BV , 
leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk 
(Cap), efficiency risk (Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy 
(Spo), firm's age (Age), percentage of equity sold (Eq), and privatisation dummy (Priv), 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Variables Expected 
sign 
Po/pBV 
(t-stat) 
Pl/pBV 
(t-stat) 
pBV/pBV + 5.453*** 5.400*** 
(3.53) (3.87) 
E/pBV + 6.091*** 6.377*** 
(3.05) (3.03) 
D + 0.951 0.857 
(1.08) (1.05) 
D*E/pBV - -6.929*** -7.901*** 
(-2.90) (-3.08) 
Div/pBV + 1.242 2.161 
(0.66) (0.99) 
Risk factors: 
Lev - 0.181 0.174 
(0.79) (0.74) 
Cap + 0.132 0.135 
(0.57) (0.51) 
Effr - -0.631* -0.941 * 
(-1.84) (-1.87) 
Cpy - -0.866** -1.069** 
(2.49) (-2.69) 
Ind - -2.061 -2.589 
(-1.35) (-1.69) 
Signals: 
Spo + 0.301 0.323 
(1.06) (1.00) 
Age + 0.083 0.191 
(1.31) (1.64) 
Eq - -1.024* -1.235* 
(-1.92) (-1.79) 
Priv -0.578 -0.167 
(-1.10) (-0.27) 
N 157 157 
Adj. R-sq 0.428 0.403 
Wald regression 133.52(0.00) 127.67 (0.00) 
(p-value) 
Wald fundamental 21.78 (0.00) 20.53 (0.00) 
(p-value) 
Wald e-a risk ftrs 12.27(0.01) 19.30 (0.00) 
(p-value) 
Wald signals (p-value) 8.28 (0.03) 7.65(0.04) 
Note: *** significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10% 
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suggests that loss making firms are valued very differently from profit making 
fraction of equities at the IPOs, are expected to have lower IPO values. The results 
also confirm the findings of prior studies (e. g. Downes and Heinkel, 1982; Firth et 
al, 1995, Klein, 1996, Keasey and Short, 1997). 
The explanatory power of the full valuation model using the historic 
earnings is substantially lower than the main analysis based on the forecasted 
earnings. This implies that the use of earnings forecasts in the analysis has 
increased the predictive power of the model. All the Wald statistics confirm that 
each group of prospectus information (fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and 
signals) are significantly related to the IPO offer and initial market prices. 
4.7.2. Pro-forma book value vs. Pre-IPO book value as a deflator 
Another robustness check is undertaken by considering an alternative for 
the scale factor. It is discussed earlier in chapter 3, that book value is chosen as the 
appropriate scale factor. Some IPO studies (e. g., Kim and Ritter, 1999, Firth et al, 
2000) use the post IPO book value as the scale factor, while non-IPO studies (e. g. 
Danbolt and Rees, 2002; Core et al, 2003) employ realised book value. Therefore a 
sensitivity analysis using pre-IPO book value is undertaken as a robustness check 
to the results of the main analysis. The results are reported in table 4.10 below. 
In this sensitivity analysis, the net proceeds per share scaled by book value 
pre IPO is also included to capture its signalling role as suggested by some studies 
(e. g.,. Keasey and Short, 1997). As argued by Krinsky and Rottenberg (1989) net 
proceeds as indicated in the offering prospectus, might also convey the insiders' 
private information regarding the future planned projects in the firms. Therefore, it 
is regarded as a signal to the firm's future value. The expectation is that the more 
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Table 4.10. Regression results on the basic IPO valuation model 
using book value of equity pre-IPO as a scale factor 
The table contains output from OLS regression of the offer price and initial market price 
scaled by pre-IPO book value (Po/BVp, and Pj/BVpfe) on pre-IPO book value scaled by 
pre-IPO book value (BVp, e /BV,, ), forecasted earnings scaled by pre-IPO book value (El 
BVp, e), a dummy variable for negative earnings (D), an interactive term of negative 
earnings scaled by pre-IPO book value (D*E/BVp, e), and dividend scaled by pre-IPO book 
value (Div/ BVp,, ). All variables are in per share value. Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t- 
statistics are reported in brackets. 
Variables Expected sign PQ/pBV 
(t-stat) 
Pj/pBV 
(t-stat) 
BVpreBVprc + 0.212** 0.251** 
(2.61) (1.98) 
fEBVprý + 11.400*** 13.187*** 
(10.14) (9.26) 
DIE + 6.887** 6.093** 
(2.55) (2.10) 
DfE* fEBVpp« -18.962*** -19.430*** 
(-2.75) (-3.18) 
DivBVp« + 0.975 1.26 
(0.59) (0.61) 
NetPrBVp« + 1.495 2.247 
(0.65) (0.76) 
Adj. R-sq 0.589 0.544 
N 146 146 
Wald statistics 128.53 97.48 
_ 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) 
Note: *** significant at ]Yo, - * *significant at S%; *significant at 10% 
net proceeds received from the IPOs, the more projects would be undertaken in the 
firms to raise the firms' value. Therefore the new proceeds is expected to be 
positively related to the IPO prices. 
The analysis is based on smaller sample (146 IPOs). There are 15 out of the 
final sample of 161 IPOs that have negative pre-IPO book values; hence they are 
excluded from the analysis. The results of the basic valuation model demonstrate 
similar inferences to the main analysis (table 4.2). All fundamentals, except the 
dividends, are as expected and significantly related to the IPO offer and initial 
market prices. The intercept, which is considered as the pre-IPO book value 
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coefficient, and the forecasted earnings coefficients take slightly lower values than 
the pro-forma book value and the forecasted earnings in the main analysis. 
However, the negative forecasted earnings and the interactive term coefficients 
appear to be higher than the ones in the main analysis. 
The net proceeds variable appears to be positively related to the IPO prices, 
although the association is insignificant. Therefore, the analysis fails to prove the 
signalling role of the net proceeds. 
The results shows that the coefficients of determination of the model using 
the pre-IPO book value as a deflator are 58.9% and 54.4% for the offer price and 
the initial market price, respectively. They are substantially lower than the main 
results (72.9% and 67.0% for the offer price and the initial market price, 
respectively). This result suggests that the use of pro-forma book value as a model 
deflator explains the IPO basic valuation model better than the use of realised book 
value. 
The full valuation analysis using the pre-IPO book value as the scale factor, 
as reported in table 4.11, also provides similar inferences to the main results (table 
4.4 and 4.5). The fundamentals are of expected sign and maintain their 
significance. After controlling for risk factors, signals, and the PIPOs, the analysis 
still finds no evidence of the signalling role of the net proceeds. Similar to the 
results of the basic valuation model, the full valuation models show that the 
explanatory powers of the models are significantly greater when the models use the 
pro-forma book value as a deflator. 
In sum, changing the pro-forma book value to the pre-IPO book value as a 
deflator for the IPO valuation model does not change the main results' inferences. 
Yet, the explanatory powers of the models are better when the pro-forma book 
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Table 4.11. Regression results on the basic IPO valuation model 
using book value of equity pre-IPO as a scale factor 
The table contains output from OLS regression, of the IPO offer price scaled by pre-IPO book value 
(Pol BVp, e) on pre-IPO 
book value scaled by pre-IPO book value (B Vpe / BVp, e), earnings forecast 
by pre-IPO book value (EIBVp, e), a 
dummy variable for negative earnings (D), an interactive term 
of negative earnings scaled by pre-IPO book value (D*E/BVp1e), and dividend scaled by pre-IPO 
book value (Div! BVp, e), leverage risk 
(Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk (Effr), 
capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's age (Age), 
percentage of equity sold (Eq), and privatisation dummy (Priv), Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t- 
statistics are reported in brackets. 
Variables Expected sign PoBVpTe 
(t-stat) 
PiBVpre 
(t-stat) 
BVpre / BVpre + 2.056** 2.130 
(2.02) (1.69) 
fE/ BVpre + 10.753*** 12.449 
(10.89) (8.90) 
DE + 6.901** 6.484 
(2.51) (2.03) 
DfE* fE/BVpre - -17.553*** -19.444 
(-3.15) (-2.03) 
Div/ BVp, e + 1.107 1.394 (1.56) (1.39) 
NetPr/ BVp e + 1.456 2.233 (0.93) (1.62) 
Risk factors: 
Lev - 0.377 0.591 
(0.36) (0.54) 
Cap + -0.389 -0.306 
(-0.98) (-0.67) 
Effr - -1.451* -3.257* 
(-1.77) (-1.97) 
Cpy - -0.722* -0.861* 
(-1.75) (-1.83) 
Ind - -4.434 -5.093 
(-1.69) (-1.69) 
Signals: 
Spo + 0.205 0.664 
(0.37) (1.51) 
Age + -0.169 -0.164 
(-0.76) (-0.59) 
Eq - -2.765** -3.143*** 
(-2.81) (-3.35) 
Priv - 0.067 0.309 
(-0.48) (0.17) 
N 146 146 
Adj. R-sq 0.633 0.617 
F-stat 18.87 17.69 
Note: *** significan t at 101o; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10% 
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value is used as a deflator. The results also fail to find evidence for the signalling 
role of the net proceeds. 
4.7.3. Ex-ante risk factors vs. Risk disclosure index 
The main analyses (table 4.4 and 4.5) show mixed results are found on the 
relationship between 5 ex-ante risk factors and IPO prices. Only Efficiency risk 
(Effr), Capacity risk (Cpy), and Industry risk (Ind) are significantly related to the 
IPO prices. Yet, as a group, they have significant impact on the IPO prices as 
shown in the Wald statistics for the ex-ante risk factor group. 
Having discussed the content analysis of the offering prospectus using the 
AABRM framework in chapter 3, another sensitivity analysis is undertaken to 
examine the impact of the amount of risk factors disclosed in the prospectus. The 
risk disclosure index is proxied by the number of AABRM risk factor disclosed in 
the prospectus, regardless of whether measures of the level of risk are provided or 
not. Based on the AABRM classification, this study comes up with four risk 
disclosure indices; the environment index, the process index, the information 
index, and the total index. The descriptive statistics of the risk disclosure indices 
are presented in appendix table A. 4.3. 
This robustness check is undertaken with two analyses. In the first analysis, 
the 5 ex-ante risk factors are substituted by the three group indices (the 
environment index, the process index, and the information index). Then, in the 
second one, the total index is used as a substitute to all ex-ante risk factors. The 
results are shown in the appendices to this chapter (chapter 4) in table A. 4.4. None 
of the indices are found to be significant, which implies that how many risk factors 
disclosed in the prospectus is not important to the IPO pricing. Moreover, the 
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Wald statistics for the risk disclosure indices show that the indices have 
insiginificant impacts on the IPO prices. The main results show that the ex-ante 
risk factors are important for the IPO valuation, however the sensitivity analysis 
suggests it is not the simple number of risks disclosed that matters, but more 
detailed measures of the individual risk factors. 
4.7.4. Industry fl vs. Industry dummy 
Industry 8 is included in the IPO valuation model as a proxy for industry 
risk -a risk factor that is identified in the AABRM. Moreover, since there is no 
market valuation for the firms' shares prior to the IPO, a proxy to the firm's 6 is 
not available at the IPO, therefore the industry it is also used as a proxy to the 
firm's 8. The hypothesis is that the higher the /3, the riskier the industry, and the 
lower the IPO prices. The main results show mixed results. The industry risk (Ind) 
coefficent is of the expected sign. However, it is only significantly related to the 
initial market price (Pt), while its relationship with the offer price (Po) is unclear. 
Many IPO studies use industry dummy to examine the impact of industry 
on the IPO valuation (e. g., Keasey and Short, 1997; Beatty et al, 2002). Therefore, 
another sensitivity analysis is undertaken to examine whether different proxies for 
industry effect could make a different impact on the IPO valuation. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the research sample is classified into 5- 
industry groups based on the 1995 FTSE Actuaries industry classification. 
Therefore, 4 industry dummies (DM; fl, Dc,,, DGen Dser) are included as a substitution 
to Ind in the IPO valuation model. The results are reported in the appendix (table 
A. 4.5). 
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The results show similar outcomes to the main results. All other predictors 
(the fundamentals, the ex-ante risk factors, and the signals) are of expected sign 
and maintain their significance. All industry dummies are positively related to the 
IPO prices, however only a dummy for service industry has a significant impact on 
the IPO prices. 
4.7.5. Rank regression analysis 
As explained in the Research sample section, the treatment for the outliers 
has been undertaken by deletion of IPOs with extreme values. However, to make 
sure that there is no more outliers that could still significantly affect the results, the 
rank regression analysis is undertaken. The results are reported in the appendix 
(tables A. 4.6) 
To test the robustness of the IPO full valuation model results to the outliers, 
the rank regression analysis is run. The results are presented in the appendix table 
A. 4.6. The rank regression analysis demonstrates that there is no substantial 
differences in the coefficients that could potentially alter the inferences of the main 
results. Therefore, it could be concluded that there is no outliers problem and the 
main results are robust. 
Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the impact of the fundamental accounting (pro- 
forma book value, forecasted earnings, and pro-forma dividend), the ex-ante risk 
factors, and the signals on the IPO valuation. The IPO values are examined at the 
offer price and the closing price on day 1. The analysis is based on the accounting- 
based valuation model. The model hypothesises that the IPO price is an increasing 
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function of the fundamentals and signals, but a decreasing function of the ex-ante 
risk factors. The analysis is divided into two empirical models. The first model is 
called the basic valuation model. It analyses the interaction between the 
fundamentals and the IPO prices. The second model is the extended valuation 
model, including the ex-ante risk factors and the signals. Since the'sample includes 
10 privatisation IPOs (PIPOs) and prior studies show robust results on the PIPOs 
pricing being different to that of other IPOs, the full valuation model includes a 
privatisation dummy variable. 
The analysis on the basic valuation model demonstrates that the 
fundamental accounting variables play a vital role in valuing IPOs. The IPO 
valuations, both at the offer price and the initial market price, heavily depend on 
those accounting numbers, which results in a high explanatory power of the model. 
This result is consistent to previous valuation studies using non-IPO cases that also 
find accounting valuation models to work well. Particularly, pro-forma book value 
and forecasted earnings appear to be strongly and significantly related to the offer 
price and the initial market price. The basic valuation model analysis also confirms 
the significant impact of negative earnings on the IPO valuations. This is also 
consistent to the findings from prior studies (Hayn, 1995; Rees, 1999) using 
seasoned stocks. 
The analysis on the full valuation model exhibits mixed result. All risk 
factors appear to be consistent to the theoretical foundation, except leverage risk. 
While leverage appears to have a signal role rather than being a risk factor, the 
other results show that the IPO price is a decreasing function of the ex-ante risk 
factors. The riskier IPOs are priced lower at the offer price and the initial market 
price. Only two risk factors, efficiency risk and capacity risk, have statistically 
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significant influence the IPO valuations. However, the Wald statistic of the ex-ante 
risk factors as a group shows that the group have a significant impact on the IPO 
prices. 
Similar to the analysis on risk factors, the results of the signals show that 
sponsor reputation, firm age, and the percentage of equity sold at the offering 
induce the movement of IPO prices as expected. It implies that the IPO price is an 
increasing function of the signals. However, only the impact of the percentage of 
equity sold on the initial market price appears to be significant. Therefore the 
results could not confirm the working hypotheses relating to the sponsor reputation 
and firm age. A sensitivity analysis confirms there is a multicollinearity problem 
between the percentage of equity sold (Eq) and the privatisation dummy, which 
results in the lack of significance of the Eq on the initial market price. While the 
privatisation dummy coefficients have the expected sign, the result shows that the 
impact of privatisation on the valuation appears to be statistically insignificant. 
This could be explained by the multicollinearity problem between the Priv and the 
Eq variables, as the sensitivity analysis confirms that the variables are significant 
separately, but becomes insignificant when both variables are included in the 
regression. 
Despite mixed results regarding the influence of ex-ante risk factors and 
signals on the IPO valuation, the inclusion of those predictors to the valuation 
models increases the adjusted R-square by 1.9 and 2.5% respectively for the offer 
price and the initial market price implying that to some extent the ex-ante risk 
factors and the signals do explain parts of the variations in the IPO prices. The 
Wald statistics show that collectively all predictors have a significant impact on the 
IPO prices. It is also shown that the joint restriction of the fundamentals and the 
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Appendices 
for 
Chapter 4 
ex-ante risk factors are significant and valid to predict the IPO prices, while the 
joint restriction of the signals becomes insignificant once the model control for 
privatisations. 
Finally, a number of sensitivity analyses demonstrate that the main IPO 
valuation models are not sensitive to the choice of predictors (fundamentals and 
risk factors). Confirming prior IPO studies (e. g. Firth, 1998; Kim and Ritter, 
1999), the sensitivity analyses show that the future accounting numbers, such as 
forecasted earnings, explain the IPO valuation better than the historic numbers. 
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Table A. 4.2 Stepwise regression full valuation model 
The table contains output form the Stepwise regression, of the IPO offer (initial market) 
price on prospectus information (fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, signals) and control 
variables (privatisation dummy) 
Panel A- Full sample; Po as dependent variable 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
pBV/pBV 0.280 0.909 1.306 1.567 
fE/pBV 12.35 11.98 12.04 12.01 
(18.47) (18.12) (18.35) (18.40) 
D 2.52 2.44*** 2.44*** 2.44*** 
(5.29) (5.25) (5.29) (5.33) 
D*fE/pBV -15.9*** -15.00*** -14.80*** -14.8*** 
(-7.93) (-7.61) (-7.53) (-7.61) 
pDiv/pBV 1.50 1.10 0.90 0.40 
(0.93) (0.67) (0.56) (0.23) 
Eq - -1.22*** -1.09** -1.18*** 
(-3.08) (-2.74) (-2.95) 
Effr - - -0.69* -0.74** 
(-1.95) (-2.14) 
Cpy - - - -0.41 * 
(-1.68) 
Adj R-sq 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 
Note: *"significant at 1 %; "significant significant at 5%,; * significant at 10%, 
Panel B- Full sample; Pl as dependent variable 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
pBV/pBV 0.35 1.10 1.56 1.93 2.35 
FE/pBV 13.13 12.70 12.76 12.72*** 12.85*** 
(15.72) (15.32) (15.50) (15.57) (15.79) 
D 3.10*** 3.00 3.00 3.00*** 2.98*** 
(5.19) (5.14) (5.18) (5.23) (5.23) 
D*fE/pBV -15.90*** -14.90 -14.60*** -14.70*** -14.70*** (-6.35) (-6.02) (-5.92) (-6.01) (-6.06) 
pDiv/pBV 3.10 2.50 2.30 1.60 1.80 
(1.52) (1.28) (1.18) (0.81) (0.90) 
Eq - -1.45*** -1.30** -1.42*** -1.42*** (-2.99) (-2.61) (-2.89) (-2.93) 
Effr - - -0.80* -0.90** -0.85* 
(-1.80) (-2.33) (-1.94) 
Cpy - - - -0.58* -0.62** 
(-1.88) (-2.14) 
Ind - - - - -2.70* 
(-1.87) 
Adj R-sq 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 
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Panel C- Non-privatisation sample; Po as dependent variable 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
pBV/pBV 0.35 0.88 1.19 1.48 
fE/pBV 12.22*** 12.30*** 12.21*** 12.12*** 
(17.75) (18.08) (18.10) (17.97) 
D 2.76*** 2.78*** 2.79*** 2.73*** 
(5.49) (5.60) (5.68) (5.57) 
D*fE/pBV -15.00*** -14.70*** -14.70*** -14.40*** 
(-7.34) (-7.23) (-7.32) (-7.19) 
pDiv/pBV 1.20 1.00 0.30 0.20 
(0.73) (0.59) (0.16) (0.14) 
Effr - -0.81** -0.88** -0.83** 
(-2.21) (-2.42) (-2.27) 
Cpy - - -0.54** -0.48* 
(-2.07) (-1.84) 
Eq - - - -0.83 
(-1.48) 
Adj R-sq 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.74 
Note: *** significant at I ? lo; ** significant at 5%,; * significant at I0%, 
Panel D- Non-privatisation sample; PI as dependent variable 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
pB V/pB V 0.42 1.07 1.60 1.87 2.16 
fE/pBV 13.03 12.86 12.96*** 12.88*** 13.00*** 
(15.07) (-14.98) (15.22) (15.24) (15.41) 
D 3.42*** 3.33*** 3.35*** 3.37*** 3.30*** 
(5.42) (5.32) (5.41) (5.49) (5.39) 
D*fE/pBV -14.90*** -14.40*** -14.00*** -14.10*** -14.20*** 
(-5.79) (-5.63) (-5.52) (-5.60) (-5.68) 
pDiv/pBV 2.80 2.50 2.30 1.50 1.60 
(1.33) (1.24) (1.12) (0.73) (0.79) 
Eq - -1.50** -1.38* -1.19* -1.19* 
(-2.13) (-1.97) (-1.69) (-1.70) 
Effr - - -0.90* -0.99** -0.95** 
(-1.96) (-2.16) (-2.13) 
Cpy - - - -0.62* -0.66** 
(-1.89) (-2.11) 
Ind - - - - -2.60 
(-1.62) 
Adj R-sq 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 
Note: *** significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5%,; * significant at 10%, 
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Table A. 3. Descriptive statistics of the disclosure index of AABRM 
Index Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Environmental risk 1.329 1.000 0.545 1.000 3.000 
Process risk 9.683 10.000 1.539 5.000 14.000 
Information risk 4.733 5.000 1.435 3.000 8.000 
Total disclosure 15.745 16.000 2.335 10.000 22.000 
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Table A. 4.4a. Regression änälysis results on the full IPO valuation model for 
the offer price (Po/pBV ) using the disclosure index of AABRM. 
Variables Expected Po/pBV Po/pBV 
sign (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Fundamental 
pBV/pBV + 1.475** 1.531** 
(2.28) (2.30) 
fE/pBV + 11.744*** 11.908*** 
(16.83) (16.28) 
D + 2.608*** 2.504*** 
(3.19) (3.00) 
D*fE/pBV - -14.919*** -14.992*** 
(-4.59) (-4.45) 
PDiv/pBV + 0.855 0.908 
(0.43) (0.45) 
Disclosure index: 
Env. risk 0.076 - 
(0.52) 
Process risk -0.085 - 
(-1.12) 
Inf. risk 0.004 - 
(0.07) 
Total disclosure index - -0.052 
(-1.58) 
Signals: 
Spo + 0.049 0.062 
(0.34) (0.41) 
Age + 0.053 0.051 
(0.80) (0.72) 
Eq - -1.118* -1.118** 
(-1.73) (-2.05) 
Priv - -0.238 -0.612 
(-0.56) (-0.36) 
N 161 161 
Adj. R-sq 0.743 0.755 
Walds regression 510.64(0.00) 478.61 (0.00) 
Walds fundamentals 315.29(0.00) 296.21(0.00) 
Walds risk disclosure 4.85(0.18) 2.51(0.11) 
index 
Walds signals 6.85(0.10) 6.75(0.10) 
Note: *** significant at I ? lo, significant at 5%; * significant at 10%, 
230 
Table 4.. 4b. Regression analysis results on the full IPO valuation model for 
the initial market price (P1/pBV) using the disclosure index of AABRM. 
Variables Exp. sign P1/pBV P1/pBV 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
Fundamental 
pBV/pBV + 1.932** 1.846** 
(2.42) (2.28) 
fE/pBV + 12.396*** 12.345*** 
(14.57) (14.38) 
D+ 3.200*** 3.177*** 
(2.95) (2.92) 
D*fE/pBV - -15.007*** -15.121*** 
(-3.65) (-3.68) 
pDiv/pBV + 2.397 2.471 
(0.98) (0.99) 
Disclosure index: 
Env. risk 0.003 - 
(0.01) 
Process risk -0.087 - 
(-0.73) 
Inf. risk -0.012 - 
(-0.16) 
Total disclosure index - -0.051 
(-1.32) 
Signals: 
Spo + 0.051 0.026 
(0.38) (0.15) 
Age + 0.059 0.060 
(0.73) (0.74) 
Eq - -1.554** -1.602** 
(-2.38) (-2.38) 
Priv - -0.127 -0.306 
(0.23) (0.59) 
N 161 161 
Adj. R-sq 0.692 0.695 
Walds regression 379.26 (0.00) 370.46 (0.00) 
Walds fundamentals 228.41 (0.00) 222.57 (0.00) 
Walds risk disclosure index 3.17 (0.37) 1.76 (0.19) 
Walds signals 6.33 (0.10) 6.43 (0.10) 
Note: *** significant at 1 %; "significant significant at 5%,; * significant at 10%, 
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Table A. 4.5. Regression analysis results on the full IPO valuation model 
using the industry dummy 
Variables Expected Po/pBV Po/pBV 
sign (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Fundamental 
pBV/pBV + 1.830* 1.675* 
(1.98) (1.89) 
fE/pBV + 11.761*** 10.397*** 
(16.44) (14.40) 
D + 2.698*** 2.341*** 
(3.43) (3.33) 
D*fE/pBV - -13.904*** -12.411*** 
(-3.76) (-2.98) 
pDiv/pBV + 0.245 1.579 
(0.13) (0.69) 
Risk factors: 
Lev - 0.176 0.232 
(0.95) (0.96) 
Cap + 0.136 0.189 
(0.80) (0.84) 
Effr - -0.670* -0.799* 
(-1.87) (-1.70) 
Cpy - -0.521 ** -0.667** 
(-2.11) (-2.21) 
Industry dummy: 
DMi,, 0.576 0.660 
(1.22) (1.20) 
Dcon 0.723 0.657 
(1.28) (1.26) 
Doe 0.852 0.931 
(1.37) (1.29) 
Dscr 1.399** 1.716** 
(1.99) (2.08) 
Signals: 
Spo + 0.296 0.306 
(0.22) (0.30) 
Age + 0.089 0.098 
(1.21) (1.15) 
Eq - -0.945* -1.344* 
(-1.79) (-1.94) 
Priv - 0.476 0.802 
(1.02) (1.20)) 
N 161 161 
Adj. R-sq 0.721 0.665 
Walds regression 531.73 (0.00) 497.01 (0.00) 
Walds fundamentals 216.18(0.00) 212.21(0.00) 
Walds e-a risk 8.96(0.06) 10.31(0.05) 
Walds signals 3.65(0.30) 4.35(0.22) 
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Table A. 4.6 - Rank regression result for full valuation model 
The table contains output from Rank regression, of the IPO offer price, the initial market price, and 
the differential price scaled by pro-forma book value (Po/PBV and PI/PBV, and (PO-Pl)/PBVý on 
pro-forma book value scaled by pro-forma book value (PBV/PB), forecasted earning scaled by 
pro-forma book value (E/PBV), a dummy variable for negative earnings (D), an interactive term of 
negative earnings scaled by pro-forma book value (D*E/PBP), pro-forma dividend scaled by pro- 
forma book value (Div/PBV), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk 
(Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's age (Age), 
percentage of equity sold (Eq), and privatisation dummy (Priv), Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t- 
statistics are reported in brackets. 
Panel A- Full IPO sample 
Variables Expected sign Po/pBV 
(t-stat) 
Pj/pBV 
(t-stat) 
Fundamentals: 
pBV/pBV 2.005** 3.136** 
(2.09) (2.61) 
fE/pBV 11.892*** 12.700 
(21.53) (18.36) 
D 2.329*** 2.475*** 
(5.98) (5.07) 
D*fE/pBV -13.757*** -14.189*** 
(-8.10) (-6.67) 
pDiv/pBV -0.345 0.241 
(-0.26) (0.15) 
Risk factors: 
Lev 0.143 0.161 
(1.00) (0.90) 
Cap 0.063 0.101 
(0.45) (0.58) 
Effr -0.471 * -0.677 
(-1.82) (-1.89) 
Cpy -0.357** -0.530** 
(-2.13) (-2.27) 
Ind -1.178 -2.745* 
(-1.21) (-1.91) 
Signals: - 
Spo 0.062 0.011 
(0.42) (0.06) 
Age 0.027 0.014 
(0.41) (0.17) 
Eq -0.785 -1.194* 
(-1.07) (-1.73) 
Priv -0.425 -0.425 
(-1.05) (-0.84) 
N 161 161 
Note: *** signific ant at 1%; ** significant at 5%,; * significant at 10%, 
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Panel B- Non-privatisation sample 
Variables P(/PBV 
(t-stat) 
P1/PBV 
(t-stat) 
PIPdPBV 
(t-stat) 
pBV/pBV 1.932* 3.132** 0.926** 
(1.92) (2.40) (2.32) 
fE/pBV 11.847*** 12.717*** 0.701*** 
(21.185) (17.57) (3.16) 
D 2.766*** 2.99*** 0.228 
(6.68) (5.58) (1.39) 
D*fE/pBV -12.260*** -12.618*** -0.640 
(-7.07) (-5.62) (-0.93) 
pDiv/pBV -0.307 0.170 0.835 
(-0.233) (0.10) (1.60) 
Risk factors: 
Lev 0.261 0.283 0.021 
(1.73) (1.45) (0.35) 
Cap 0.080 0.115 0.007 
(0.56) (0.63) (0.13) 
Effr -0.517* -0.754* -0.132 
(-1.74) (-1.96) (-1.11) 
Cpy -0.418* -0.608** -0.164* 
(-1.90) (-2.13) (-1.89) 
Ind -1.128 -2.018 -0.625 
(-1.10) (-1.52) (-1.54) 
Signals: 
Spo 0.077 0.001 -0.078 (0.52) (0.01) (-1.32) 
Age 0.069 0.060 -0.005 
(0.97) (0.66) (-0.17) 
Eq -0.442 -0.494 -0.172 
(-0.97) (-0.84) (-0.96) 
N 150 150 150 
Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at S%; * significant at 10%, 
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Table A. 4.7. The summary of IPO valuation hypothesis testing 
othesis H V i bl 
Expected Evidence 
yp ar a e 
sign PO P1 
Hla 
There is a positive relationship 
BV BV/ +   between IPO offer (initial) prices p P 
and proforma book value of equity 
Hlb 
There is a positive relationship 
E/ BV +   between IPO offer (initial) prices p J 
and forecasted earnings 
H2 
The negative earnings dummy is D/pBV +   
positively related to the IPO 
prices, while negative interactive   
term is expected to be negatively D*JE/pBV - 
related to IPO offer (initial) prices 
H3 
There is a positive relationship 
between IPO offer (market) prices PDIV/pBV + k ýC 
and proforma dividend 
H4a 
There is a negative relationship 
between firm's pre IPO leverage Lev - k jC 
and IPO offer (initial) prices 
H4b 
There is a positive relationship 
between firm's pre-IPO capital Cap + x x 
availability risk and IPO offer 
(initial) prices 
H4c 
There is a negative relationship 
' E -   s pre-IPO efficiency between firm ffr 
risk and IPO offer (initial) prices 
H4d 
There is a negative relationship 
' C - 
  
s pre-IPO capacity between firm PY 
risk and IPO offer (initial) prices 
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Hypothesis Variable Expected Evidence 
H4e 
There is a negative relationship 
between industry risk and IPO Ind - X 
 
offer (initial) prices 
H5a 
Sponsor reputation is positively Spo + XC 
related to IPO offer (initial) prices 
H5b 
Firm age is positively related to Age + )C 
IPO offer (initial) prices 
H5c 
Percentage of equity sold at the 
E - x  IPO is negatively related to IPO q 
offer (initial) prices 
H6 
Privatisation IPOs are priced Priv - x x 
lower than private IPOs 
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Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 
IPO initial returns analysis 
Introduction 
The previous chapter presents and discusses the results relating to the IPO 
valuation analysis. The analysis tries to answer whether the prospectus information is 
useful to price the IPOs. The prospectus information is categorised into three groups: the 
fundamentals, the ex-ante risk factors, and the signals. The model used in the analysis is 
based on the accounting-based valuation model, which then is developed to two empirical 
models: the IPO basic valuation model and the full valuation model. 
The evidence shows that the basic IPO valuation model works well with both the 
offer price and the initial market price scaled by pro-forma book value. The basic model 
was extended to include other prospectus information, such as the ex-ante risk factors, 
signals and a privatisation dummy as control variable. The empirical results show that two 
ex-ante risk factors, the efficiency risk and capacity risk factors, appear to be consistent 
with the working hypotheses. Industry risk is significantly related to the IPO initial market 
price, although its impact on the IPO offer price is insignificant. The results relating to the 
signalling variables support the findings from previous studies. However, only the 
ownership-retained variable, which is proxied by the percentage of equity sold at the IPO, 
is significantly related to the IPO valuation. The results relating to the control variable 
(privatisation dummy) is unclear. The sign of the Priv coefficients is as expected, but is 
found to be insignificant. 
The prospectus information variables seem to interact in a similar way towards the 
offer price and the initial market price. However, a number of variables (forecasted 
earnings, dividends, capacity risk, industry risk, and the percentage of equity sold) appear 
to have significantly different impacts on the IPO offer and initial market prices, which 
may lead to the well-documented IPO underpricing anomaly. 
This chapter presents and discusses the empirical results relating to the IPO underpricing 
analysis. As explained in the research design chapter, the short-run return or initial return 
is defined as the rate of return received by the `initial' investors, by the close of the first 
trading day. In the IPO literature, the initial return is also identified as the underpricing 
phenomenon. In this study, both terms are used interchangeably. 
The IR analysis tries to answer the second research question: Does the prospectus 
information have a predictive power towards the IPO performance in the short run? The 
analysis also examines whether there is `mispricing' of IPOs which results in a significant 
positive initial return, as referred to in the IPO literature as the underpricing anomaly. An 
empirical model has been developed to undertake the IPO initial returns analysis. The 
model includes the prospectus information variables, the control variable (privatisation 
dummy), and the valuation residual as a proxy for the unobservable pricing variable. 
The diagram in figure 5.1 below presents the main hypotheses in this empirical 
chapter. As discussed in the research design chapter, to simplify the IPO performance 
models (the initial returns models and the long run performance models), the fundamental 
variables are reduced to two variables: the proforma book to offer price ratio (pBV/Po), and 
the forecasted earnings to offer price ratio (fE/Po). Moreover, the results of the regression 
of the IR and the basic fundamentals, as shown in table 4.3 (p. 188) in the previous chapter, 
shows that those proxies for the fundamentals have very low explanatory power to explain 
the IR' 
It has been discussed in the research design chapter that the pro-forma book value 
to offer price and the forecasted earnings to offer price are expected to be positively 
related to the IRs. The rationale for each of the working hypotheses relating to IPO 
performance and the relationship to each of the ex-ante risk factors have been based on the 
theoretical positive risk-return relationship. Hence, in general a positive relationship 
between each of the ex-ante risk factors and the IRs is expected. Based on IPO signalling 
Column 3 of table 4.3 (p. 188) shows the OLS regression results of IR and fundamentals (/E, Dummy and 
Interactive term for negative, /E, and Dividends, all scaled by pro-forma book value). None of the fundamentals 
are significantly related to the IRs. 
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theory, it has been posited that the signals, which are sponsor reputation, and firm age will 
be negatively related to the IPO initial returns, while the percentage of equity sold at the 
IPO is positively related to the IPO IRs. In line with previous studies, it is also 
hypothesised that the privatisation variable will be positively related to the IPO initial 
returns. Finally, to capture the impact of other unobservable factors in the IPO valuation, 
the residuals (Rest) variable2 is included in the IR model. The inclusion of Resi into the IR 
models has a similar motivation to the Beaty et al's (2002) study. A negative relationship 
is expected between the IPO initial return and the residuals. More detailed working 
hypotheses regarding the IR analysis has been presented in the research design chapter 
table A. 3.2 (appendix) 
2 The Resi variable is the standardised residuals from the IPO valuation model with the P//BV as the dependent 
variable. 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. After the introductory section, 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the IR models are presented. As the 
descriptive statistics of the main predictors has been discussed in the IPO valuation 
chapter, the descriptive statistics analysis in this chapter focuses on the IPO short run 
performance (IRs), and the Resi variables. This is followed by discussions of the results of 
the fundamentals, the ex-ante risk factors, the signals, the control variables, and the 
residuals. Finally, a brief summary of the chapter is presented. 
5.1 Data 
The data used in the IR models is from the sample of 161 IPOs used in the 
valuation analysis. Similar to the valuation analysis, the IR analysis also employs data 
from the IPO prospectus. Moreover, the prospectus information is also classified into the 
similar groups (fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and signals). However, as it is 
explained in the research design chapter, different proxies are used for the fundamentals3. 
Additionally, the IR models include the standardised residuals from the valuation model as 
a proxy for the unobservable factors on the pricing. 
Table 5.1 below contains the descriptive statistics of IPO IRs, pBY/P0 and fE/Po as 
proxies for fundamentals, and the residuals (Resi). The ex-ante risk factors and signals 
data is not presented in table 5.1, as the same figures from table 4.1 in previous chapter are 
used. 
5.1.1. IPO initial returns 
As mentioned above, the initial returns are the returns for the initial investors on 
the closing of the first trading day. Table 5.1 shows that IR has a mean (median) positive 
value of 0.089 (0.067), and is significantly different from zero at the 99% levels of 
3 In the IPO valuation model, five proxies for fundamentals (proforma book value of equity, forecasted 
earnings, negative earnings dummy, the interactive term of negative earnings dummy, and proforma dividends) 
are employed. To simplify, fewer and different proxies for fundamentals (proforma book value to offer price, 
and forecasted earnings to offer price) are used in the IPO IR analysis. 
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confidence, indicating the existence of underpricing in the research sample. It implies that 
on average, investors, who buy the IPOs at the offer prices and sell them at the closing 
prices of the first trading day, are better off by 8.9% from their investments. 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics for initial return analysis 
The table contains descriptive statistics for IPO sample of variables in the IPO performance analysis. IR to IPO 
initial returns, which is measured by the percentage of the difference of the closing price on day I and the offer 
price to the offer price [(Pi-P0)/Po, pBV/Po to proforma book value to offer price, JE/P, to forecasted EPS to 
offer price, and Resi to standardised residuals from the IPO valuation model with PdBV as the dependent 
variable. 
Variable N Mean Median StDev Min Max 
IR 161 0.095*** 0.068 0.110 -0.171 0.700 
pBV/Po 161 0.454 0.366 0.281 0.108 1.165 
fE/Po 161 0.064 0.075 0.046 -0.120 0.149 
Resi 161 0.003 -0.182 1.022 -2.413 3.843 
Note: ***significant at 1% 
Most of the IPOs (155 IPOs) in the research sample are underpriced, 18 IPOs are 
overpriced, and 6 IPOs are accurately priced. The maximum IR is 53.1 % (Virtuality Group 
plc) and the minimum is -18.7% (Betacom p1c). 
Levis (2001) documents a higher average first day return of 60.1% for the LSE in 
2001. These figures include all IPOs for all three UK markets. However, the figure is 
much lower for the main market, which records an average of 5.9% for the first day return. 
Since the research sample is drawn from IPOs on the UK main market, it appears that the 
research sample has a higher average initial return than the recent figures documented by 
Levis (2001). 
The research sample of this study includes 10 privatisations. Prior studies 
conclude that PIPOs are priced differently, which results in the higher IRs of PIPOs than 
the private IPOs. Table 5.2 below presents the comparison of IPO IR of the non- 
privatisation and privatisation sub-samples. The privatisation sub-sample shows that PIPO 
prices closed at an average of 13.7% higher than the offer price on the first trading day. 
The non-privatisation IPOs shows that they are less underpriced. Further statistical 
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analysis reveals that the initial returns (IRs) of PIPOs are significantly different to the 
initial returns (IRs) of non-privatisation IPOs at the 99% level of confidence4. 
It is also known that over the next 3 years after the admission, 17 IPOs of the 
research sample have not survived to their 3`d anniversary'. Therefore, it is interesting to 
examine further the comparison of the performance between the survivors and non- 
survivor IPOs. 
Table 5.2 The descriptive statistics of IRs across the research sub-samples 
The table contains the JPO initial returns of privatisation, non-privatisation, survivors, and non-survivors sub- 
samples. 
IPO sub-sample N Mean Median StDev Min Max 
Privatisation 10 0.137*** 0.147 0.094 -0.025 0.302 
Non-privatisation 151 0.080*** 0.064 0.087 -0.187 0.351 
Survivors 144 0.086*** 0.069 0.089 -0.187 0.351 
Non-survivors 17 0.058** 0.064 0.084 -0.082 0.307 
Note: ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 5.2 above also includes the descriptive statistics of the IRs of the survivors 
and non-survivors sub-samples. Like other IPOs, the non-survivors shows a significant 
positive initial returns, suggesting that the non-survivors are also underpriced on the first 
day although they are less underpriced than their counterparts (survivor IPOs). However, 
the difference of IR means between the two groups appears to be insignificant statistically. 
IPO studies have also documented the third anomaly called the hot market. During 
the research period, there is a sub-period when the UK economy, in -general, was 
in 
recession (early 1990s). Therefore, it is interesting to see the IPO performance during 
different economic states. Table 5.3 below presents the distribution of average initial 
returns (IR) for the research sample by year when the IPOs took place. The maximum 
average IR per year is 20.1% in 1987, and the lowest is 2.5% in 1992. All years show that 
IRs take positive values significantly different to zero, except for IRs in 1990. Although 
the IR distribution over the years, as demonstrated in figure 5.2 (see Appendix A. 5.1. ), 
° The hypothesis testing of the mean difference between two populations is undertaken. The t-test results in a 
rejection of the hypothesis of equal means of IRs between the PIPOs and the non-PIPO at 1% level. 
S More detailed information regarding the 17 non-survivor IPOs in the research sample will be explained in the 
IPO long-run performance chapter. 
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does not show any clear pattern throughout the research period6, it could be inferred that 
during the recession phase (early 1990s), few firms went public (cold market) and the 
market demand also appears to have been low, which is shown in the low IRs. Then, the 
market peaked again on the mid 1990s up to the Internet bubble era. The distribution 
shows that an increasing number of firms went public and so did the market demand, 
which is shown in the increasing IRs. 
Table 5.3 The IR of all sample by year 
The table consists of the average of initial returns (IR) of the research sample by year when the IPO took place. 
Year No. of IPO sample Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
1987 7 0.201*** 0.229 0.124 
1988 13 0.048** 0.046 0.087 
1989 6 0.128** 0.153 0.107 
1990 2 0.040 0.040 0.161 
1991 6 0.098** 0.071 0.095 
1992 10 0.025** 0.039 0.078 
1993 17 0.111*** 0.093 0.164 
1994 31 0.085*** 0.063 0.083 
1995 19 0.109*** 0.096 0.097 
1996 29 0.112*** 0.078 0.117 
1997 21 0.072*** 0.066 0.094 
Note: ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
5.1.2. Fundamental and Residual Analyses 
As many studies using return models employ a number of fundamental accounting 
ratios, such as the book to market ratio, this study also uses proforma book value of equity 
to the offer price (pBY/Po) ratio and forecasted EPS to the offer price (JE/Po) ratio. 
Additionally, the standardised residuals from the valuation model are included as a 
predictor in the performance models as a proxy for the ex-ante unobservable factors. 
The descriptive statistics shown in table 5.1 above demonstrates that the pro-forma 
book to market ratio of the sample has a mean (a median) of 0.454 (0.366), which means 
6 The research sample shows a correlation coefficient of 0.002 between the number of IPOs and the IRs, which 
is statistically insignificant. 
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that on average, the IPOs were offered at more than twice their net book value of equity 
per share, suggesting that the expectations regarding the future possible earnings plays an 
important role in IPO pricing as well as the net asset of the firm. However, the numbers 
are higher than the ones in the US market', implying that the US IPO pricing depends even 
more on the expected future earnings. 
Fama and French (1995) argue that the book to market ratio contains the 
information of the shares riskiness. Moreover, they argue that the firms with high book to 
market ratios tend to be persistently distressed. Conversely, firms with low book to market 
ratios are associated with sustained strong profitability. Therefore, the implication of such 
information to the IPO initial investors is that IPOs with the higher pBV/P0 are riskier; 
therefore greater IRs are expected to compensate for the additional risk. On the other hand, 
IPOs with lower pBV/Po are less risky, hence lower IRs are expected. To examine that 
relationship, the research sample is divided into the low and high pro-forma book value to 
offer price groups based on the median. Then the average of initial returns of each group is 
examined. Table 5.4 below presents the comparison of IPO initial returns between the pro- 
forma book value to offer price groups. 
Table 5.4. The IPO performances of Fundamentals groups 
The table contains the IPO IRs of the low and high pBV/P0 groups 
Fundamentals IR 
pBV/Po Low 0.0974*** 
High 0.0695*** 
Note: *** significant at 1% 
Surprisingly, the result shows the opposite. The low pBY/Po group demonstrates a 
significant higher average initial return (IR). Further examination shows that the IRs of the 
IPOs with pBY/Po is statistically different to the IRs of the IPOs with high pBV/P 8. The 
result implies that IPOs that are offered at the higher price relatively to the book value 
7 Using US data for 1980-1991 period, Klein (1996) finds the mean (median) of pro-forma book value to offer 
price is 0.3241 (0.2967). 
The hypothesis testing of mean difference between two populations is undertaken. The t-test results in a 
rejection of hypothesis of the equal means of IRs between the low pBV/Po IPOs and high pBV/Po IPOs at the 
5% level. 
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(lower pBV/Po) are priced higher in the market, which results in greater IRs. On the other 
hand, IPOs that are seemingly `underpriced' relatively to the book value (higher pBV/Po) 
are valued lower in the market, which results in lower subsequent IRs. This suggests 
market momentum. 
Referring to the Fama and French's proposition regarding the information content 
of the book-to-market ratio, the result shows that the market favours the low pBV/P0 IPOs 
(less risky IPOs) than the high pBV/Po IPOs (riskier IPOs), so that it pushes the demand 
for low pBV/Po IPOs up, which results in higher price and higher IRs. Therefore, it could 
be inferred that in the short-run the initial demand for the IPOs drives the IRs more than 
the risk-return relationship. 
Another fundamental used in the IR models is the forecasted earnings to price 
ratio. Similar to the book to market ratio, prior studies (e. g., Fama and French, 1988) show 
that the earnings/price ratio captures information about stocks risk and has the ability to 
predict stocks returns. Table 5.1 above exhibits that forecasted earnings to offer price ratio 
of the sample has a mean (a median) of 0.064 (0.075). 
The standardised residual of the IPO valuation model (Resi) has an average value 
of 0.003. By construction, the mean of Resi is expected to be zero; further examination 
confirms that the mean value is not statistically different to zero. However, the negative 
value of the median is significantly different to zero at the 90% level of confidence. It also 
shows that Resi is not normally distributed. 
5.2. Univariate analysis 
Table 5.5 below exhibits the correlation coefficients between each of the research 
variables in the IR models. This section analyses on a one-to-one basis the relationship 
between the predictors and the IPO short run performance (IRs) that are statistically 
significant. 
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Overall, it could be said that the correlation matrix shows that generally, na- 
multicollinearity problem exist among the research variables, except a high correlation 
between the percentage of equity sold at the IPO and the privatisation dummy. 
As discussed in the previous section, the working hypothesis posits a positive 
association between the pBVIPO and the IRs. However, the correlation matrix (table 5.5) 
shows that pBY/Po is negatively and significantly related to the IRs. This implies that the 
IPOs, which were valued higher relatively to this fundamental at the admission, are valued 
higher on the first trading day, suggesting the investors' over optimism on the earning 
potential of the `hot' IPOs. 
The other fundamental variable is the earning-price ratio, which is proxied by the 
forecasted EPS to offer price (fE/Po). Prior research suggests that such a variable contains 
information regarding the shares risk. Therefore, a positive association between the fE/P0 
and the IPO returns is expected. Table 5.5 exhibits a negative correlation between fE/Po 
and IRs, although statistically insignificant. 
In the research design chapter (chapter 3), it is argued that the hypotheses of the 
ex-ante risk factors and the IPO performance are developed on the general risk-return 
relationship. Therefore, this study posits positive relationships between the ex-ante risk 
factors and the IPO short-run and long run returns. However the correlation matrix shows 
all the ex-ante risk factors to be negatively related to the IRs, implying that riskier IPOs 
are less underpriced. Nonetheless, only 2 out of 5 ex-ante risk factors (Capacity risk and 
Industry risk factors) are significantly related to the IRs. All signal variables in the model 
(Spo, Age, and Eq) turn out to be insignificantly related to the IRs. 
Many studies document evidence of underpricing of privatisation IPOs (PIPOs). 
Prior sections demonstrate that the PIPOs in the research sample are more underpriced 
than the rest of the sample. The univariate analysis, here, shows that the dummy for 
privatisation (Priv) is positively related to the IR, confirming that PIPOs are more 
underpriced than ordinary IPOs. Moreover, the descriptive statistics analysis also 
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demonstrates that in the long run, PIPOs perform significantly different to their private 
IPO counterparts. 
It is argued in the research design chapter that the inclusion of the standardized 
residuals (Res) into the performance model is to capture the unobservable factors 
affecting the IPO pricing. Theoretically, the greater Rest means the IPOs are more 
overpriced relatively to the fundamentals, hence lower IRs are anticipated. Thus, Resi is 
expected to be negatively related to the IRs, assuming that the market does not misprice 
the IPOs on the first trading day. However, the correlation coefficient between the IRs and 
Resi turns out to be positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the IPOs with 
greater residuals, meaning those that are more overpriced relatively to the fundamentals, 
are valued higher on day 1. This corroborates with the pBV/P0 univariate analysis, 
suggesting market momentum on the first trading day. This is in line with Beatty et al.. 
(2002), who find that the offer price residuals are positively related to the standard 
deviation of the IPO returns for the first 5 days as a measure of the IPO risk. They also 
find that the IPO risk is positively related to the offer price, which result in higher IRs. 
Hence, they conclude that `hot' IPOs appear to be priced higher on the first day and 
generate greater IRs. 
In sum, the univariate analysis suggests that the IPO short-run performance is 
affected by the investors' over optimism. The analysis also indicates that only some of the 
ex-ante risk factors (Cpy, Ind) appear to be correlated to the IPO IRs, but none of the 
signals are individually related to IRs. It also confirms the evidence of the PIPOs 
underpricing. 
5.3. The IPO initial returns analysis 
Table 5.6 below demonstrates the results of the IPO initial return model for the 
full IPO sample. The results of the IPO valuation models in the previous chapter 
demonstrate that the behaviour of each predictor is similar for both Po/pBV and Pl/pBV. It 
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is, therefore, unsurprising that those predictors do not help much in explaining the IRs. 
However, there are a number of interesting findings in the results of the IR models. 
Table 5.6 presents the OLS regression results of three IR models. The first model 
includes the fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and signals. It is then extended by 
including a dummy for PIPOs into the second model. Finally, the third model includes all 
variables in the second model and the standardised residual variable (Resi). 
The presentation of the analysis is split into to the separate predictor variable 
groups. The next sub-section analyses the result of IR models on the fundamentals, 
followed by the analysis of the ex-ante risk factors, signals, privatisation, standardised 
residuals, and finally, the model as a whole. A number of sensitivity analyses to the result 
of the IR model are also presented at the end of this section. 
5.3.1. Fundamental analysis 
The constant coefficients of all the IPO initial return models are positive and 
significant. This, again, confirms the underpricing anomaly of the research sample as an 
addition to the evidence demonstrated in the descriptive statistics of IR. The IR model 
result shows the persistence of the underpricing of the research sample after adjusting and 
controlling for other variables. 
One conclusion of the IPO valuation analysis is that although the fundamental 
variables are priced similarly on the IPO offer and initial prices, it is found that there are 
significant impacts of pro-forma book value and forecasted earnings on the price 
differences between day 1 and day 0, scaled by pro-forma book value [(P1- 
P0) 
pBV 
Therefore, it is expected that both fundamental variables could explain the variations in the 
IRs. The working hypothesis posits a positive coefficient ofpBV/P0. 
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Table 5.6 Regression analysis on the IPO initial return model 
The table contains output from OLS regression for all IPO sample, of the initial return (IR) on pro forma book 
value scaled by the offer price (pBVIP0), forecasted earnings scaled by the offer price ((E/Po), leverage risk 
(Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk (Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor 
reputation dummy (Spo), firm's age (Age), percentage of equity sold (Eq), privatisation dummy (Priv), and 
standardised residual from the valuation model (Resi). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are reported in 
brackets. 
Variables Model I Model II Model iII 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant 0.329*** 0.350*** 0.356*** 
(3.62) (3.49) (3.65) 
pBV/Po -0.054* -0.071** -0.056 
(-1.93) (-2.41) (-1.63) 
n/po 0.09 0.041 0.115 
(0.06) (0.26) (0.72) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.012 -0.009 -0.004 
(-0.75) (-0.64) (-0.25) 
Cap 0.011 0.007 0.012 
(0.73) (0.47) (0.71) 
Effr -0.010 -0.011 -0.016 
(-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.48) 
Cpy -0.44* -0.031 -0.031 
(-1.91) (-1.38) (-1.08) 
Ind -0.239** -0.232** -0.370** 
(-2.58) (-2.25) (-2.42) 
Signals: 
Spo -0.013 -0.016 -0.011 
(-0.79) (-1.03) (-0.60) 
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(-0.57) (-0.42) (-0.38) 
Eq 0.048 -0.014 -0.036 
(1.16) (-0.29) (-0.57) 
Priv - 0.091** 0.084** 
(2.07) (2.01) 
Resi - - 0.015** 
(2.18) 
N 161 161 161 
Adj. R-sq 0.044 0.065 0.088 
Wald regression 26.43*** 41.38*** 49.85*** 
Wald fundamental 3.30 5.32* 2.74 
Wald ex-ante risk factors 15.40*** 9.91* 10.18* 
Wald signals 2.20 1.65 1.72 
Note: * significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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It has been explained in the research design that the higher pBV/Po implies that the 
IPOs are more underpriced relatively to the fundamentals; therefore a greater IR is 
expected. Additionally, Fama and French (1995) argue that the book-to-market ratio 
contains information regarding the shares riskiness. Beatty and Ritter (1986) also conclude 
that the greater uncertainty, the greater the degree of IPO underpricing. Based on those 
arguments, the working hypothesis posits a positive relationship between the pBV/Po and 
. 
the IPO IRs. However, the evidence in table 5.6 demonstrates that the impact of the 
pBY/P0 on IR is negative. The result means that IPOs with higher pBV/Po result in greater 
IRs. While the result corroborates the univariate analysis, it rejects the working hypothesis 
(H7a). As suggested in the univariate analysis, s the explanation for this appears to be 
down to the investors' optimism on such `hot' IPOs. 
As argued by Fama and French (1995), high book-to-market ratios are typical of 
firms that are relatively distressed, that signals sustained low earnings on book equity. 
Conversely, low book-to-market is typical of firms with high average returns on capital. 
Therefore, the result implies that IPOs with low book-to-market (signalling potential high 
growth) are valued higher in the market as a reflection of the investors' optimism on the 
potential earnings growth of the firms. 
The impact of pBY/Po on the IRs is significant in model I and II, yet, it loses its 
significance when Resi is introduced in model III. Although the correlation coefficient 
between pBV/Po and Resi is significant, the magnitude of the coefficient suggests a weak 
correlation (-0.269). Therefore, it is sufficient to say that there is no multicollinearity 
problem. 
The working hypothesis expects that the earnings forecast is positively related to 
the returns as the earnings forecast is usually used as a signal to the firm's value, as 
demonstrated in the IPO valuation chapter. Moreover, the IPO valuation analysis also 
concludes that the impact of forecasted earning is significant on the IPO pricing 
differences [(P1- 
PO) 
pBV 
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The result in table 5.6 above shows a positive association, although the impact 
appears to be insignificant in all IR models. Using the USM data, Keasey and McGuiness 
(1991) find that the disclosure of the forecasted earnings in the prospectus reduces the 
information asymmetry, which in turn results in the lower IRs. However, the proxy for the 
forecasted earnings applied in their study is different to that adopted in this study. They 
employ a dummy variable for the forecasted earnings. The dummy takes a value of 1 when 
the forecasted earnings is disclosed in the offering prospectus. Other IPO studies 
examining the prospectus forecasted earnings tend to focus on the association between the 
accuracy of the earning forecasts (the forecast error) and the underpricing (e. g. Firth, 1998, 
How and Yeo, 2000). This study examines a direct impact of the earnings forecast on the 
IPO initial returns based on the information available to the market at the admission. 
Moreover, it does not only analyse whether the voluntary disclosure of the earnings 
forecast in the prospectus has a different impact on the IPO initial returns, but also 
provides more information on the explicit association between the earnings forecasts and 
the IPO initial returns. 
In sum, the impact of the fundamentals on the IPO initial returns is not as robust 
as it is on the IPO valuation. The proforma book value of equity to offer price ratio is 
negatively related to the IRs, suggesting market momentum. The impact of earnings 
forecast to offer price on the IRs appears to be insignificant. Moreover, the Wald statistics 
in table 5.6 demonstrates that the joint restriction of the fundamentals as a group is mixed. 
The fundamental group only has significant impact on IRs in model II, when the 
privatisation dummy is included in the model. However, the impact loses significance 
once the model includes the valuation residuals. 
5.3.2. Ex-ante risk factors analysis 
As explained in the research design chapter, the general hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between the risk factors and the IPO return is in line with the traditional risk- 
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return relationship, which posits a positive association. However, it is noted here; since the 
IR is the one-day return, the expected risk-returns relationship in the short-run may not be 
as strong as expected in the long-run window of returns. 
Row 4 to 8 of table 5.6 above indicate the estimated coefficients on the ex-ante 
risk factors in relation to the IR. As shown in the univariate analysis, each ex-ante risk 
factor appears to be negatively correlated to the IR, which is contrary to the testable 
hypotheses. After controlling for other variables (fundamentals, signals, privatisation, and 
residuals), these associations remain unchanged. For example, the results of all IR models 
(model I, II, and III) show that the leverage risk factor (Lev) is negatively related to IR, 
implying that IPOs with higher leverage tend to have lower returns on day 1. This appears 
to be inconsistent with the hypothesis (H8a). However, it is in line with the results of 
Hedge and Miller (1996), which examine the signalling role of debt in IPO pricing and 
find a negative association between the debt ratio and the degree of underpricing. 
However, the coefficients are insignificant. 
The second risk factor examined is the capital availability (Cap). The result 
shows positive coefficients of Cap in all the IR models, implying that the more internal 
capital is available to the firms, the less risky the IPOs, and the higher the initial returns. 
This is contrary to the working hypothesis (H8b) regarding the Cap-IR relationship. It 
could be argued that there is a higher demand for the IPOs with greater capital availability, 
which results in higher IRs. However, the results are statistically insignificant across the 
IR models. 
The efficiency risk (Effr) appears to be negatively related to'IR, suggesting that the 
IPO firms with lower operating efficiency tend to have lower IR. In other words, the less 
efficient the firm's operating system, the riskier the firm, the lower the IR. This result 
rejects the general hypothesis of a risk-return relationship, which in turn also does not 
support the working hypothesis (H8c). Yet, it shows the investors' favour towards less 
risky IPOs. However, the impact appears to be statistically insignificant. 
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Capacity risk (Cpy) is measured by the ratio of investment proposed in the 
prospectus over the net IPO proceeds. It is hypothesised that IPOs, which disclose in the 
prospectus that the usage of the net proceeds is mainly for investment activities, are 
considered as riskier IPOs. Therefore, it is expected that such IPOs produce higher returns, 
in the short run and the long run. However, the evidence in the IR models shows that Cpy 
is negatively related to IR, implying that the more proceeds are used for the investment 
activities, the riskier the IPOs, the lower the IR on day 1. The result appears to be 
inconsistent to the working hypothesis (H8d). However, after controlling for privatisations 
(model II) and the valuation residual (model III), Cpy loses its significance. The 
correlation matrix (table 5.6) demonstrates a low but significant correlation between Cpy 
and Priv. Thus, the impact of Cpy on IR becomes weaker, once privatisations are taken 
into consideration. 
Another risk factor that appears to have a significant relationship to IR, 
consistently throughout all IR models, is the Industry risk (Ind). The Ind is measured by 
industry Beta in the quarter when firms go public. Higher beta reflects higher industry risk. 
The working hypothesis (H8e) regarding the Ind IR relationship posits a positive 
association. Table 5.6 above presents negative coefficients of Ind for all models. This 
result implies that IPOs from riskier industries tend to have lower initial returns. Hence, it 
does not support the working hypothesis, yet it confirms the higher market short run 
demands for the IPOs in the less-risky industry. 
In sum, the empirical results on the ex-ante risk factors impact on IRs appear to be 
contrary to the general hypothesis of a risk-return relationship. Despite the general lack of 
statistical significance, the results of the ex-ante risk factors suggest a negative 
relationship between IPO riskiness and the IRs. This suggests that in the short run, 
investors favour the less risky IPOs, which pushes up the market price, and thus results in 
higher IRs for the less risky IPOs. This suggestion is consistent with the fundamentals-IR 
association that has been discussed in the previous section. However, regarding the 
statistical matter, only industry risk has a significant impact on the IRs, while the impact of 
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capacity risk vanishes when the model is adjusted by the privatisation dummy and the 
valuation residuals. 
Despite mixed results regarding the impact of the ex-ante risk factors on the IRs, 
the Wald statistics (see table 5.6) shows that the joint restriction of the ex-ante risk factors 
group is consistently significant across the IR models. This implies that as a group, they 
are significantly related to the IRs. 
5.3.3 Signalling analysis 
The relationships between the signals examined in this study and IPO initial 
returns have been discussed widely in the prior IPO literature. In general, 3 working 
hypotheses regarding the signals IR relationship are based on expected positive 
associations. The evidence presented in table 5.6 above shows that the results are in line 
with the hypotheses as well as previous findings. However, unexpectedly, none of the 
signals appear to be statistically significant. 
The sponsor reputation (Spo) coefficients are negative, which implies that IPOs 
sponsored by prestigious investment bankers appear to have lower returns. The result 
corroborates the working hypothesis (H9a), which sustain that prestigious investment 
bankers price the IPOs more accurately than less prestigious bankers. It also suggests that 
prestigious investment bankers choose to sponsor the less risky firms, which results in 
lower IR (or less underpricing). This means that less prestigious investment bankers are 
left with the riskier IPOs, which in turn results in higher IR (or more underpricing) 
(Johnson and Miller (1988), Carter and Manaster (1990)). Compared to prior UK studies, 
the result does not confirm the findings by Byrne and Rees (1994) who find a significant 
relationship between the sponsor reputation and the IPO initial returns; however it is in 
line with results in Keasey and McGuiness (1992) and Keasey and Short (1992). Using 
WO data from the USM, they find an insignificant impact of sponsor reputation on the IRs.. 
Moreover, the result, here, fails to corroborate with the recent paper by Logue et al. (2002) 
based on the US market. 
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The testable hypothesis regarding the Age-IR relationship posits that older firms 
are expected to have lower IR. The evidence seems to support the testable hypothesis 
(H9b). The negative Age coefficient implies that the more experienced IPO firms tend to 
have lower IR. This confirms the results from a previous study by Ritter (1984) that also 
finds a negative relationship between firm age and the level of underpricing. However, this 
study finds that the relationship is statistically insignificant. It is in line with the findings 
from previous UK studies (e. g., Keasey and Short, 1992) that find no evidence of an Age- 
IR association. The ownership variable is the most popular signalling variable used in 
IPO studies to explain the abnormal return in the short-run and long run. The IPO 
signalling hypothesis (Welch, 1989) shows strong support for a positive association 
between ownership retention and IPO valuation, and a negative relationship between the 
ownership retention and the IPO abnormal short-run performance. However, prior 
evidence demonstrates mixed results (e. g., Jegadeesh et al., 1993). In the IPO valuation 
analysis, this study finds support for the IPO signaling theory. As explained in the 
Research design chapter, this study uses the percentage of equity sold at the IPOs as a 
proxy to the ownership. Therefore, a positive relationship between the percentage of 
equity sold at the IPO dates and IR is expected. However, table 5.6 demonstrates mixed 
results, although none of the Eq coefficients are statistically significant. In model I, 
without controlling for privatisation and valuation residuals, the Eq coefficient turns out 
positive. The suggestion, here, is that, the higher percentage of the enlarged share capital 
that is sold at the admission means the less confidence old shareholders of the firm have in 
its future value, which results in more underpricing in the market. Consequently, the 
higher IR is expected. This result appears to be consistent to the findings from prior UK 
studies (e. g., Keasey and Short, 1992). However, after introducing the privatisation 
variable in model II and, then, the valuation residuals in model III, the Eq coefficients 
change to negative, which suggests that the higher the percentage of the enlarged share 
capital sold at the admission, the lower the IRs. The explanation for this is down to the 
Eq-Priv relationship. Although the univariate analysis concludes there is generally no 
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multicollincarity problem among the research variable, the correlation matrix (table 5.5) 
does record a correlation coefficient of 0.705 between Eq and Priv, which is statistically 
significant at the 95% level of confidence. A further investigation of the PIPOs in the 
research sample shows that all I11POs sold 100% of the enlarged number of shares at the 
admission. 'Therefore, it is sufficient to say that the changing sign of Eq in model II and III 
is due to the Eq-! 'riv correlation. Nonetheless, Eq is statistically insignificant in all IR 
models. 
In sung, despite the lack of statistical significances, the results of the signalling 
analysis show that in general, the impact of signals (Spo, Age, Eq) on the IRs is as 
predicted. I lowever, the role of the ownership retention variable, which is measured by the 
pcrccntagc of the enlarged number of shares sold at the admission, in explaining the IR 
variations becomes unclear, when the model is adjusted to privatisations. The proposed 
explanation to this matter is due to the significant relationship between the ownership 
retention variable and the privatisation dummy. Moreover, the Wald statistics in table 5.6 
also dcmonstratcs that the joint restriction of the signals as a group have insignificant 
impact on the IRs. 
5.3.4. Analysis In respect of the control variable - Privatisation 
Prior studies show robust cvidcncc of the underpricing of privatisation IPOs 
(PII'Os). Somehow, PIPOs appear to be more underpriced (higher IR) than private JPOs 
(Martin and Parker, 1997; Dcwcntcr and Malatesta, 1997; Florio and Manzoni, 2004). 
Based on findings from other studies, this research posits a positive relationship between 
Prly and the IR. The role of privatisation in the IR models is presented in models II and III. 
The results in table 5.6 shows positive and significant Priv coefficients, suggesting that 
I'IPOs tend to have higher ! X, i. e., they are more underpriced. This result confirms the 
descriptive statistical analysis that also finds PIPOs are more underpriced by 5.7%9. 
Table 5.2 presents that the non-privatisation IPOs records an average of 8.0% IRs, while the PIPOs have an 
average of 13.7% IRs. 
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In their research, Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) raise the question of whether 
PIPOs in several countries are deliberately undepriced. However, their research sample, 
including some UK PIPOs, cannot conclude the underpricing deliberation of the PIPOs. In 
this study, having argued that government wants to ensure the participation of investors in 
the subsequent PIPOs, there is an incentive to underprice the PIPOs. The results of model 
II and III of the IR models confirms that PIPOs are more underpriced than their 
counterparts. Moreover, the result in the IPO valuation model shows a negative association 
between Priv and the IPO offer price, although this result appears to be statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, despite the robust result of the IR model regarding the role of 
privatisation, this study cannot conclude that PIPOs are deliberately underpriced. 
In the main IR analysis, the IR models are adjusted by the inclusion of the 
privatisation dummy in model II and model III to control for the PIPO effect. However, to, 
check whether other predictors' behaviours towards the IRs are similar between the PIPOs 
and their counterparts, it is valuable to perform a sensitivity analysis. Therefore, the IR 
models are applied once more using the non-privatisation sub-sample. 
Table 5.7 below presents the results of the IR model for the non-privatisation sub- 
sample. Consequently, the privatisation dummy is dropped from the models, leaving only 
model I and model III to perform the analysis. 
The analysis shows a number of interesting results. Firstly, the constants show a 
robust result of the underpricing of the non-PIPOs. The constant variables magnitudes are, 
on average, lower than the ones for the full sample. This is understandable, as the full 
sample includes the PIPOs that are proven to have higher IRs, as concluded in the 
descriptive analysis. 
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Table 5.7 Regression analysis on the IPO initial return model 
for non-privatisation IPOs 
The table contains output from OLS regression for non-privatisation sub sample, of the initial return 
(IR) on pro forma book value scaled by the offer price (pBV/Pa), forecasted earnings scaled by the 
offer price (/E/Po), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk (Effr), 
capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's age (Age), 
percentage of equity sold (Eq), privatisation dummy (Priv), and standardised residual from the 
valuation model (Resi). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Variables Model I Model III 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant 0.307*** 0.319*** 
(2.99) (3.33) 
pBV/Po -0.064** -0.046 
(-2.13) (-1.36) 
fE/po -0.089 0.006 
(0.51) (0.03) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.006 -0.005 
(-0.42) (-0.31) 
Cap 0.005 0.005 
(0.34) (0.34) 
Effr -0.012 -0.013 
(-0.39) (-0.44) 
Cpy -0.034 -0.035 
(-1.46) (-1.46) 
Ind -0.193* -0.201** 
(-1.86) (-1.99) 
Signals: 
Spo -0.017 -0.015 
(-1.06) (-0.99) 
Age -0.001 -0.002 
(-0.12) (-0.23) 
Eq -0.011 -0.021 
(-0.23) (-0.38) 
Resi - 0.0 14* 
(1.94) 
N 151 151 
Adj. R-sq 0.027 0.045 
Wald regression 26.46*** 33.80*** 
Wald fundamental 5.01 * 1.86 
Wald ex-ante risk factors 6.06* 6.79* 
Wald signals 1.53 1.63 
Note: * significant at 10% ** significant at5 %4 ***significant at 1% 
The fundamentals perform similarly to the main result. The pro-forma book value 
to offer price is significantly related to the IRs (model I), but this relationship fades once 
the model controls for the valuation residuals. The forecasted earnings to offer price ratio 
remains insignificant. 
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An interesting outcome is found in the ex-ante risk factors result. For the full 
sample (table 5.6), the capacity risk (Cpy) is significantly related to the IRs in model I, but 
this impact becomes unclear in the subsequent models after controlling for the 
privatisation dummy and the valuation residuals. The result of Cpy for the non- 
privatisation sub-sample demonstrates the insignificance impact of such risk factors on the 
IRs. Although, it seems to be inconsistent to the main results of model I, it corroborates 
the result of model II for the full sample. Therefore, this result does not differ after all, 
since the results of model I for the non-privatisation sub-sample is equivalent to the results 
of model II for the full sample. The industry risk (Ind) shows consistent results, although 
the impact of Lid on the IRs is weaker for the non-privatisation sub-sample than it is for 
the full sample. 
The signalling results remain unchanged. Sponsor reputation (Spo) performs 
slightly better, but the impact is still insignificant, while the impact of firm age is, literally, 
close to zero. The coefficient of the percentage of equity sold at the offering (Eq) appears 
to be of the opposite sign and insignificant. The residuals variable demonstrates a stable 
result, which confirms the momentum of the IPOs. 
In sum, this study demonstrates that PIPOs are priced differently to private IPOs, 
so that on the first trading day the PIPOs record a significant higher IRs compared to the 
non-PIPOs. This confirms findings from previous studies. However, the impact of PIPOs 
is limited as shown by the similar result found in the main analysis and the sensitivity 
analysis using the non-PIPO sub-sample. 
5.3.5. Analysis of offer price underpricing (residual) 
Column 4 in table 5.6 above presents the result of model III of the IR models, in 
which the residual from the IPO valuation model (Resi) is included. This variable refers to 
other missing (unobservable) variables that are assumed to affect the IPO valuation at the 
offer price. It has also been presented in the earlier section of this chapter that, by 
construction, the average of Resi should be nil and the descriptive statistics show that on 
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average, Resi is almost zero (0.003). The sign of Resi in model III is expected to be 
negative. Since the greater Resi arise when IPOs are priced higher relatively the firm's 
fundamentals, in turn, lower IRs are expected. 
The empirical evidence shows that the Resi coefficient appears to be positive and 
significant, which rejects the working hypothesis H11. The result implies that IPOs, which 
are offered at higher prices relatively to their fundamentals, continue to get even more 
`overvalued' on the first day of trading, suggesting market momentum. This verifies the 
findings of the impact of pBV/Po on the IRs. 
Another possible implication as suggested by Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
(2002) is that the issuers/sponsors price these IPOs at a premium given their private 
information about the future growth prospects of the firms. If the market agrees with the 
issuers/sponsors, their prices would run-up further in the after-market. 
Additionally, further analysis shows that IPOs offered at higher prices, on 
average, result in higher IRs. Table 5.8 below exhibits the distribution of the average of IR 
based on Po quartiles. 
Table 5.8 The IR average and the offer price (Po) distribution 
Quartile Po range (p) IR average (%) 
I< 178.26 7.24 
2 178.26 - 283.02 7.01 
3 283.02 - 414.27 9.77 
4> 414.27 10.87 
The table shows the pattern of IR average distribution based on P0. In the research 
sample, the greatest IR average is found for Q4 or in the IPOs with Po greater than 414.27p 
per share, while the minimum IR average is found in the Q2. This suggests higher Po IPOs 
tend to be more underpriced. This result supports prior evidence found in the UK main 
market and USM during the period 1980-1988 (Levis, 1993) as well as in the Singaporean 
market (Firth, 1998). 
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If the IPOs are underpriced relatively to their fundamentals, the Resi is expected to 
be lower and the IRs is greater, hence a negative coefficient of Resi is predicted. However, 
since the evidence shows the opposite result, this study cannot confirm that the IPO are 
underpriced at the offer price. Rather, it suggests that the IPOs with greater Resi are 
surrounded by higher uncertainty, which results in the greater IRs. This suggestion is in 
line with the findings in Beatty and Ritter (1986). 
5.4 Validity of the IPO short run performance models 
Prior sub-sections analyse the impact of each predictor on the IRs. The predictors 
are categorised based on their roles in explaining the IRs (fundamentals, ex-ante risk 
factors, signals, control variables). However, it is also important to examine the model as a 
whole. The result of model I shows that the prospectus information, which is represented 
by fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and signals, explains 4.4% of the variation in the 
IRs. For cross-sectional research the adjusted R-square is quite low, yet as a whole the 
model is statistically significance at the 1% level (Wald statistics of 26.43, and p-value of 
0.00). 
The inclusion of control variables, such as a dummy for privatisation in model II 
shows a marginal improvement to the explanatory power and model validity. The adjusted 
R-square of model II increases to 6.5%, showing that the privatisation, itself, could explain 
an additional 2.1% of IR variations. Moreover, model II turns out to have higher and 
significant Wald statistics that confirms the validity of the model. 
Similarly, the last IR model demonstrates that introducing the valuation 
standardised residuals increases the model's explanatory power. Along with the 
fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, signals, and the privatisation dummy, the residuals 
explain about 8.8% variation in IRs. The Wald statistic also attests the statistical fitness of 
the model at the 99% level of confidence. 
As discussed earlier in the corresponding sections, the Wald statistics for the 
fundamentals, the ex-ante risk factors, and the signals demonstrate mixed results. While 
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the ex-ante risk factors group show consistent joint restrictions across the IR models, 
mixed results are found in the fundamental group, and finally, the joint restriction of the 
signal group is statistically insignificant. 
A similar result is found for the non-PIPOs sub-sample (table 5.7). The 
explanatory powers of the IR models for the non-PIPOs sub sample are lower than the 
ones for the full sample. Only 2.7% of the variations in IRs could be explained by the 
prospectus information for the non-privatisation IPOs. This result confirms the substantial 
explanatory power of the privatisation dummy (Priv) to explain the variation of the IRs in 
the full sample. Adding the valuation residuals variable in model III does improve the 
explanatory power to 4.5%. The Wald tests for the regression are robustly significant at 
the 99% level of confidence. The joint restriction of the fundamentals is significant at the 
10% level for model I, although the significance disappear when the model includes the 
valuation residuals. Similar to the results of the full sample, the non-PIPOs demonstrate 
that the joint restriction of the ex-ante risk factors is significant at the 10% level across the 
IR models, yet the Wald test fails to confirm the significance of the signal joint restriction 
on the IRs. 
5.5 Sensitivity analysis 
A number of sensitivity analyses have been performed to test whether the results 
of the IR models presented above are sensitive to other factors. In the earlier section 
regarding the impact of privatisations on the IPO initial returns, a sensitivity analysis is 
undertaken using the non-PIPOs sub-sample. The overall result is similar to that reported 
in the main analysis. Additionally, the analysis confirms the substantial impact of PIPOs 
on the IRs. 
In this section, another sensitivity analysis is performed. To examine whether the 
main results are sensitive to outliers, a robust regression analysis is carried out, and thq 
results are presented in table 5.9 below. 
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Table 5.9 Robust Regression analysis on the IPO initial return model 
The table contains output from robust regression analysis for all IPO sample, of the initial return 
(IR) on pro forma book value scaled by the offer price (pBV/Po), forecasted earnings scaled by the 
offer price (JE/Po), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk (Effr), 
capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's age (Age), 
percentage of equity sold (Eq), privatisation dummy (Priv), and standardised residual from the 
valuation model (Resi). 
Variables Model I Model II Model III 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant 0.278** 0.293** 0.296*** 
(2.76) (2.88) (2.95) 
PBV/Po -0.052* -0.042* -0.042 
(-1.87) (-1.89) (-1.33) 
fE/P0 0.009 0.122 0.123 
(0.06) (0.74) (0.75) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 
(-0.82) (0.39) (-0.40) 
Cap 0.009 0.004 0.004 
(0.57) (0.29) (0.30) 
Effr -0.010 -0.014 -0.014 
(-0.30) (-0.43) (-0.44) 
Cpy -0.044* -0.029 -0.029 
(-1.98) (-1.26) (-1.27) 
Ind -0.184* -0.185* -0.187* 
(-1.84) (-1.98) (-1.83) 
Signals: 
Spo -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 
(-1.14) (-1.07) (-1.10) 
Age -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
(-0.61) (-0.36) (-0.35) 
Eq 0.068* -0.027 -0.028 
(1.81) (-0.553) (-0.56) 
Priv - 0.086* 0.085* 
(1.95) (1.90) 
Resi - 0.017** 
(2.18) 
N 161 161 161 
Note: * significant at 10%a ** significant at S%a *"significant at 1% 
In general, the results of the robust regression analysis are similar to the results of 
the main analysis (the OLS regression analysis). The constant estimation is consistent with 
the previous results and confirms the underpricing of the research sample. The results 
relating to the fundamentals are also consistent with previous findings and shows that the 
pro-forma book value to offer price ratio (pBV/Po) appears to be more influential in 
explaining the IR, while the explanatory power of the forecasted earnings to offer price 
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ratio (%E/Po) is weak. However, once the model is augmented by the inclusion of the 
residuals (model III), the impact of the fundamentals becomes less important. 
The results of the cx-antc risk factors and the signals are also consistent with the 
main findings. Only the capacity risk (Cap) and the industry risk (bid) are significantly 
related to the IRs, although Cap loses its significance when the IRs models are controlled 
by the privatisation dummy and the residuals. None of the signals appear to be 
significantly related to the IRs. Confirming the main findings, the result for the 
privatisation dummy remains significant in the robust regression. Additionally, the 
residuals also exhibit a consistent outcome with prior result, which confirms the market 
momentum on the first trading day. 
In sum, the sensitivity analyses demonstrate that the results of the main findings 
arc robust and not sensitive to issues, such as outliers and the privatisation effect. The 
impacts of the predictors on the IRs arc similar to the main findings. However, the results 
of non-I'IPOs sub-sample do highlight the important of the PIPOs in explaining the IR of 
the full sample. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented and discussed the performance of the research sample 
in the short-run (initial day returns). IPO initial returns have been defined as the investors' 
returns on the closing of the first trading day. The descriptive statistics demonstrate the 
persistence of the underpricing, which is reflected by the significant positive initial return. 
This result confirms the findings from prior studies in the UK and elsewhere. 
The IR models produce evidence of a significant impact of pBY/P0 on the IRs, 
when the model includes only the prospectus information (model I) and when a 
privatisation dummy is introduced to the first model (model II). Yet, it loses its 
significance when Resi is introduced into model III. However, the impact is in the opposite 
direction to that expected. The positive coefficient of pBV/Pa suggests that the overvalued 
IPOs at the offering are likely to be valued higher in the first trading day, suggesting the 
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market momentum. This result is supported by some findings in the univariate analysis. 
The fE/Po shows no evidence of its relationship with the IRs. 
Mixed results are found on the relationship between the ex-ante risk factors and 
IPO IRs. The results of the ex-ante risk factors generate little evidence to support the 
working hypotheses; only the Industry risk factor appears to be consistent with the 
hypothesis. Despite the signals coefficients having the expected signs, they are 
statistically insignificant, hence this study cannot confirm the findings from prior studies. 
The descriptive statistics show that the PIPOs are, on average, more underpriced. 
Additionally, both the univariate and cross sectional analyses confirm the significant 
impact of PIPOs on the IPO initial returns. Therefore, the Priv result is consistent to the 
findings from prior studies. 
The IR model also includes the valuation residual (Resi) to capture any impact of 
the unobservable variable. Surprisingly, the result shows that Resi is positively related to 
IRs, suggesting that the IPOs that are overpriced relatively to their fundamentals at the 
time of issue are valued more highly in the market on the first trading day. This result 
corroborates the findings in the pBV/Po, suggesting market momentum. Another 
implication is that such IPOs are priced at a premium as a signal to the firms' value. 
Despite lack of significance of most coefficient (see Appendix table A. 5.2) and 
low explanatory powers, the results show that the IR models are valid. The Wald statistics 
demonstrate that all predictors, as a whole, in the IR models are related to the IRs. The 
joint restriction of the ex-ante risk factors shows a consistent result across the IR models. 
However, mixed results are found on the impact of the fundamentals to IRs, while the joint 
restriction of the signals appears to be insignificant. The sensitivity analyses show that the 
main result is robust to the privatisation and the outlier effects. 
In sum, this chapter provides a number of explanations to the research questions 
presented in the introduction section. The prospectus information has some, albeit rather 
low, predictive power to the IPO initial returns, and the joint restriction of the ex-ante risk 
factors shows a significant impact on the IRs. 
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Table A. 5.1 Summary of IR analysis hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis Variables Expected Evidence 
signs 
H7a 
The pro-forma book value of equity to pBV/P0 + 
offer price ratio is positively related to IPO 
initial returns (a negative and 
significant 
coefficient is 
found) 
H7b 
The forecasted earnings to offer price ratio 
is positively related to IPO initial returns JE/PO + x 
H8a 
There is a positive relationship between Lev + X 
firm's pre-JPO leverage and IPO initial 
returns 
H8b 
There is a negative relationship between 
firm's pre-IPO capital availability risk and Cap x 
IPO initial returns - 
H8c 
There is a positive relationship between 
firm's pre-IPO efficiency risk and IPO Effr + 
initial returns 
H8d 
There is a positive relationship between Cpy + x 
firm's pre-IPO capacity risk and IPO initial 
returns 
H8e 
There is a positive relationship between Ind + x 
industry risk and IPO initial returns (a negative and 
significant 
coefficient is 
found 
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Hypothesis Variables Expected Evidence 
signs 
H9a 
Sponsor reputation is negatively related to Spo _ x IPO initial returns 
H9b 
Firm age is negatively related to IPO initial Age _ x 
returns 
H9c 
Percentage of equity sold at the flotation is Eq + X 
positively related to IPO initial returns 
H10 
There is a positive relationship between 
privatisation dummy and IPO initial returns Priv +  
H11 
There is a negative relationship between Resi _ x the residuals and IPO initial returns (a positive and 
significant 
coefficient is 
found 
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Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 
The IPO long run performance analysis 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discusses the short run IPO performance, which is 
well known as the IPO underpricing. In particular, the chapter address the research 
question whether the prospectus information has predictive power towards the IPO 
underpricing. In general, the evidence demonstrates that the prospectus information 
has relatively little role to explain the IPO underpricing. The fundamentals provide 
an interesting finding on the relationship between the proforma book value of 
equity and the IPO initial returns (IRs). The result shows that IPOs with the lower 
proforma book value of equity to offer price ratio, tend to be more underpriced 
(higher IRs). The result implies that IPOs, which are priced highly relatively to the 
pro-forma book value of equity, continue to be valued more highly on the first day 
of trading, suggesting market momentum. This result is supported by the finding 
on the relationship between the valuation residual and the initial returns (IRs). The 
second implication is that the issuers/sponsors set the offer prices at the premium 
as a signal to the firms' true value. If the market agrees, they push up the prices of 
such IPOs in the after-market. 
The results of other prospectus information (the ex-ante risk factors, and 
the signals) are mixed. Although of the ex-ante risk factors coefficients lack of 
significance, the joint restriction of the ex-ante risk factor as a group is robust 
across the IR models. The signals demonstrate consistent signs of coefficients, 
although none of them appear to be significant. 
Although the main purpose of the prospectus is to reduce the information 
asymmetry, the IR analysis shows that there is a divergence of opinion towards 
some prospectus information among the market participants (the issuers/sponsors 
and the investors) on the first day of trading. Therefore, it is interesting to examine 
whether a divergence of opinion towards the prospectus information is still found 
in the longer period. 
This chapter is aimed to answer the research question: Does the prospectus 
information still have any impact on the IPO long run performance? As explained 
in the Research design chapter, the IPO long run performance is defined as the 
investment abnormal returns for the `loyal' investors, who buy the IPOs on day 2 
and hold them up to the IPOs' subsequent anniversaries. In this study, the IPO 
long run performance is measured by the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
as suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997). Similar to the two previous empirical 
chapters, the prospectus information is defined as the information regarding the 
accounting fundamentals, the ex-ante risk factors, and the signals that are disclosed 
in the offering prospectus. 
In this analysis, a number of general OLS returns models are developed, 
which are referred to as the IPO long run performance models. Besides the main 
predictors (the fundamentals, the ex-ante risk factors, the signals), the IPO long run 
performance models control for a number of variables such as size, privatisation 
and the initial `mispricing' on day 1. The initial `mispricing' variables are proxied 
by the valuation residuals and the initial returns (IRs) on the first trading day. 
Research methods used in this chapter and the main working hypotheses are 
summarised and presented in the diagram below (see Figure 6.1). 
272 
Ce 
.9 :1 b cn w 
0 
M 
0 - o ': 
9 
« 1 
Üäý 0 
ö c 
= U 
ß ä 
.u . -, a 'rn 
ý W b ý 
U 
U 
0C 
4 924 
m 
0 
0 
. -. 
N 
U 
72 M 
ý1 
M 
r- 
N 
an 
w 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. After the introduction section, 
the descriptive statistics of variables used in the IPO long run performance (BHAR) 
models are presented. As the descriptive statistics of the main predictors has been 
discussed in the IPO valuation chapter, the descriptive statistics analysis in this 
chapter focuses on the BHARs and the Resi variables. This is followed by 
discussions of the results of the fundamentals, the ex-ante risk factors, the signals, 
and the control variables. The sensitivity analysis is presented and is followed by a 
discussion of the validity of the IPO long run performance models. Finally, a brief 
summary of the chapter is presented. 
6.1 Data 
As explained in the research design chapter, the long-run performance 
measure used in this study is the buy and hold 'return (BHAR). Although there are 
some limitations of this measure compared to other measures for long-run return 
(e. g., cumulative abnormal returns), Barber and Lyon (1996) argue that BHAR is 
still better than others. A broad discussion of this matter has been reviewed in the 
research design chapter. 
The BHARs employed are adjusted by the market index, which is the FTSE 
small companies index. Hence, the result of BHARs represents the market adjusted 
abnormal returns for investors, who buy the IPOs on day 1 and hold them for a 
specified period (in this study, the holding periods examined are 1-year, 2-year, 
and 3-year periods). 
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Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics for long run return analysis 
The table contains descriptive statistics for IPO sample of variables in the IPO 
performance analysis. BHARiy refers to the abnormal buy and hold returns for i=1,2, and 
3 years period, pBV/Po to pro-forma book value to offer price, fE/Po to forecasted EPS to 
offer price, and Resi to standardised residuals from the IPO valuation model with Po/BV as 
the dependent variable. 
Variable N Mean Median StDev Minimum Maximum 
BHAR1y 161 0.115*** 0.097 0.395 -1.011 1.105 
BHAR2y 161 0.006 0.008 0.823 -2.126 2.121 
BHAR3y 144 -0.033 -0.169 0.883 -1.769 2.359 
Size 161 3.841 4.361 1.099 3.002 8.429 
Note: ***significantat 1% 
Table 6.1 demonstrates that investors still gain positive abnormal returns up 
to 2 years after the admission, suggesting that the research sample outperforms the 
market. Then, the returns decrease and on the third listing anniversary, the 
abnormal returns become negative, implying the long-run underperformance of the 
research sample. However, statistically, only the buy and hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) for the 1-year period is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
The statistical tests for BHAR year 2 and 3 fail to reject the alternative hypothesis 
asserting that the BHAR for years 2 and 3 are significantly different from zero. 
However, the median of BHAR3y takes a value of -16.9%, implying that half of 
the research sample underperforms the market by 16.9% or more. 
The sign test is also undertaken for the BHARs. The result shows that the 
median of BHARy1 is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. The test also confirms that the median of the BHAR3y is negative and 
significantly different from zero. However, the test shows that the median of 
BHAR2y is statistically insignificant. 
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The results of the means of the BHARs appear to be contrary to prior UK 
studies (Levis, 1993; Espenlaub et al., 1999) that find, on average, UK IPOs 
underperform the market or other benchmarks after the first 3 years. However, 
both studies also demonstrate that the IPO underperformance is less severe when 
using the FTA index as a benchmark. Other studies using the BHAR measure and 
equally weighted market index show similar results to the ones found in this study 
(Ben Naceur, 2000; Crutchley et al., 2002). 
Moreover, the research samples of both Levis (1993) and Espenlaub et al. 
(1999) exclude privatisations, while the sample of this study includes 10 PIPOs. 
Table 6.2 below presents the IPO performances of the non-PIPO and PIPO sub- 
samples. The long-run performance measures for the PIPOs show increasing 
significant abnormal returns in the subsequent years. The positive BHARs indicate 
that, on average, PIPOs outperform the market. The figure for BHAR3y for the 
PIPOs means that investors, who buy the PIPOs at the admission and hold the 
shares up to their third anniversary of listing, are better off by 54.0%, on average, 
compared to the market. 
Table 6.2. IPO performance of PIPOs and non-PIPOs sub-samples 
The table contains the IPO performances of privatisation sub-sample, and non- 
privatisation sub-sample. BHARiy refers to the abnormal buy and hold returns for i=1,2, 
and 3 year period 
IPO sample No. of Average Average Average 
IPOs BHAR1y BHAR2y BHAR3y 
PIPOs 10 0.231** 0.439*** 0.540** 
Non-PIPOs 151 0.107*** -0.023 -0.065* 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *"significant at 1% 
In contrast to the PIPOs, the non-PIPOs exhibit decreasing abnormal 
returns in the subsequent periods. The average of the BHAR shows a positive and 
significant value for the 1-year period and eventually declining to a negative and 
276 
significant abnormal return in year 3, suggesting that non-privatisations 
underperform the market after 3 years trading. The figures for BHAR3y of the non- 
privatisation sub-sample could be interpreted, as investors, who buy non-PIPOs 
and hold them until their third anniversary of listing, are worse-off by 6.5% 
compared to the market. This result confirms the UK IPO underperformance found 
by Levis (1993) and Espenlaub et al. (2000). 
Further examination also confirms that the differences between the BHARs 
of the two sub-samples for year 2 and 3 are significant at the 1% level. However 
the difference in 13HARs for year 1 is insignificant. 
Table 6.1 also demonstrates that in year 3, the sample size is reduced to 
144, which indicate that 17 IPOs did not survive up to their third anniversaryl. 
Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether the performance of the survivor. 
IPOs is different to the non-survivors' performance. Table 6.3 below exhibits the 
BHARs in year 1 and year 2 for the survivors and non-survivors sub-samples. 
Table 6.3. IPO performance of survivors and non-survivors sub-samples 
The table contains the IPO performances of survivors sub-sample, and non-survivors sub-sample. 
BIIAR1J' refers to the abnormal buy and hold returns for i=I and 2 year period 
IPO sample No of Average BHARly Average BHAR2y 
firms 
Survivor 144 0.136*** 0.157*** 
Non-survivor 17 -0.066 -1.275*** 
Note: **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 
In the long run, the two sub-samples show big differences in BHARs. The 
non-survivor sub-sample shows that they underperform the market since year 1 up 
to year 2 before they exit the market, while the survivor sub-sample show 
1 The 17 IPOs that have not survived to the 3`d anniversary of listing are IPOs from year 1992 
onwards. The non-survivors are due to delisting (3 IPOs), taken-over/acquired (11 IPOs), merged (2 
IPOs), or went private (1 IPO), as explained in more detail in appendix A. 6.1 
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increasing positive abnormal returns during those periods. Therefore, further 
analysis confirms that the two sub-samples have significantly different long-run 
2 returns. 
The analysis above indicates how the PIPOs and the non-survivor 
performance affect the figures for the full sample performance. Hence, the 
performance analyses presented in this chapter include separate analyses of the full 
sample and the two sub-samples (i. e., the non privatisation sub-sample and the 
survivor sub-samples). 
In the previous chapter, it is shown that the IRs varies across the research 
period. The research period covers different economic states in the UK (recession 
in the early 90s, and the beginning of the internet boom in the late 90s). The data 
could not conclude a significant relationship between the IRs and the economic 
states. Here, the examination of how IPOs perform in the long run during different 
economic states is presented in table 6.4 below. The table presents the distribution 
of average abnormal returns (BHARs) for the research sample by year when the 
IPOs took place. In general, it could be said that there is no significant correlation 
between the number of IPOs that took place in a particular year and the IPO long 
run returns3 
The BHARs of IPOs that went public in 1987 demonstrate that on average, 
the IPOs outperform the market throughout the 3-year period, while the sample for 
1992 shows long-run underperformance since the first anniversary. The research 
Z The t-test results in a rejection of the hypothesis of equal means ofBHARIy and BHAR2y between 
the survivor and non-survivor sub-samples at, respectively, the 5% and 1% level. 
3 The correlation coefficients of the number of IPOs and BHARly, BHAR2y, BHAR3y, respectively, 
are -0.218, -0.401, and -0.424. None of the coefficients are statistically significant. 
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Table 6.4. Performance of full sample by year 
The table consists of the average buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for periods 1- 
year, 2-year, and 3-year of the sample by year when the IPO took place. 
Year No. of 
IPO 
sample 
Average 
BHAR1y 
Average 
BHAR2y 
Average 
BHAR3y 
1987 7 0.306* 0.602* 0.581 
1988 13 0.328*** 0.258 0.301 
1989 6 0.368** 0.531*** 0.831*** 
1990 2 -0.015 0.078 0.066 
1991 6 0.117 0.042 0.150 
1992 10 -0.034 -0.188 -0.266* 
1993 17 0.116 -0.008 -0.156 
1994 31 0.163** 0.223 0.102 
1995 19 0.096 -0.208 -0.642*** 
1996 29 0.025 -0.159 -0.228 
1997 21 -0.003 -0.314** 0.166 
Note: * significan t at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
sample does not show any clear pattern of abnormal returns over the period. 
However, the table shows that there is no sign of long-run underperformance for 
IPOs that taken place in the late 1980s, in fact - the IPO sample for 1989 show 
surprising positive abnormal returns from year 1 to year 3. On the other hand, IPOs 
that took place in the mid 1990s (1995 and 1996) show negative abnormal returns 
in the long. Therefore, it could be inferred that IPOs, which come to the market in 
`hot' period tend to suffer long run underperformance. The similar notion is also 
found in the non-PIPOs and the survivor sub-samples (see appendix - tables 
A. 6.2a. and A. 6.2b). 
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Another interesting figure is the relation between the IRs and BHARs, as it 
is shown in figure 6.2 below. The first pattern occurs in the IPO samples that come 
to the market in 1987-1992. IPOs in 1992 show the lowest IR and the lowest 
BHAR3y, while IPOs in 1987 shows the greatest IR and the second best BHAR3y. 
Therefore, in that period it could be inferred that IPOs that are less underpriced 
tend to perform worse in the long run. On the other side, IPOs that are more 
underpriced tend to enjoy better long-run performance. 
However, this notion is in contrast to the current proposition of the IPO 
underpricing and the long-run performance. The overoptimism hypothesis argues 
that the positive IRs are the results of investors' optimism in the IPO early days of 
trading. Then, the market adjustment brings the reversion effect, which results in 
the declining performance in the long run. Nevertheless, the IPO signalling 
hypothesis argues that good firms deliberately underprice the IPOs to reveal their 
firm value. Therefore, it is expected that good firm IPOs are more underpriced but 
perform better in the long run. 
The second period 1993-1997 exhibits a different pattern of the IRs and 
BHARs movement to the prior period. IPOs in this period show a reversion effect is 
taking place after the excitement in the early days of the IPOs. IPOs in 1996 shows 
the greatest IRs in that period, then 3 years after, they suffer the second lowest 
abnormal returns, while IPOs in 1995 shows the second highest IRs, yet they 
produce the lowest BHAR3y during the research period. Unlike the full sample, the 
PIPOs and the survivor sub-samples do not show any observable pattern of the IRs- 
BHARs movement (see appendix, figures A. 6.2a and A. 6.2b). 
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6.2. Univariate analysis 
This section analyses the individual correlation between the predictors in 
the IPO long run performance models and the IPO BHARs. However, only the ones 
that are significantly related to BHARs are discussed. In general, it could be said 
that the univariate analysis does not show any multicollinearity problem, apart the 
Priv-Eq correlation as discussed earlier in the IR analysis. 
The forecasted earnings to offer price ratio is positively related to the 
BHARs as expected, although the correlation coefficients is significant only for 
year 1. The Size, which is measured by the normal log of the market capitalisation 
at the IPOs, is positively related to the BHARs, but the relationship is insignificant 
in year 1 and 2, and becomes significant in year 3. 
A positive correlation coefficient is expected between the each ex-ante risk 
factor and the BHARs. Only Industry risk (Inca) appear to have an expected 
relationship, yet the coefficients are insignificant. Only Efficiency risk (Effr) is 
statistically and significantly related to the BHARs, however, the correlation 
suggests a negative relationship between Effr and the BHARs. 
Only the sponsor reputation dummy (Spo) appears to be a signal factor that 
has a significant association with the BHARs. The coefficient suggests that IPOs 
that are sponsored by the prestigious investment bankers experience better 
abnormal returns throughout the different periods. Another consistent result is 
found in the association between the privatisation dummy (Priv) and the BHARs. 
Positive correlation coefficients of the Priv-BHARs imply that PIPOs perform 
better in the long run than the non-PIPOs. 
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Many scholars argue that the IPO underpricing is caused by investors' 
overoptimism in the early days of IPOs. Eventually, the reversion actions take 
place in the market, resulting in the long-run underperformance. It implies that the 
IPO IRs are negatively related to their long-run returns, which in this study, are 
proxied by BHARs. However, table 6.5 demonstrates positive correlation 
coefficients between IRs and BHARs, although such coefficients are only 
significant with BHAR1y and BHAR2y, and it appears to be insignificant with 
BHAR3y. This implies that IPOs, which are more underpriced, are valued 
significantly higher up to 2 years after the admission, suggesting the market 
momentum does not last beyond the second anniversary of the IPO. 
6.3. IPO long-run performance analysis 
This section presents the results and the discussions of the IPO long-run 
returns models. As conversed earlier in this chapter, the IPO long run 
performances are proxied by the adjusted buy and hold returns for 1 year, 2 years, 
and 3 years after the admission. The models assume that prospectus information, 
privatisation, initial and day 1 valuation have impacts on the IPO pricing in the 
long-run, which in turn affect the IPO performance. Therefore, 3 nested long-run 
returns models are developed to analyse the behaviour of those predictors towards 
the movement of IPO prices in the long run. 
The first model analyses the relationship between the prospectus 
information and the IPO long run performance (Model 1). Then, the model is 
extended by including the privatisation dummy (Model II). Finally, to examine the 
impact of the initial `mispricing' on day 1, the valuation residuals (Resi) and the 
IPO initial returns on day 1 (IRs) are included in the model (Model III). 
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This section follows the structure of the IR analysis in the previous 
chapter. It starts with the presentation of the results for the IPO long-run 
performance models (table 6.6,6.7, and 6.8) then followed by a series of 
discussions on the role of fundamentals, signals, privatisation, initial valuation, 
day 1 pricing, in determining the IPO long-run performance. Then, this is 
followed by a discussion of the IPO long-run returns models, a number of 
sensitivity analyses are presented, and finally a chapter conclusion. 
6.3.1 IPO abnormal returns analysis 
It has been discussed widely in the descriptive statistics analysis that, 
contrary to prior studies, the research sample as a whole does not underperform 
the market in the long run, up to 3 years after the admission. The constant 
coefficient of the long-run performance models represent the average buy and 
hold abnormal returns for corresponding periods, after controlling for other 
information, such as prospectus information, privatisation, initial and day 1 
valuation effect. Table 6.6,6.7 and 6.8 exhibit that all of the constant coefficients 
appear to be negative, which may indicate the long run underperformance of the 
research sample. 
6.3.2 Fundamental analysis 
The IR model shows that, to some extend the fundamental - in this case, 
the pro-forma book value to offer price ratios - affects the determination of IRs. 
However, the results of the long-run returns models demonstrate different 
outcomes. The working hypothesis maintains that the IPO long-run performance 
is an increasing function of the fundamentals, implying that positive coefficients 
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Table 6.6 Regression analysis of the IPO long-run performances on the 
prospectus information (Model I) 
The table contains output from OLS regression analysis for all 1PO sample, of the buy 
and hold abnormal returns for 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years (BHARly; BHAR2y; BHAR3y) 
on pro forma book value scaled by the offer price (pBY/Po), forecasted earnings scaled by 
the offer price (fE/Po), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk 
(Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's 
age (Age), and percentage of equity sold (Eq). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. 
Variables BHAR1y BHAR2y BHAR3y 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant -0.202 -0.337 -1.350 
(-0.52) (-0.44) (-1.57) 
pBV/Po -0.051 0.425 -0.067 
(-0.32) (1.62) (-0.23) 
ON 1.99*** 0.957 0.758 
(3.46) (0.67) (0.88) 
Size -0.008 -0.041 0.081 
(-0.29) (-0.09) (1.32) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.077 -0.155 -0.259** 
(-1.12) (-1.25) (-2.41) 
Cap -0.049 -0.120 0.0479 
(-0.83) (-0.88) (0.35) 
Effr -0.349** -0.822*** -0.975*** 
(-2.59) (-2.88) (-2.91) 
Cpy 0.046 -0.101 0.470** 
(0.45) (-0.55) (2.26) 
Ind 0.509 1.135 1.306 
(1.24) (1.37) (1.40) 
Signals: 
Spo 0.179* 0.191* 0.247** 
(1.81) (1.87) (2.21) 
Age -0.011 -0.479** -0.100 
(-0.39) (-2.33) (-1.67) 
Eq -0.120 -0.479* 0.094 
(-0.72) (-1.85) (0.30) 
N 161 161 144 
Adj R-square 0.049 0.058 0.086 
Wald regression 32.50*** 28.07*** 39.34*** 
Wald fundamental 11.98*** 3.14 3.53 
Wald ex-ante risk factors 10.82* 10.86* 17.47*** 
Wald signals 2.76 10.42** 6.82* 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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are expected for the pBY/Po and fE/Po. Table 6.2 above shows that in year 1, 
pBV/Po appears to be negatively related to the BHARly, which is inconsistent to 
the theoretical base. In year 2 and year 3, they change to become positive. 
However, none of the pBY/P0 coefficients appear to be statistically significant. 
Hence, this study is not able to confirm the impact ofpBY/PO on the IPO long-run 
performance. 
In the subsequent tables (table 6.7, page 302 and table 6.8, page 305), 
introducing other predictors does not improve the impact of pBV/Po on BHARs. 
Even more, the coefficients in year 3 alter to become negative, yet remain 
insignificant. Therefore, it could be inferred that in the long run, the pro-forma 
book value is no longer important to price the IPOs, since the actual book-value 
figures, which are more relevant, have been available to the market at that time. 
As prior studies have revealed, the actual book value to market ratio is robustly 
and significantly related to the stock returns. 
Nonetheless, an interesting finding is the relationship between the 
forecasted earnings to offer price ratio and the BHARly. Table 6.6 demonstrates 
that the forecasted earnings is positively and significantly related to the BHARly, 
implying that the IPOs that report higher forecasted earnings tend to have greater 
returns in the following year after the admission. This fact is understandable since 
the forecasted earnings figures disclosed in the offering prospectuses are the 1- 
year forecasts. Therefore, it shows the relevancy of the forecasted earnings to the 
IPO pricing from the first trading day up to a year after the offerings. To the 
researcher's knowledge, since there have been no prior studies examining the 
relationship between the forecasted earnings and IPO long run performance, this 
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study is the firsts to find such a significant relationship. Moreover, the result adds 
valuable knowledge about the usefulness of the earning forecasts disclosures. 
The results of the extended models also prove that the impact of the 
forecasted earnings to offer price ratio on the BHARIy is robust to the inclusion of 
any additional control variable. Even more, the magnitudes of the coefficients 
show increasing figures, suggesting that when the models are controlled for 
privatisation, valuation residuals, and initial market pricing effects, the forecasted 
earnings put greater weights on the BHARIy. 
However, the forecasted earnings to offer price ratio loses its significance 
in the subsequent years. All IPO long-run returns models fail to find any evidence 
of the forecasted earnings impact on BHAR2y and BHAR3y, suggesting that for 
the longer periods, such information is not relevant any more to the IPO returns. 
At those times, the actual earnings figures have been made available to the 
market, which presumably, is more relevant to the IPO pricing and their 
performances. 
As explained in the research design chapter, the IPO long run performance 
models include the Size variable in the analysis. The inclusion of Size is purposed 
to control for the common risk factors in the stock returns as suggested by Fama 
and French (1992), and frequently applied in long run returns studies (e. g., 
Gleason and Lee, 2002). 
The working hypothesis posits a negative relationship between firm size 
(Size) and the IPO long run performance. The results of model I demonstrate 
negative coefficients for Size, as expected. However, none of the Size coefficients 
are significant in model I. The coefficients gain significance for year 1 when the 
privatisation dummy is introduced into the model (models II and III). However, 
288 
the significance disappears in the longer periods. The results imply that IPOs with 
greater market capitalisation at the IPO tend to have lower abnormal returns on 
their first anniversary. The association between Size and the IPO abnormal returns 
becomes unclear in the longer period (year 2 and 3), which is possibly because 
more relevant figures of the market capitalisation is available to the market. 
In sum, mixed results are found regarding the association between the 
fundamentals in the prospectus and the IPO long-run performance. The pro-forma 
book value to offer price ratio appears to have no impact on the IPO long-run 
returns, while the forecasted earnings to offer price ratio is robustly related to the 
BHARIy, but irrelevant in the subsequent years. 
6.3.3 Ex-ante risk factor analysis 
Similar to the testable hypotheses on IRs, the working hypotheses 
regarding the relationship between the ex-ante risk factors and the IPO long run 
performance are based on the general positive risk-returns association. 
Additionally, it is also expected that the impact of the ex-ante risk factors on the 
IPO performance is weaker in the longer period. 
The results of model I, which is shown in table 6.6 exhibit interesting 
findings. While little evidence is found to explain the association between the ex- 
ante risk factors and the BHARly, a number of substantial results are found in 
year 3, which is not as expected. A similar pattern is also found in the successive 
IPO long-run performance models (Model II and III). 
The result of model I shows that Leverage risk (Lev) is negatively related 
to BHARs. This suggests that IPOs with higher leverage risk tend to have lower 
BHAR up to 3 years after the admission, which contradicts to the hypothesis. 
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However, it is in line with the result of Hedge and Miller (1996), who argue that 
instead of risk, debt is often used as a signal to the firm's value. It implies that 
high-quality firms deliberately increase firm's debt prior to IPOs in order to reveal 
its true value. Therefore, it could be inferred that a higher debt ratio reflects the 
higher quality of the firm, which is then expected to produce higher returns in the 
long run. Another explanation is that the higher debt preceding the offering date 
could play as a certification of firm's quality from the third party, such as banks. 
Slovin and Young (1990) argue that the firms, which successfully obtain 
borrowing from the banks prior to the public offering, have been through the 
extensive assessment on their qualities. Such firms are considered as good firms. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that in the long run they produce greater returns. 
However, while the Lev-BHARs relationship is statistically significant 3 
years after the admission, the coefficients are insignificant during the 1-year and 
2-year period. It suggests that it takes times for the market to fully take Lev into 
account as a signal to the firm's quality. 
The Lev coefficients remain unchanged in model II and III. It implies that 
the result is robust to any additional predictors in the models. However, 
controlling the models for the privatisation, valuation residuals, and initial market 
pricing effects, does slightly reduce the magnitudes of the Lev coefficients. 
The impact of capital availability risk (Cap) to BHARs is in line with the 
hypothesis. The negative coefficients imply that the more internal capital available 
to the IPO firms, the less risky the IPOs, then it results in the lower expected 
return. However, the Cap-BHAR relationship is statistically insignificant. 
The efficiency risk (Effr) is the only ex-ante risk factor that appears to 
have consistent results over the periods and across the BHAR models. The Effr is 
290 
negatively and significantly related to BHARs. This implies that the less efficient 
IPO firms, which are considered as riskier IPOs, tend to have lower returns. This 
result rejects the working hypothesis, which expects a positive association based 
on the theoretical risk-return relationship. As defined in the research design 
chapter, Effr is measured by the ratio of the cost of goods sold over sales. 
Therefore, the higher Effr could be understood as less operating efficiency, which 
implies the firm is defined as more risky. However, apparently, the investors do 
not interpret the Effr as a common risk. It seems that they identify the operating 
efficiency as a firm performance measure. The low performance firms tend to be 
valued lowly in the market, which in turn result in lower return. Hence, less 
efficient firms result in lower BHARs. 
The consistency of the Effr results throughout all the IPO long run 
performance models, after controlling for the privatisation, valuation residuals, 
and initial market pricing effects, demonstrate the robustness of its impact on the 
BHARs. 
Model I in table 6.6 demonstrates mixed results for Capacity risk (Cpy). 
The signs of the coefficient alter in every period. Cpy is positively related to 
BHARIy and BHAR3y, but it turns to be negatively related to BHAR2y. However, 
the coefficient becomes more consistent in other extended models after controlling 
for the privatisation, valuation residuals, and initial `mispricing' effects (table 6.7 
and 6.8). Yet, the Cpy-BHARs relationship appears to be significant only in year 
3. 
Since Cpy is measured by the ratio of investment plan cost over the IPO 
net proceeds, it means that the higher the investment plan cost, the lower the 
capacity risk, the greater the expected long-term returns. The result presented in 
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table 6.6 suggests a positive coefficient of Cpy. This result rejects the testable 
hypothesis, which predicts a positive relationship between capacity risk and IPO 
long-run performance. Similar to the explanation to the efficiency risk (Effr), the 
investors, apparently, interpret such information differently. From the issuer's 
point of view, the greater the investment plan cost means the lower the probability 
that the firms is under their optimal production capacity, which indicates the lower 
capacity risks. However, from the investors' point of view, the greater fraction of 
net proceeds allocated for the investment means greater funds go to uncertain 
project, indicating higher risks. Consequently, from the investors' perspective, the 
greater investment cost, relatively to IPO net proceeds, the riskier the IPOs, and 
the greater IPO long-run returns expected. That argument could explain the 
positive Cpy-BHARs associations. Additionally, the relationship is insignificant 
for the shorter period; perhaps, as the investment proposal disclosed in the 
prospectuses are usually long-term projects. Therefore, it needs a longer period to 
detect its impact on the IPO performance. 
Prior studies (e. g., Klein, 1996; Leone et al., 2003) examine the usefulness 
of the usage of IPO net proceeds for pricing the IPOs. Although using different 
proxies for the usage of the proceeds, they find similar results that conclude the 
value relevance of such information. However, to the researcher's knowledge, the 
result from this study is among the first to find a significant impact of the 
information of the IPO net proceeds usage on the IPO subsequent performance. 
The last ex-ante risk factor is industry risk (Ind). The testable hypothesis 
on its relation to IPO long-run performance expects positive coefficients, which 
suggests the IPOs in riskier industries are expected to have higher long-run 
returns. The results for all models show positive Ind-BHARs association; however, 
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they appear to be significant only for the 3-year period in models III and IV. The 
Ind is insignificantly related to BHARs when the models only include the 
prospectus information, and when the privatisation dummy is included as a 
predictor (model II and III). It does, however, become relevant to the IPO 3-year 
performance once the models include additional control variables, such as the 
valuation residuals and the IRs. 
In sum, mixed results are found on the relationship between each ex-ante 
risk factor and the IPO long-run performance. Efficiency risk (Effr) is the only 
risk factor that demonstrates consistent results throughout the periods and models, 
while Capital availability risk (Cap) is the one that appear to have no significant 
impact on BHARs. Among the market participants, there is evidence of different 
views of risk recognition in a number of ex-ante risk factor examined, such as 
Leverage risk (Lev), Efficiency risk (Effr), and Capacity risk (Cpy). The impacts 
of most of the ex-ante risk factors take longer than expected, Leverage risk and 
Capacity risk appears to be insignificant during the 1-year and 2-year periods but 
eventually turn out to be significantly related to the IPO long-run returns. The 
results of Industry risk are mixed. They appear to be sensitive to the model 
specifications. The impact of Industry risk on the BHARs is significant once the 
models control for the effects of privatisation, valuation residuals, and initial 
market pricing. 
In sum, the ex-ante risk factors demonstrate mixed results throughout the 
research periods. The impact of the ex-ante risk factors on the IPO performance is 
limited in the shorter period (1-year period), but it is more influential in the longer 
period (3-year period). This suggests the market needs a longer period to detect 
the impact of the ex-ante risk factors on the IPO performance. Moreover, the ex- 
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ante leverage risk and the efficiency risk take the opposite signs of coefficients to 
those expected, implying that those proxies are perceived as signals rather than 
ex-ante risk factors. The results of Industry risk are robust, suggesting that IPOs 
in the riskier industries tend to have greater BHARs. A similar result is found for 
the Capacity risk, however the impact is significant in the longer period (3-year 
period). No evidence is found to support the Capital availability risk having an 
impact on the IPO long run performance. 
6.3.4 Signalling analysis 
The signals used in this study have been used widely in the IPO literature. 
Therefore, the working hypotheses on each signal are based on the empirical 
evidence found in prior studies. The sponsor reputation dummy (Spo) is expected 
to have positive coefficients, implying that IPOs brought to market by prestigious 
sponsors tend to have higher long-run abnormal returns. 
In all models and all periods, Spo appears to be positively related to the 
BHARs, which is consistent to the hypothesis. However, the coefficients are 
statistically significant only for the 3-year abnormal returns for all models, 
implying that IPOs brought to the market by prestigious sponsors tend to show 
significant higher returns after 3 years traded in the market. In terms of time, the 
results are quite surprising, as it is expected that the role of sponsor reputation as 
the third party's certification of the firm's value, would have an important impact 
in the early days of the IPOs, rather than in the longer run. 
The results tend to go along with another implication of agent reputation. 
Carter and Manaster (1990) refer it to the `picking' game. Having robust result of 
the impact of underwriter reputation on both IPO initial and long run returns, they 
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claim that there is an incentive for the prestigious underwriters to pick `good' 
firms, such as to maintaining their reputation. Meanwhile, the less prestigious 
underwriters are left with `bad' firms. Consequently, it appears that IPOs with the 
prestigious underwriter are expected to perform better than ones with the less 
prestigious underwriter. Based on this argument, it is reasonable to expect the 
delay of the impact of Spo, as the IPO performance, then, is as a result of `good' 
firms. The market may need time to observe the firm's quality in the long run. 
The empirical evidence supports the working hypothesis H15a, which 
claims a positive relationship between sponsor reputation and the IPO long run 
performance. It also corroborates the findings from previous findings (Hogue et 
al., 2002), although it contradicts the result from other studies (e. g., Carter et al., 
1998). 
Having argued that older firms tend to have more experience in business, 
the firm's age could be a good signal to reveal the firm's value. In the long run it 
is also expected to have stable operations, which is eventually reflected in the 
market prices. Therefore, the testable hypothesis expects positive coefficients for 
Age. 
The results for Age are mixed. In all models, it appears that the firm's age 
is insignificantly related to BHAR1y. Yet, eventually, the empirical evidence 
shows that firm's age is negatively related to IPO abnormal returns in year 2 and 
3, implying that older firms tend to have lower returns. The result is contrary to 
the working hypothesis H15b. 
The result infers that younger firms are likely to have significantly higher 
abnormal returns in years 2 and 3. This could be explained as follows. Most of the 
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IPO firms are young firms when they go publico. One of main characteristics of 
young firms is high growth of earnings. If the market believes on the high 
potential earnings growth of the IPO young firms, it is likely the young firms are 
valued higher, which in turn results in higher returns. 
Many studies attempt to examine the impact of firm's age at the IPO on its 
initial and subsequent performance. However, most of them fail to find a 
significant impact of firm's age on the IPO performance. Therefore, this study is 
one of the few that find evidence of firm's age having an impact on the IPO long- 
run returns. 
The last signal examined is the percentage of equity sold at the offerings 
(Eq). It could be argued that this variable is the most used signal in the IPO 
literature, since it shows very consistent results over different time periods, 
markets, and regimes. The testable hypothesis posits negative coefficients of Eq, 
implying that the greater the fraction of the enlarged shares sold at the offerings 
signals inferior firm value. The signal involves the old shareholder's perception of 
the firm's value in the future. Therefore the Eq-BHARs association is expected to 
be negative. 
The results show interesting findings. In model I, where the model only 
includes the prospectus information, Eq is negatively related to BHARs, yet, this 
relationship appears to be significant only in years 2 and 3. However, in the 
extended models (models II, III, and IV), the results are more consistent. Eq is 
negatively and significantly related to BHARs for all periods. It indicates that 
firms that sold higher percentages of equity tend to have lower IPO returns. 
° The mean of firm's age at the IPO of the research sample is approximately 9 years after they are 
incorporated, and the median of approximately 7.5 years. 
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This finding implies that Eq serves as an efficient signal for IPOs, as the 
more equity sold at the IPOs indicates that the old shareholders have lower 
expectations regarding future firm value. Consequently, investors put lower values 
on such IPOs, which in turn results in lower IPO long-run returns. This result 
corroborates the finding from previous studies (e. g., Koh et al., 1992; Khurshed et 
al., 1999). However, it contradicts the conclusion of another study (e. g., 
Ljunggvist, 1996). 
In sum, mixed results are found on the relationship between the signals 
and IPO long-run performance. The results of sponsor reputation tend to 
demonstrate that the Sponsors are likely to pick `good' firms, which then, 
eventually produce higher returns in the long run. The result of firm's age does 
not support the testable hypothesis. The evidence shows that younger firms tend to 
generate higher long-run abnormal returns. The percentage of equity sold at the 
IPO turn out to be as predicted and confirms prior studies. 
6.3.5 Privatisation and IPO long run performance analysis 
As presented earlier in the descriptive analysis and throughout the section, in the 
long run PIPOs are priced differently to the non-privatisation IPOs, and as such 
robustly affect the results for the full IPO research sample. One attempt to control 
for the privatisation effect on the results is to include a dummy variable. Model II 
is an extended model of the IPO long run performance that considers the 
privatisation effect. Based on prior research, it is predicted that the coefficients of 
the privatisation dummy (Priv) are positive. Table 6.7 and 6.8 exhibit strong 
results for Priv, which support the testable hypothesis H16. The results imply that 
in the long run, PIPOs perform better than the non-PIPOs. 
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Table 6.7 Regression analysis of the IPO long-run performance on the 
prospectus information and privatisation dummy (Model II) 
The table contains output from OLS regression analysis for all IPO sample, of the buy 
and hold abnormal returns for 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years (BHAR1y; BHAR2y; BHAR3y) 
on pro forma book value scaled by the offer price (pBVIPo), forecasted earnings scaled by 
the offer price (/Po), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk 
(Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's 
age (Age), percentage of equity sold (Eq), and privatisation dummy (Priv) 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Variables BHAR1y BHAR2y BHAR3y 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant 0.138 0.301 -0.799 
(0.35) (0.39) (0.89) 
pBV/Po -0.095 0.342 -0.139 
(-0.60) (1.30) (-0.46) 
Alpo 2.223*** 1.399 0.134 
(3.83) (0.99) (0.13) 
Size -0.064* -0.107* -0.031 (-2.04) (3.95) (-0.47) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.049 -0.104 -0.219** 
(-0.71) (-0.91) (-2.15) 
Cap -0.092 -0.199 -0.047 (-1.59) (-1.48) (-0.33) 
Effr -0.382*** -0.886*** -1.017*** 
(-2.99) (-3.26) (-3.15) 
Cpy 0.126 0.019 0.635*** 
(1.27) (0.25) (3.08) 
Ind 0.570 1.250 1.557* 
(1.49) (1.53) (1.79) 
Signals: 
Spo 0.113* 0.206* 0.264* 
(1.77) (1.94) (1.86) 
Age -0.005 -0.102** -0.089 
(-0.18) (-2.20) (-1.52) 
Eq -0.610** -1.398*** -0.877** 
(3.09) (3.96) (-2.17) 
Priv 0.768*** 1.442*** 1.461*** 
(4.33) (3.95) (3.42) 
N 161 161 144 
Adj. R-square 0.112 0.108 0.134 
Wald regression 59.74*** 61.11*** 59.18*** 
Wald fundamental 14.65*** 2.84 4.61 
Wald ex-ante risk factors 18.12*** 13.92** 22.37*** 
Wald signals 11.42*** 22.80*** 10.63** 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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From the investors' point of view, this means that buying PIPOs and 
holding them in the long run result in higher profit than if they invest in the non- 
PIPOs. For example, the results of model II shows that the Priv coefficient takes a 
value of 1.334, meaning that after controlling for other characteristics of the IPOs, 
investors, who buy the PIPOs and hold them until the PIPOs' third anniversary, on 
average, gain 133.4% more profits than if they buy the non-privatisation IPOs. 
This result is in line with the findings of previous studies (e. g., Menyah et al., 
1995; Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997; Samat, 2000). 
Additionally, the magnitudes of the coefficients show increasing figures 
over the periods, implying that for the longer period the gap between PIPOs 
performance and their counterparts is greater. This supports the descriptive 
statistics analysis that exhibits an escalating superiority of PIPOs abnormal returns 
to the non-privatisation IPOs: As the evidence shows the important effect of the 
privatisation to the overall results, this study also attempt to totally isolate such 
effects by splitting the research sample into the privatisation/non-privatisation 
sub-samples, and examine whether other predictors behave differently. The results 
of the non-privatisation IPOs are presented later in the Sensitivity analysis section. 
6.3.6 Valuation residuals, initial returns and long-run performance 
It is argued here that the valuation residual (Resi), to some extend, may 
affect the long-run performance. In the hypothesis development, it is discussed 
that the IPOs with higher Resi are expected to have lower initial returns (IRs). 
Hence a negative association between the Resi and the IRs is expected. It is also 
assumed that if the markets are efficient, any `mispricing' in the early days of 
IPOs is corrected in the long run. Thus, it is expected that IPOs with higher IRs 
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will have lower long run performance. This sequence predicts a negative 
relationship between IRs and BHARs (H18). Therefore, if the valuation residuals 
are greater, IRs are expected to be lower, and in turn, higher BHARs are expected. 
Hence, the valuation residuals are expected to be positively related to the BHARs 
(H17). 
However, the result in the previous chapter (IR analysis) shows that Resi is 
positively related to the IPO IRs. Two possible implications have been discussed 
in the IR analysis chapter. The first implication refers to the market momentum, 
and the second is to the signalling theory. The IPO long run model III includes 
Resi and IRs in the analysis, which is presented in table 6.8 below. 
The prediction is that if the IRs on day 1 is driven by the market 
momentum, the market corrects the IPO prices in the long run (reversion effect). 
Thus, the results are expected as posited in the working hypothesis. However, if 
the Resi is a signal to the firms' true value, it is expected the greater Resi results in 
the higher IRs and higher BHARs. 
The results in table 6.8 show that Resi is positively related to the BHAR in 
year 1, and negatively related to BHARs in the longer period. The result in year 1 
is in line with the signalling theory, while the results in year 2 and 3 are aligned 
with the reversion effect. However, none of the Resi coefficients are statistically 
significant. Therefore, the results do not confirm working hypothesis H17. 
In contrast, the IRs shows more robust results. Surprisingly, the 
coefficients on the IRs are positive and statistically significant for the 1-year and 
2-year periods. The significance during the 3-year period disappears, but the 
coefficient still retains the positive sign. The result implies that on average, IPOs 
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Table 6.8 Regression analysis of the IPO long-run performances on 
prospectus information, privatisation dummy, valuation residuals, and initial 
returns (Model III) 
The table contains output from OLS regression analysis for all IPO sample, of the buy and hold abnormal returns for 1 year, 
2 years, and 3 years (BJIARI y; BHAR2y; BHAR3y) on pro forma book value scaled by the offer price (pBVIP0), forecasted 
earnings scaled by the offer price (/E/Po), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk (Effr), capacity 
risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ina), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's age (Age), percentage of equity sold (Eq), 
privatisation dummy (Priv), valuation residuals (Resi), and initial returns (IR). Heterosccdasticity-adjusted t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. 
Variables BHAR1y BHAR2y BHAR3y 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant -0.769 -0.525 -1.289 
(-0.19) (-0.64) (-1.33) 
pBV/Po -0.565 0.348 -0.135 
(-0.34) (1.39) (-0.41) 
f/Po 2.219*** 0.969 0.818 
(3.769) (0.69) (0.92) 
Size -0.057* -0.072 -0.008 
(-1.79) (-1.29) (-0.12) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.044 -0.106 -0.223** 
(-0.64) (-1.01) (-2.25) 
Cap -0.094 -0.203 -0.055 
(-1.61) (-1.60) (-0.41) 
Effr -0.373*** -0.834*** -0.982*** 
(-2.97) (-3.34) (-3.19) 
Cpy 0.141 0.116 0.685*** 
(1.41) (0.61) (3.23) 
Ind 0.689* 1.739** 1.841* 
(1.75) (2.07) (1.92) 
Signals: 
Spo 0.119* 0.211* 0.263* 
(1.78) (1.75) (1.92) 
Age -0.003 -0.098** -0.089 
(-0.12) (-2.13) (-1.56) 
Eq -0.591*** -1.261*** -0.801* 
(-3.07) (-3.77) (1.94) 
Priv 0.689*** 1.161*** 1.298*** 
(3.97) (3.29) (2.99) 
Resi 0.005 -0.067 -0.047 
(0.87) (-0.85) (-0.64) 
IR 0.546* 1.886** 1.108 
(1.72) (2.56) (1.39) 
N 161 161 144 
Adj. R-square 0.114 0.134 0.133 
Wald regression 67.09*** 74.70*** 64.03*** 
Wald fundamental 14.49*** 2.35 3.79 
Wald ex-ante risk factors 19.55*** 17.04*** 23.76*** 
Wald signals 11.45*** 21.52*** 10.73** 
Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *significant at I% 
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that have higher IRs on day 1 will perform better in the long run, which is contrary 
to the working hypothesis. This result is also supported by further analysis of the 
relationship between IRs and BHARs as shown in table 6.9 below. The table 
exhibits the average of BHARs on the IR quartile distribution. It is clearly seen 
that for year 1, IPOs that have lowest IRs generate the lowest abnormal returns. 
On the other hand, the IPOs that have highest IRs produce the highest average 
abnormal returns on their first listing anniversary. In fact, that pattern continues in 
the following years up to the third listing anniversary. 
Table 6.9 The BHARs averages on the IR distribution 
The table contains the average of BHARly, BHAR2y, and BHAR3y on the IR 
quartile distribution. 
Quartile JR range BHAR1y BHAR2y BHAR3y 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
1 IR<=2.23 -4.52 -9.76 -22.27 
2 2.23<IR<=6.70 -0.73 2.43 -16.23 
3 6.70<IR<=13.63 2.34 9.84 -1.03 
4 IR>13.63 8.74 17.20 -0.12 
Earlier in the IR analysis, results of several predictors (pBVIPO and Resi) 
on the IRs indicate market momentum on day 1 that results in the IPOs, which are 
overvalued relatively to their fundamentals at the offering, are valued even higher 
on day 1. In relation to that finding, the IPO long run performance result suggests 
that the market momentum that may drive the IRs on day 1, still continue up to 
year 2. It seems that the momentum does not stop promptly, rather it continues at 
least up to the 2"a listing anniversary. Thus, the IPO prices still go up until their 
2 "a listing anniversary. In year 3, the momentum may start to diminish, which 
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results in a significant decreasing IR coefficient, although it appears to be 
insignificant. 
Even though the results do not confirm the working hypothesis, which is 
based on the efficient market hypothesis, the results are in line with the prediction 
of the signalling theory. However, while Welch (1989) argue that the issuers 
deliberately underprice the IPOs to signal the firm's `true' value, the result of this 
study may imply that the issuers/sponsors of `good' firms set the offer price at a 
premium as a signal to the firm's true value, which results in higher IRs on day 1, 
and the greater abnormal returns in the long run. 
The result cannot confirm the findings from previous studies (e. g., Ritter, 
1991; Levis, 1993). However, there are a number of differences between prior 
studies and this one. The first is that the results from prior studies are based on the 
relation between the IRs and the longer windows (long run performance covering 
from 3 up to 5 years post IPO). A recent study by Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
(2003) finds that after 4 Y2 years listed, IPOs, which have higher IRs underperform 
the IPOs that have lower IRs. However, they do not find such an evidence for the 
shorter period (up to 1 year). 
The second difference is that prior studies use different benchmarks in 
calculating the long run abnormal returns. Although Levis (1993) also attempts to 
calculate the long run performance using the BHAR measure and the Hoare Govett 
Index as the benchmark, he uses the CAR measure and the matching firm 
benchmark in the cross-section analysis. However, in general, he finds no 
evidence of a significant difference between the different benchmarks used. 
Therefore, it is expected that the benchmark employed in this study (FTSECO 
index) is not the cause of the different result. 
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Finally, prior studies do not include the PIPOs in their analysis, while this 
study, as explained earlier, includes 10 PIPOs. As discussed earlier, the 
descriptive statistics demonstrate that on average the BHARs for the PIPOs are 
significantly higher than the BHARs for the non-PIPOs. Therefore, separate 
analysis for the non-PIPOs are also undertaken and reported in the next section. 
In sum, mixed results are found on the relationship between the initial 
`mispricing' (the valuation residuals and the IRs) and the IPO long run 
performance (BHARs). The analysis does not find any significant impact of Resi 
on BHARs, although more robust results are found on the relationship between IRs 
and BHARs. In contrast to the working hypothesis, the IRs is positively related to 
BHARs, suggesting that IPOs that have higher IRs on day 1 continue to have 
greater BHARs after 1 and 2 years. In conjunction to the findings from the IR 
analysis, there are two possible explanations to the results. Firstly, it may imply 
that the market momentum on day 1, as suggested in the IR analysis, continue up 
to the IPOs' 2"a listing anniversary. Secondly, it may also imply that the 
issuers/sponsors of `good' firms price the IPOs at the premium to signal the firms' 
true value, which results in higher IRs on day 1 and greater subsequent BHARs. 
6.4 Sensitivity analysis 
In the prior section, it has been demonstrated and discussed the robust 
impact of PIPOs on the IPO long run performance. In the main analysis using the 
full sample, the PIPOs impact is controlled for by including the privatisation 
dummy (Priv) in the model. Another way to test the robustness of the results of 
the main analysis is to totally exclude the PIPOs in the analysis, by running the 
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OLS regression analysis for each long run performance model using the 'non- 
PIPOs sub sample. 
The results are presented in tables 6.10 and 6.11 below. Since the analysis 
uses the non-PIPOs sub sample, there will be no sensitivity analysis for model II - 
the IPO long run performance model that examines the impact of the prospectus 
information and the privatisation dummy on the BHARs. 
Overall, the results indicate that the models work as well as with the full 
sample. The constant term shows negative coefficients, although only in year 3 is 
it statistically significant for both models (I and III), suggesting that after 
controlling for other factors, the non-PIPOs underperform the market after 3 years 
trading. 
Another improvement is observed in the Eq variable. The main results for 
model I show that Eq is insignificant related to BHAR1y, however it turns out to 
be significant in the non-PIPOs sub-sample (table 6.6). Moreover, the Eq 
demonstrates statistically robust results. It implies that the impact of the Eq on the 
IPO BHARs is strong, although its impact in the main analysis is influenced by the 
interaction between the Eq and the privatisation dummy. Therefore, after 
excluding the PIPOs, the result highlights the robust impact of Eq on the IPO long 
run performance. Other results remain unchanged. 
As mentioned above, the sensitivity analysis is carried out in order to test 
the robustness of the IPO long-run performance models. Although the data has 
been treated for outliers (see the research design chapter regarding outliers 
treatment), it is still necessary to check the results for that effect. Therefore, all. 
IPO long run performance models are tested by using the robust regression. 
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Table 6.10 Regression analysis of the IPO long-run performances on the 
prospectus information (Model I) for Non-PIPOs sub-sample 
The table contains output from OLS regression analysis for all IPO sample, of the buy 
and hold abnormal returns for 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years (BHARly; BHAR2y; BHAR3y) 
on pro forma book value scaled by the offer price (pBV/Po), forecasted earnings scaled by 
the offer price (fE/Po), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk 
(Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's 
age (Age), and percentage of equity sold (Eq). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. 
Variables BHAR1y BHAR2y BHAR3y 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant -0.267 -0.525 -1.517* 
(0.61) (-0.63) (-1.82) 
pBV/Po -0.072 0.396 -0.108 (-0.43) (1.46) (-0.35) 
fE/po 1.979*** 0.525 0.165 
(2.93) (0.34) (0.35) 
Size -0.064** -0.104 -0.026 (-2.04) (-1.81) (-0.38) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.040 -0.085 -0.221** 
(-0.55) (-0.71) (-2.05) 
Cap -0.088 0.189 -0.056 
(-1.47) (-1.37) (-0.39) 
Effr -0.373*** -0.889*** -0.989*** (-2.95) (-3.20) (-3.06) 
Cpy 0.122 0.035 0.643*** 
(1.22) (0.18) (3.15) 
Ind 0.726* 1.671* 2.274** 
(1.71) (1.89) (2.32) 
Signals: 
Spo 0.114* 0.201 * 0.261 * 
(1.69) (1.74) (1.80) 
Age -0.007 -0.094* -0.081 
(-0.25) (-1.84) (-1.31) 
Eq -0.609 -1.369*** -0.847* (-3.07)*** (-3.84) (-1.97) 
N 151 151 133 
Adj R-square 0.097 0.098 0.133 
Wald regression 47.07*** 37.13*** 37.74*** 
Wald fundamental 8.64** 2.33 1.86 
Wald ex-ante risk factors 16.99*** 13.92** 23.50*** 
Wald signals 11.22*** 20.53*** 9.22** 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at S%; * significant at 1% 
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Table 6.11 Regression analysis of the IPO long-run performances on 
prospectus information, valuation residuals, and initial returns (Model III) 
for Non-privatisation sub-sample 
The table contains output from OLS regression analysis for all IPO sample, of the buy 
and hold abnormal returns for 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years (BHAR1y; BHAR2y; BHAR3y) 
on pro forma book value scaled by the offer price (pBVIPo), forecasted earnings scaled by 
the offer price (/Po), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk 
(Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's 
age (Age), percentage of equity sold (Eq), valuation residuals (Resi), and initial returns 
(IR). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
Variables BHAR1y BHAR2y BHAR3y 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant -0.196 -0.916 -1.951* (-0.43) (-1.01) (-1.95) 
pBV/Po -0.047 0.349 -0.144 (-0.27) (1.34) (-0.43) 
ON 2.001** 0.011 0.735 
(2.93) (0.01) (0.73) 
Size -0.056* -0.061 0.003 
(-1.71) (-1.04) (0.05) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.039 -0.095 -0.231** (-0.53) (-0.87) (-2.18) 
Cap -0.088 -0.184 -0.054 (-1.53) (-1.38) (-0.39) 
Effr -0.361** -0.838*** -0.949*** (-2.73) (-3.30) (-3.09) 
Cpy 0.139 0.108 0.692*** 
(1.39) (0.57) (3.28) 
Ind 0.826* 2.146** 2.549** 
(1.87) (2.36) (2.45) 
Signals: 
Spo 0.119* 0.201 * 0.251 * 
(1.78) (1.74) (1.85) 
Age -0.007 -0.087* -0.080 (-0.24) (-1.76) (-1.33) 
Eq -0.584** -1.198*** -0.7444* (-2.98) (-3.51) (-1.77) 
Resi -0.001 -0.093 -0.072 
(-0.03) (-1.12) (-0.94) 
IR 0.540* 1.861** 1.047 
(1.75) (2.67) (1.26) 
N 151 151 133 
Adj. R-square 0.097 0.125 0.108 
Wald regression 53.42*** 48.43*** 41.13*** 
Wald fundamental 8.11** 1.79 1.34 
Wald ex-ante risk factors 18.18*** 16.91*** 24.31*** 
Wald signals 10.77** 17.76*** 8.69** 
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The results of the robust regressions are presented in tables 6.12,6.13 and 6.14. 
Overall, the robust regression analysis for model I (table 6.8) shows similarity to 
the results of the OLS regression. The fundamentals work as well as it does in the 
OLS regression analysis, suggesting that outliers do not affect the impacts of 
fundamentals on the BHARs. The results also maintain negative coefficients for 
Size, as predicted, and they are only significant for year 1, as found in the main 
analysis. Overall, the ex-ante risk factors also perform similarly; however, 
Capacity risk (Cpy) demonstrates a slightly different performance. While it 
appears to be insignificantly related to the BHARs in the main analysis, the robust 
regression analysis finds a robust result of Cpy, implying that IPOs that disclose a 
higher fraction of net proceeds for the investment tend to have greater BHARs in 3 
years. The different results found in the main analysis and the robust regression 
analysis is possibly due to some extreme values, in which some IPOs propose 
100% of net proceeds to fund an investment project. 
Other differences are detected in results for the signals: firm's age (Age) 
and the percentage of equity sold at the IPO (Eq). In the main results, Age appears 
to be significantly related to the BHAR2y and BHAR3y. However, the rank 
regression analysis cannot find the evidence for year 3. The similar problem is 
also found with regard to the Eq. The main results show the significant Eq-BHARs 
relationship in years 2 and year 3, but it loses significance in the rank regression. 
In other models, the robust regression analyses highlight the same changes 
in the results with regard to Cpy and Age. However, there is no difference found 
for Eq, once the models are controlled for privatisations, or in the subsequent 
models. 
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Table 6.12 Robust Regression analysis of the IPO long-run performance on 
the prospectus information (Model I) 
The table contains output from robust regression analysis for all IPO sample, of the buy 
and hold abnormal returns for 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years (BHARly; BHAR2y; BHAR3y) 
on pro forma book value scaled by the offer price (pBVIPo), forecasted earnings scaled by 
the offer price (JE/Po), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk 
(Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's 
age (Age), and percentage of equity sold (Eq). 
Variables BHARly BHAR2y BHAR3y 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant -0.295 -0.409 -1.125 
(-0.64) (-0.42) (-0.96) 
pBV/Po -0.113 0.395 0.157 
(-0.87) (1.46) (0.48) 
ON 2.295*** 1.531 0.784 
(3.21) (1.02) (0.58) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.103 
(0.03) (0.01) (1.45) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.108 -0.156 -0.243* 
(-1.63) (-1.13) (-1.78) 
Cap -0.047 -0.073 -0.011 
(-0.70) (-0.52) (-1.48) 
Effr -0.315** -0.779** -0.880** 
(-2.21) (-2.61) (-2.30) 
Cpy 0.099 -0.147 0.337* 
(0.99) (-0.70) (1.79) 
Ind 0.494 1.111 1.362 
(1.05) (1.13) (1.12) 
Signals: 
Spo 0.076 0.203 0.294* 
(1.09) (1.40) (1.84) 
Age -0.002 -0.128* -0.124 
(-0.06) (-1.89) (-1.54) 
Eq -0.066 -0.430 0.007 
(-0.38) (-1.20) (0.02) 
N 161 161 161 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6.13 Robust Regression analysis of the IPO long-run performance on 
the prospectus information and privatisation dummy (Model II) 
The table contains output from robust regression analysis for all IPO sample, of the buy 
and hold abnormal returns for 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years (BHARly; BHAR2y; BHAR3y) 
on pro forma book value scaled by the offer price (pBVIPo), forecasted earnings scaled by 
the offer price (fE/Po), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk 
(Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Ind), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's 
age (Age), percentage of equity sold (Eq), and privatisation dummy (Priv). 
Variables BHAR1y BHAR2y BHAR3y 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant -0.103 -0.124 -0.883 
(-0.57) (-0.35) (-0.97) 
nBV/Pn -0.171 0.243 -0.187 
(-1.09) (0.87) (-0.81) 
fE/po 2.227*** 1.422 1.190 
(2.94) (0.93) (1.23) 
Size -0.055* -0.111 -0.014 
(-1.85) (1.72) (-0.16) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.083 -0.136 -0.219* 
(-0.97) (-1.42) (-1.98) 
Cap -0.073 -0.186 -0.012 
(-1.07) (-1.47) (-0.08) 
Effr -0.322** -0.790*** -0.906** 
(-2.37) (-2.97) (-2.54) 
Cpy 0.107 -0.157 0.391* 
(1.39) (-0.51) (1.93) 
Ind 0.666 1.011 1.329* 
(1.48) (1.55) (1.77) 
Signals: 
Spo 0.083 0.177 0.213* 
(1.29) (1.71) (1.93) 
Age -0.002 -0.105* -0.077 
(-0.15) (-1.83) (1.51) 
Eq -0.322** -0.780** -0.807** 
(-1.99) (-2.69) (-2.42) 
Priv 0.543** 1.044** 1.371** 
(2.88) (2.32) (2.70) 
N 161 161 144 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6.14 Robust Regression analysis of the IPO long-run performances 
on prospectus information, privatisation dummy, 
valuation residuals, and initial returns (Model III) 
The table contains output from robust regression analysis for all IPO sample, of the buy 
and hold abnormal returns for 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years (BHARly; BHAR2y; BHAR3y) 
on pro forma book value scaled by the offer price (pBY/Po), forecasted earnings scaled by 
the offer price (JE/Po), leverage risk (Lev), capital availability risk (Cap), efficiency risk 
(Effr), capacity risk (Cpy), industry risk (Intl), sponsor reputation dummy (Spo), firm's 
age (Age), percentage of equity sold (Eq), privatisation dummy (Priv), valuation residuals 
(Rest), and initial returns (IR). 
Variables BHARIy BHAR2y BHAR3y 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Constant -0.344 -0.866 -1.14 
(-0.78) (-0.93) (-0.96) 
pBV/Po -0.154 0.253 -0.069 
(-1.16) (0.91) (-0.20) 
FE/Po 2.340*** 1.250 0.968 
(3.39) (0.87) (0.77) 
Size -0.059* -0.069 0.003 
(-1.81) (-1.06) (0.03) 
Risk factors: 
Lev -0.083 -0.118 -0.201 
(-1.32) (-0.90) (-1.29) 
Cap -0.078 -0.172 -0.124 
(-1.23) (-1.30) (-0.70) 
Effr -0.312** -0.789*** -0.851** 
(-2.35) (-2.90) (-2.40) 
Cpy 0.203** 0.133 0.616** 
(2.07) (0.65) (2.33) 
Ind 0.639 1.777* 1.643* 
(1.42) (1.89) (1.69) 
Sign als: 
Spo 0.072 0.189 0.260* 
(1.08) (1.37) (1.78) 
Age 0.007 -0.119* -0.109 (0.21) (-1.87) (-1.41) 
Eq -0.451 ** -1.124** -0.904* 
(-2.19) (-2.60) (-1.70) 
Priv 0.494** 0.912** 1.321** 
(2.58) (2.28) (2.67) 
Resi -0.001 -0.096 -0.052 (-0.00) (-1.49) (-0.61) 
IR 0.592* 1.946** 1.033 
(1.69) (2.62) (1.09) 
N 161 161 144 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Overall, the results of model II and III appear to be more consistent to the main 
results. 
In sum, two sensitivity analyses are conducted to detect any problem that 
may affect the results of the main analysis. The first analysis is to test whether the 
models perform differently when the non-privatisation sub-sample is used. The 
results show a robust effect of privatisations influencing the models' explanatory 
power. The rank regression analysis indicates a slight change to the main results 
with regard to the capacity risk and firm's age variables, which become less 
significant than in the main analysis. 
6.5 Validity of the IPO long run performance models 
To this point, there have been several interesting findings, although a 
surprising result is the evidence that demonstrates how the prospectus information 
appear to be irrelevant in years 1 and 2, yet they turn out to be significant related 
to the 1311AR3y. Therefore, it is predictable that the adjusted R-square of all IPO 
long-run returns will be highest in year 3. This result is contrary to the findings of 
Bhabra and Pcttway (2003). Using Canadian data, they find the adjusted R- 
squares declining throughout the periods, suggesting that the prospectus 
information is less relevant for the longer period. 
The adjusted R-square for model I (table 6.6) ranges from 4.9% to 8.6%, 
meaning that the prospectus information could explain 4.9% of the variation in 
BHARIy and up to 8.6% of the variation in BHAR3y. The Wald statistics of 
model I shows that the model is statistically significant across the different time 
periods, suggesting that the prospectus information as a whole has a significant 
impact on the IPO long run performance. Moreover, the Wald statistics for each 
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classification of the prospectus information show that the joint restriction of the 
fundamentals information is significant in year 1, but loses significance in the 
longer periods. In contrast, the joint restriction of the signals appears to be 
insignificant in year 1, but gains significance in the longer period. Meanwhile, the 
more robust results are found in the joint restriction of the ex-ante risk factors, 
which are significant throughout the different time periods. 
Model II is the extended model I after adding the privatisation dummy into 
the model (see table 6.7). The explanatory power of model II improves 
significantly to the range from 11.2% to 13.4%. Similar to the previous model, the 
Wald statistics of model II shows that it is a valid model at least at the 99% level 
of significance across the different periods. The joint restriction of the 
fundamentals shows a similar pattern to the previous model. However, the joint 
restriction of the signals improves in model II in which the signals as a unit is 
significantly related to the BHARs through the different periods. 
Model III is the extended model II after the inclusion of the valuation 
residual and the IPO initial returns into the model (see table 6.8). With robust 
results for the association between the IRs and the BHARs in years 1 and 2, the 
explanatory power of model III for those periods slightly increase. However, in 
year 3, the explanatory power of model III is virtually similar to the explanatory 
power of model II. The joint restrictions of each group of the prospectus 
information are similar to the results of model II. 
In terms of the model's explanatory power, the non-privatisation sub- 
sample exhibits stronger results in model I. For example, the adjusted R-square of 
model I in year I using the full sample is 4.9%, while the non-PIPOs sub-sample 
demonstrates a significantly higher explanatory power of 9.7% (see table 6.10). It 
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means that by totally isolating the privatisation effect, the prospectus information 
explains higher variations in BHAR1y. Additionally, it confirms the robustness of 
the privatisation effect that influences the performance of the IPO long-run returns 
model. 
However, the privatisation effect does not appear to have a similar 
influence for the subsequent models. The results of model III (table 6.11) 
demonstrates that instead of increasing, the explanatory power of the model is 
lower than the ones of the full IPO sample. Yet, the outcomes confirm the fact that 
the privatisation effect significantly influences the IPO long run returns models. 
The Wald statistics shows that using the non PIPOs sub sample does not 
change the validity of the IPO long run performance models. The models are valid 
across the different periods. The joint restrictions of the prospectus information 
classifications for the non-PIPOs sub sample perform similarly to the ones for the 
full sample. The joint restrictions of the ex-ante risk factors are robust. The 
fundamentals joint restriction is significant only in year 1. Meanwhile, the joint 
restrictions of the signals are more robust for the non-PIPOs, as they are 
statistically significant across the models and the different periods. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented and discussed the IPO performance of the 
research sample in the long run (up to 3 years post-IPO). IPO long run 
performance has been defined as the investors' abnormal returns from a day after 
the IPOs to the 1St, 2nd, and 3d listing anniversaries. In contrast to prior studies 
(e. g., Ritter, 1991; Levis, 1993), the descriptive statistics of the buy and hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) demonstrate that the research sample outperform the 
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market in year 1. The BHARs start to decrease in year 2, and have a negative mean 
value in year 3, yet the statistical test cannot confirm the significance of the 
research sample underperformance. 
However, when the research sample is broken down into the 
privatisation/non-privatisation and the survivor/non-survivor sub-samples, the 
non-PIPOs estimates uncover evidence of the long-run underperformance in year 
3, and so do the non-survivors. 
Mixed results are found on the relationship between the prospectus 
information and the IPO long run performance. From the fundamentals group, 
only the forecasted earnings to offer price ratio is significantly related to the IPO 
BIJARs in year 1, but loses significance for the longer periods. The result is 
understandable as the earnings figure used in this study is the 1-year forecasted 
earnings, therefore this information is relevant to the IPO pricing after 1 year 
trading. Additionally, the actual figures of earnings and book value of equity have 
been available to the market, which are more relevant in pricing the IPOs in the 
longer periods. Since the analysis only finds evidence of the fundamentals impact 
on the BHARs for year 1, it is not surprising that the joint restriction of the 
fundamentals is significant only for year 1. 
Mixed results are found on the relationship between the ex-ante risk 
factors and IPO performance. In the shorter period, the impact of the ex-ante risk 
factors generates little evidence to support the working hypotheses. Nevertheless, 
the impact becomes more important in the long run, particularly over 3 years after 
the offering. The efficiency risk is the only ex-ante risk factor, which shows 
consistent results throughout the periods. An interesting finding for this predictor 
group is that seemingly the market perceives the proxies as firm performance 
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measures, rather than as risk measures. Despite mixed results for the individual 
ex-ante risk factors, the joint restrictions of the group are robust across the models 
and throughout the different periods. 
The signals appear to perform as expected, despite the lack of statistical 
significance for the firm's age (Age) variable. The sponsor reputation (Spo) shows 
robust results across the models and the different periods. The result implies that 
IPOs that are sponsored by the prestigious investment bankers perform better in 
the long run than IPOs that are sponsored by the less prestigious investment 
bankers. The evidence for the percentage of equity sold at the IPO (Eq) appears to 
be weak in model I. However, once the models control for the privatisations, the 
impact of Eq on BHARs becomes significant throughout the periods. The result 
implies that IPOs that sell lower percentages of the enlarged shares at the offering 
perform better in the long run than do the IPOs that sell higher percentages of the 
enlarged share capital. Mixed results are found in the joint restriction of the 
signals across the models. In model I, it is significant only in year 2 and 3, 
although, it becomes more consistently significant in the subsequent models. 
A robust result is found on the relationship between the privatisation and 
the IPO performances. The results lend further support to the prior findings that 
demonstrate the significant impact of privatisations on the IPO long run returns. 
The PIPOs appear to have better performance in the long run (up to the 3-year 
period). Hence, it corroborates the prior UK studies on the IPO long-run 
performance. 
Another interesting finding is demonstrated in the relationship between the 
initial `mispricing' (valuation residuals and IRs) and the BHARs. There is no 
evidence to support an association between Resi and the BHARs. Prior studies find 
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a negative relationship between the IRs and the BHARs, suggesting mean 
reversion. However the result in this study suggests differently. The positive IR- 
BHARs relationship continues up to year 2, and then loses the significance in year 
3. In conjunction to the findings in the IR analysis, the results imply that the 
market momentum continues up to the IPOs' 2"d listing anniversary. Another 
implication is that the higher IRs on day 1 is a result of the signalling action of the 
issuers/sponsors of `good' firms. Therefore, in the long run, such IPOs are 
expected to have greater BHARs, which results in a positive relationship between 
the IRs and the BHARs. 
Despite mixed results and lack of significance of a number of predictors 
(sec appendix - table A. 6.4), all IPO performance models demonstrate increasing 
explanatory powers throughout the periods. The Wald statistics shows that the 
models are valid. The sensitivity analyses demonstrate that the results of the main 
analysis are generally robust. 
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Appendices 
for 
Chapter 6 
Appendix 
Table A. 6.1. The reason for the non-survivor IPOs 
Company name Reason 
International Food Machinery plc Delisted 
Parkdran Leisure plc Taken-over 
Parksidc International plc Taken-over 
Unipalm Group pie Merged 
GRT Bus plc Taken-over 
Rainford Group plc Taken-over 
Brunner Mond pie Private 
Oliver Ashwort plc Taken-over 
Car Group plc Delisted 
Pcnna Holdings plc Taken-over 
SDX Business System pie Taken-over 
Ushers of Trow plc Delisted 
Gremlin plc Merged 
Primesight plc Taken-over 
Newsquest plc Taken-over 
BCH group plc Taken-over 
Tetra Taken-over 
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Table A. 6.2a Performance of non-privatisation sub-sample by year 
Year No. of 
IPO 
sample 
Average 
BHAR1y 
Average 
BHAR2y 
Average 
BHAR3y 
1987 5 0.281 0.613 0.528 
1988 12 0.330** 0.248 0.228 
1989 4 0.292 0.524* 0.693** 
1990 2 -0.015 0.078 0.066 
1991 4 0.116 -0.201 -0.145 
1992 10 -0.034 -0.188 -0.266* 
1993 15 0.095 -0.039 -0.201 
1994 31 0.163** 0.223 0.102 
1995 19 0.096 -0.208 -0.642*** 
1996 28 0.043 -0.179 -0.242* 
1997 21 -0.003 -0.314** 0.166 
Table A6.2b Performance of survivor sub- sample by year 
Year No. of 
IPO 
sample 
Average 
BHAR1y 
Average 
BHAR2y 
Average 
BHAR3y 
1987 7 0.306* 0.602* 0.581 
1988 13 0.328*** 0.258 0.201 
1989 6 0.368** 0.531*** 0.831*** 
1990 2 -0.015 0.078 0.066 
1991 6 0.117 0.042 0.150 
1992 9 0.021 0.027 -0.266* 
1993 16 0.105 0.053 -0.156 
1994 28 0.157** 0.359** 0.102 
1995 17 0.126 -0.089 -0.642*** 
1996 24 0.042 0.064 -0.242* 
1997 15 0.057 0.099 0.166 
Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***signfficant at 1% 
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Table A. 6.4 Summary of long run performance analysis 
hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis Variables Expected Evidence 
signs 
1-112a 
The pro -forma book value of equity to 
offer price ratio is negatively related to pBV/Po +x IPO lang run abnormal returns 
1.112b 
The forecasted earnings to offer price 
ratio is positively related to IPO long fE/Po + (only abnormal returns in year 1) 
1.113 
There is a positive relationship between Size - 
size and IPO long run abnormal (only in 
returns year 1) 
1-I 14a 
There is a positive relationship between 
firm's pre-IPO leverage and IPO long Lev + (a negative and run abnormal returns 
significant 
coefficient is 
found in year 3) 
H14b 
There is a negative relationship 
between firm's pre-IPO capital Cap 
availability risk and long run abnormal 
returns 
I-i14c 
There is a positive relationship between 
firm's pre-IPO efficiency risk and IPO Effr 
long run abnormal returns (negative and 
significant 
coefficients are 
found in years 
1,2, and 3) 
H14d 
There is a positive relationship between V/ firm's pre-IPO capacity risk and IPO Cpy + 
long riot abnormal returns 
(only in year 3) 
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Hypothesis Variables Expected Evidence 
signs 
HI4c 
There is a positive relationship between hid + 
industry risk and IPO long run 
abnormal returns 
1-115a 
There is a positive relationship between 
sponsor reputation dummy and IPO Spo + V/ long run abnormal rcturus 
1-11 5b 
There is a positive relationship between V/ firm age and IPO long riot abnormal Age + 
returns (a negative and 
significant 
coefficient is 
found only in 
year 2) 
1115c 
Tltcrc is a ncgativc rclationship 
bctºrccit pcrccntagc of equity sold at Eq 
the flotation and IPO long run 
abnormal returns 
1-i 16 
Privatisation dummy is positively prig V/ 
related to IPO abnormal returns + 
1-117 
Naluatior: residuals is positively related Resi +x 
to IPO abnormal returns 
H18 
There is a negative association between 
IPO initial returns and the long run IR - V/ 
abnormal returns. (positive and 
significant 
coeffients are 
found in years 1 
and 2) 
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Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to summarise the findings from the research that is 
presented in the prior chapters. It also presents the final conclusion, which is to 
address the main research question: Can investors use the prospectus information 
to price the Initial public offerings (IPOs) in the short-run and the long run? This 
question leads to three empirical questions analysed in this study. The first part of 
the research is to examine whether issuers and sponsors (the investors) use the 
prospectus information to set the IPO offer price (the initial market price). The 
results and analysis of the first part of the research are presented in chapter 4. The 
second part of the research is presented in chapter 5, which is to observe whether 
the prospectus information offers an explanation to the IPO underpricing anomaly. 
The final part, which is presented in chapter 6, is to address the impact of the 
prospectus information on the IPO long run performance. 
The main focus of this study is to analyse the impact of the prospectus 
information on the IPO valuation in the short-run and their long run performance. 
The prospectus information is believed to be comprehensive information available 
to the market at the admission; therefore it is interesting to examine how the 
market participants value the IPOs given such limited information. 
Operationally, the prospectus information is classified into three different 
groups (fundamentals, ex-ante risk factors, and signals). Additionally, this 
research also controls for a number of research sample characteristics, such as the 
privatisations, that may play an important role and influence the results. 
The research is based on a sample of 161 IPOs in the UK main market that 
took place during the 1987-1997 period. An accounting valuation method is used 
in the IPO valuation analysis. This is a unique contribution of this study to the IPO 
research area, since, to the researcher's knowledge, no prior IPO valuation study 
uses the accounting valuation model. Very limited information regarding the IPO 
finns is available to the market prior to the admission, which makes the IPO 
valuation more difficult than the valuation for the seasoned stock. The offering 
prospectus is believed to be the most comprehensive information that is available 
at the admission. The advantage of using the accounting valuation model is its 
simplicity. It requires limited basic information included in the offering 
prospectus, while other valuation methods require additional information - such 
as projected cash flow - which may not be available to investors at the admission. 
A review of the major IPO literature that is reasonably associated to the 
research is provided as a background and reference to the empirical investigation, 
and is presented in chapter 2. The research design is explained in detail in chapter 
3. It presents the research models, which are the IPO valuation and the IPO 
performance models. The IPO valuation models analyse the impact of the 
prospectus information on the IPO offer price and the initial market price. The 
IPO performance models analyse the impact of the prospectus information on the 
IPO performance in the short run and long run. Chapter 3 also presents a list of the 
working hypotheses of the research. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section summarises the 
findings and conclusions of the IPO valuation analysis. It is followed by a section 
that reviews the findings and conclusions of the IPO long-run performance 
analysis. Then, the limitations of the research are discussed in the next section. 
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There are a number of possible future avenues of research as extended studies 
based on the findings of this research, which is presented in the following section. 
And finally, the thesis is concluded in the last section. 
7.1 IPO valuation analysis 
This IPO valuation analysis investigates the impact of prospectus 
information on the IPO offer price and the initial market price. The prospectus 
information is categorised as fundamental information (pro-forma book value of 
equity, forecasted earnings, and pro-forma dividend), ex-ante risk factors 
(leverage risk, capital availability risk, efficiency risk, capacity risk, and industry 
risk), signals (sponsor reputation, firm's age at the time of admission, and the 
percentage of ownership that is sold at the IPO) and various control variables, 
such as privatisation. The analysis is based on the accounting-based valuation 
model. The model hypothesises that the IPO price is an increasing function of the 
fundamentals and signals, but a decreasing function of the ex-ante risk factors. 
The results show that the fundamental accounting variables play a vital 
role in valuing IPOs. The IPO valuations, both at the offer price and the initial 
market price, heavily depend on those accounting numbers, which results in 
impressive explanatory power of the model. Particularly, pro-forma book value 
and forecasted earnings appear to be highly and significantly related to the offer 
price and the initial market price. However, in contrast to prior findings for non- 
IPO samples, the dividends seem to have an insignificant impact. The basic 
valuation model analysis also confirms the significantly different impact of 
negative earnings on the IPO valuations, which is consistent to the findings from 
prior non-IPO studies (Hayn, 1995; Rees, 1999). Overall, the fundamentals seem 
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to be a major factor in valuing the IPOs, as demonstrated by the high explanatory 
power of the basic valuation models (the adjusted R-square of 72.9% and of 
67.0%, respectively, for the offer priced and the initial market priced scaled by the 
pro-forma book value). 
The analysis on the full valuation model exhibits mixed results. Only two 
out of five ex-ante risk factors, efficiency risk and capacity risk, significantly 
influence the IPO valuations and confirm that the IPO prices are a decreasing 
function of the ex-ante risk factors. The results of such prospectus information are 
robust, as a number of sensitivity analysis exhibit unchanged results. 
Amongst the signals, only the impact of the percentage of equity sold at 
the IPO on the initial market price appears to be significant. The result implies 
that the IPOs, where a higher percentage of the equity is sold at the admission, are 
valued lower in the market. The market perceives the fraction of the firm's equity 
sold at the offering as a signal to the firm's true value. The higher the percentage 
of equity offered at the admission reflects the management's low expectations 
regarding the firms' future value. Meanwhile, there is no evidence to support the 
signalling role of the sponsor reputation and the firm's age. Therefore, this study 
cannot confirm the findings from previous studies that find a robust result of the 
signals, particularly the sponsor (underwriter) reputation (e. g., Clarkson et al, 
1992). However, this result is similar to results from a number of UK studies (e. g., 
Kcasey and Short, 1992). 
The results of the privatisation dummy show no empirical evidence of its 
impact on the IPO prices. Prior studies (e. g., Menyah et al, 1995) find that the 
PIPOs are priced differently, hence resulting in a significantly greater degree of 
underpricing. However, the IPO valuation analysis in this study fails to find 
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evidence to confirm such previous findings. The, collinearity problem between the 
privatisation dummy and the percentage of equity sold at the IPO is suspected to 
be the cause of lacking statistical significance in this case, as the univariate 
analysis records a correlation coefficient of 0.705 between the two variables. 
Despite mixed results of the influence of ex-ante risk factors and signals on 
the IPO valuation, the inclusion of those predictors to the valuation models 
increases the adjusted R-square for the offer price and the initial market price to a 
maximum of 74.8% and 69.5%, respectively, implying that to some extent the ex- 
ante risk factors and signals do explain parts of the variations in the IPO prices. A 
number of sensitivity analyses also show that the main results are robust and the 
model is not sensitive to the choice of measures (proxies) of the predictors, such 
as the use of forecasted earnings as a predictor, and the pro-forma book value as a 
model deflator. Additionally, the Wald test demonstrates that the IPO valuation 
models are statistically valid. 
7.2 IPO performance analysis 
The IPO performance analysis aims to address two IPO anomalies: the 
underpricing and the long run underperformance. Therefore, the analysis is 
divided into two empirical analyses. The first analysis examines the investors' 
returns on the closing of the first trading day. This is referring to as the 
underpricing phenomenon in the IPO market. The second analysis is to observe 
the investors returns at subsequent IPO listing anniversaries. 
The results of the first analysis show robust evidence of the underpricing 
in the research sample. Even when the sample is separated to the privatisation 
IPOs (PIPOs) and non-PIPOs sub-sample, the undepricing fact significantly exists 
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in both sub-samples. However, in contrast to previous UK studies on IPO long- 
run performance, this study does not find a support for the hypothesis of the 
underperformance of the IPOs based on the full sample. In contrast, the results 
suggest that, on average, the research sample outperforms the market during the 
first two years of their lives, which is shown by the positive and significant means 
of the 1-year buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs). In turn, the average of the 
BI-HARs in year 2 is also positive, but statistically insignificant, while in year 3, the 
average of the BHARs takes a negative value, although does not significantly 
different to zero. Further analysis is undertaken by, splitting the research sample 
into the PIPOs/non-PIPOs and the survivor/non-survivor sub-samples. The above 
results seems to have been driven by the privatisations, as analysis of the non- 
PIPOs sub- sample finds evidence of the long-run underperformance in year 3, as 
is also the case for the non-survivors. 
While the fundamental accounting variables are found to be substantially 
influencing the IPO prices, their impact is weaker in explaining the IPO 
performance. An interesting finding is the relationship of the pro-forma book 
value of equity to offer price ratio and the Initial returns (IRs), which demonstrates 
a significant result but in the opposite direction to that predicted. This study 
posits a positive coefficient of the proforma book value to offer ratio variable, 
however the result shows a negative sign, which implies that the IPOs that are 
priced more highly compared to their book value at the offering are likely to be 
valued even more highly on the first trading day. Another possible explanation 
offered in this study is that the issuers/sponsors priced the `good' IPOs at the 
premium to signal the firms' true value. If the market agrees with the 
issuers/sponsors, the market demand push-up the prices, which in turn results in 
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the higher IRs. This result is consistent with the later results of the impact of 
valuation residuals on the IRs. However, the impact of the pro-forma book value 
to offer price ratio disappears for the longer period. 
While weak evidence is found on the relationship between the forecasted 
earnings and the IPO short run performance (IRs), its impact on the IPO 1 year 
performance (BHARI y) is significant. This is understandable, since the forecasted 
earnings figures disclosed in the prospectus is a 1-year forecast. Therefore, the 
figures is relatively relevant in pricing the IPOs after 1 year listed. The impact of 
the forecasted earnings disappears over the longer periods, since the actual 
earnings figures are available to the market in the subsequent years. 
The impact of the ex-ante risk factors on the IPO short run performance 
generate little evidence to support the working hypotheses; only Industry risk is 
significantly related to the IRs. However, the Industry risk coefficient is of the 
opposite sign to that predicted, which implies the IPOs in riskier industries 
experience lower IRs. Nevertheless, the impact of the ex-ante risk factors becomes 
more important in the long run, particularly over the 3-year period after the 
offering. The efficiency risk is the only ex-ante risk factor, which shows 
consistent results throughout the periods. The leverage risk also appears to be 
significantly related to BHAR3y. However, the coefficients of the two variables 
take the opposite signs to those hypothesised. This means that the riskier IPOs 
perform worse in the long run. This suggests that the market perceives the ex-ante 
risk proxies as firm performance measures, rather than as risk measures. The 
results of the other ex-ante risk factors are mixed. While the Capital availability 
risk appears to have no impact to the IPO performance, the impacts of Capacity 
risk and Industry risk become significant in year 3. 
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The signal group exhibits mixed results. In the short run, no evidence is 
found to support the expectation of a negative association between the signals and 
IRs. However, the analysis shows more robust results in the long run. Both the 
Sponsor reputation and the Percentage of equity sold at the IPO are consistently 
and significantly related to IPO long run performance throughout different 
periods. To the researcher's knowledge, this study is among the first UK studies to 
document evidence of an association between the Sponsor reputation and the 
percentage of equity sold at the admission and the IPO long run performance. 
Weak evidence is found on the relationship between the firm's age and the IPO 
performance. 
The privatisation variable shows robust results in explaining the IPO 
performance. The evidence supports the claim that the PIPOs tend to be more 
underpriced (have greater IRs on day 1) but have better performance in the long 
run up to the 3-year period. Hence, it corroborates the findings from prior UK 
studies on the privatization IPOs (e. g., Menyah et al., 1995; Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 1997) 
Another interesting finding is demonstrated on the relationship between 
the IR and the BHARs. Prior studies find a negative relationship (e. g., Levis, 
1993), however the results in this study suggests differently. The positive IR- 
BHARs relationship continues up to year 2, and then loses the significance in year 
3. The results imply that the overvalued IPOs at the offering are valued higher in 
the market from day 1 up to at least their second listing anniversary. Two possible 
explanations have been discussed in the IPO long run performance analysis. The 
first explanation is down to the market momentum. In the IR analysis, it is found 
that the IPOs that are priced higher relatively to their fundamentals (greater 
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valuation residuals) appear to be valued higher in the market. This phenomenon is 
explained by the market momentum for such IPOs. The results in the long run 
analysis shows that such IPOs perform significantly better up to their 2°a 
anniversary, suggesting the momentum continues up to, at least, year 2. The 
second explanation is related to the signaling theory. In conjunction to the IR 
analysis, it is suggested that `good' IPOs are priced at a premium at the offering as 
a signal to the firms' true value. When the market concurs with the signal, it 
pushes up the demand for `good' IPOs that results in higher IPOs returns. Since 
such IPOs are `good' firms, it is expected they perform better in the long run. 
Therefore, the positive JR-BHARs relationship is explained. 
All IPO performance models are statistically valid. The tests of the joint 
restriction of the predictors show mixed results. The fundamentals have a 
significant impact only in year 1, the signals significantly predict the IPO long run 
performance for year 2 and 3, while the joint restrictions of the ex-ante risk factors 
are consistently significant across the different models and periods. The 
explanatory power of the models increases when control variables are introduced 
into the model. The sensitivity analyses demonstrate that the main results are 
generally robust. 
7.3 Research limitations 
The main source of data for this research is the offering prospectus. 
Therefore, the accomplishment of the research depends on the ability to obtain the 
prospectus. With limited financial resources, the researcher manages to attain 180 
IPO prospectuses during the 1987-1997 periods. Moreover, to analyse the 
prospectus manually is reasonably time consuming. Some missing data and 
deletion of extreme cases reduce the sample to 161 valid cases. For an empirical 
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study in the Finance area, the final sample is possibly small, which may encounter 
a few econometric/statistical problems in producing better results, when further 
analysis is needed. In particular, this study cannot pursue the sensitivity analysis 
for the non-survivor sub-sample, since only 17 IPOs of the research sample are 
found to be Lion-survivors IPO. However, the research sample sufficiently 
represents the population, as there are only 492 appropriate IPOs in the UK main 
market during the research period. Therefore, the research sample is 
approximately 32.7 % of the population. Moreover, a comprehensive analysis of 
the research sample has been undertaken and the results show that the sample is 
representative of the population of IPOs during the sample period. 
As presented in the thesis, there is limited information, which is 
consistently disclosed in the prospectuses, such as the risk factors. However, a 
robustness check shows that the main results are robust. 
Similar to the prior studies examining the IPO long-run performance, the 
measures of IPO abnormal returns may be sensitive to the benchmarks employed. 
Since most IPOs in the research sample are small firms, it is sensible to use the 
small companies market index, as employed in this study. Moreover, Espenlaub et 
al. (2000) re-examine the UK IPO long-run performance using 5 different 
benchmarks, yet they cannot conclude which one is the best benchmark. 
Therefore, it could be said that using different benchmarks in calculating the IPO 
long run abnormal returns does not certify the free-bias results. Finally, as applied 
by other studies (e. g., Gleason and Lee, 2002), the risk element in calculating the 
long run returns is controlled by including firm size variable in the right hand side 
of the IPO long run performance models. 
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Finally, Since the research sample is drawn from the main market only, the results 
could not be generalized for other UK markets. 
7.4 Possible future research 
A number of interesting findings in the two empirical sections of this study 
lead to several opportunities for future research. This study provides evidence of 
the association between the prospectus information and the IPO valuation. It also 
presents evidence on the undepricing anomaly to the research sample. Based on 
the economic law of supply and demand, the underpricing could be seen as the 
results of the offering excess demand. Prior studies also confirm that the 
oversubscribed IPOs tend to produce higher initial returns. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to analyse whether the prospectus information has the ability to predict 
the subscription of IPOs. 
This study also demonstrates that the performances of IPOs, which survive 
to their third listing anniversary, are significantly different to the non-survivors. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to observe whether the prospectus information 
can be used to predict the company failures. 
This study demonstrates the strong impact of the prospectus forecasted 
earnings on the IPO valuation and the buy and hold abnormal returns in year 1. 
However, it loses the significance in the following years, as the actual earnings 
figures are already available in the market at that time. Prior studies using non- 
IPO data provide evidence of the influence of the earnings forecast errors to the 
stock returns. Therefore, a study concerning the effect of the prospectus earnings 
forecast errors on the IPO valuation and performance in the long run could be a 
worthwhile area of research. 
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Concluding remarks 
This thesis consists of two main parts. The first part examines the 
usefulness of the prospectus information to the IPO offer price as well as the 
initial market price. The results show that the prospectus information is useful in 
the pricing process. In particular, the `future' fundamental information performs 
an important role in the IPO pricing. Moreover, such information explains almost 
75% of the variation in the IPO prices. Furthermore, while the results somewhat 
mixed, this study also demonstrates some impact of the ex-ante risk factors and 
signals, which are also parts of the prospectus information, on the IPO prices. 
The second part of the empirical analysis investigates whether the 
prospectus information still have significant impacts on the long-run IPO 
performance. The evidence shows mixed results. As expected, the `future' 
fundamental information is found to be related to the IPO 1 year performance and 
becomes irrelevant in the longer period. On the other hand, the ex-ante risk factors 
do not show any significant impact on the first two years of the IPOs, but becomes 
significant in year 3. Meanwhile, the results of signals are more consistent. 
Confirming prior studies, this part of the study also proves the distinction of the 
pricing of the PIPOs. They are significantly underpriced on the first trading day, 
but perform far better in the long run. 
This thesis offers a number of contributions to the research area. The first 
one is to give empirical evidence of the robustness of the accounting-based 
valuation model. This model is widely used in the non-IPO literature. This study 
demonstrates that it works well in the case of IPO as well. Secondly, to some 
extent, the prospectus information can be used to price the IPOs. Some 
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information is relevant for predicting the short-run prices; others are more 
appropriate for longer period returns. 
While many IPO studies present cross-sectional analysis of the IPO 
underpricing, very few have been done for the IPO long run performance. 
Therefore, this study provides a new explanation of the factors affecting the IPO 
long run performance. Lastly, this thesis provides additional evidence of the 
peculiarity of the pricing of the privatisation IPOs' pricing. 
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